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Abstract and Lay Summary of Thesis 
 
This thesis analyses the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) efforts to create and maintain 
modern sound technology infrastructures to deliver culture to its citizens. Analyses of GDR 
heavy and hi-tech industries and the state’s cultural policies have been key to understanding 
how state socialism functioned and how it interacted with the world beyond its borders. 
However, while the intersection of the technological and cultural spheres was no less integral 
to state socialism, it has been less well served in academic discourse. Tracking the development 
and application of sound technology in the GDR from the immediate post-war period to the 
state’s eventual demise uncovers revealing narratives of perpetual change across the GDR’s 
nationalised broadcasting and recording industries, provoked by unique political, economic 
and technological convergences. 
 
The technological infrastructures that supported cultural media in the GDR were 
initially restored from the remnants of pre-war structures, but technological developments in 
the West brought rapid transformation.The mid- to late-1950s were particularly convulsive as 
the GDR weathered the loss of its main radio broadcasting centre to Western encirclement and 
the gramophone record industry collapsed due to the arrival of the vinyl record. The 
infrastructures that emerged from this period synthesised established commercial and sound 
technology practices with new ideological priorities, tempered by material and economic 
limitations. These new infrastructures had substantial success over their lifetimes, but were 
also vulnerable to the deficiencies of the wider GDR economy. Interactions between the GDR 
and both Eastern Bloc and Western sound industries were thus critical to the survival of the 
GDR’s native industries. GDR institutions consistently attempted to negotiate and improve 
their own capabilities while leveraging their strengths to develop commercial relationships that 
could compensate for areas of comparative weakness. A period of relative technological 
stability from the 1960s to the late 1970s led into another period of technological upheaval as 
microelectronics and digital technologies were integrated into sound technologies. A long-term 
project to develop digital sound technology confirms many criticisms of the GDR’s straitened 
electronics industry, but also indicates how the GDR had workable plans to maintain its sound 
infrastructures into the next century.  
 
 iii 
This thesis uses representative case studies taken from some of the most tumultuous 
periods of the GDR’s existence to demonstrate how ideology and technology became entwined 
in the GDR’s sound infrastructures. It relies on the records and writings of sound technicians 
and audio institution administrators to relay how well-understood forces in the GDR’s history 
materially impacted diverse areas of sound technology development and implementation. It 
also demonstrates how the continuous renewal and re-conceiving of sound-related practices, 
facilities and technologies in the GDR mingled with the state’s economic situation, Cold War 
political factors and socialist ideologies concerning culture and technology to produce unique 
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Introduction: Noisy Archives, Quiet Narratives  
 
This thesis has two broad aims: to offer insight on several areas of the GDR’s unique audio 
infrastructures based on primary sources and, by so doing, make a case for the centrality of 
technical histories to larger narratives. This research was prompted by an interest in discovering 
how recording technologies and music recording studios in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) developed in the context of the Cold War. These two investigative lenses - the general 
area of music recording and the particular political, social and geographic context of the GDR 
- were the guiding lines of pursuit that led an initially narrow-focussed investigation to broaden 
and engage with several unanticipated but fecund areas of research. Consequently, this study 
uses five case studies as a basis for engaging with broad patterns that characterised the 
development of audio technology and infrastructure in the GDR. Each of the case studies 
offered is compelling in regards to its interactions between technology and wider dynamics 
within the GDR. The political and strategic significance of a construction like Funkhaus Berlin 
makes this very clear from the beginning and the following chapters detail repeated 
intersections between diverse audio technologies and wider GDR and global narratives. Initial 
assumptions regarding a broad Soviet technological influence on GDR technology and practice 
were quickly dispelled and a surfeit of research material pertaining to GDR recording and 
broadcasting led towards much more compelling and byzantine narratives. These narratives 
deliver several new perspectives on the role of cultural technologies within the GDR’s larger 
history and make the case for cultural technologies as useful lines of enquiry in political and 
social histories.  
 
A cursory examination of audio technology in the GDR reveals that the state’s lifetime 
aligns in interesting ways with several major technological changes and shifts in audio 
technology paradigms. These technological timeframes could be used as the basis for an 
insightful analysis of most developed economies, but the utilisation of technology and culture 
as oppositional constructs in the broad-fronted Cold War heightened the stakes for sound 
technology developments and utilisations in the GDR considerably. This intersection of culture 
and technology also helps make explicit the human element; this is not simply a narrative of 
technological components and procedures – but of a people and their society and how they 
used audio technologies to construct their lives. This thesis attempts to enact its recognition of 
this by placing technological and infrastructural developments within broader historical 
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narratives and by making a case for the utility of cultural technologies as a point of analysis in 
wider political narratives. 
 
The intersection of cultural and technological activities carries a specific significance 
within the context of the GDR; state socialism placed notable emphasis on the role of both in 
the development of its new society. New media distribution technologies and cheaply-produced 
“wonder” materials offered a potential basis for creating a shared cultural and economic 
prosperity ideologically distant from historical modes of wealth-generation. During the GDR’s 
existence, the technological areas emphasised by central government policies varied over time 
and ranged from plastics and other petrochemicals to consumer electronics and information 
technologies.1 Policies in each of these broad areas impacted on how sound technologies were 
introduced and developed in the GDR. Alongside the GDR’s generalised faith in a 
technological modernism, Germany’s high-art cultural heritage supplied a reassuring historical 
continuity that could bypass to some extent the angst of the Third Reich.2 As well as providing 
a sense of cultural stability, this cultural heritage was mobilised for other purposes. Elite 
classical music performance ensembles within the boundaries of the GDR became essential to 
the domestic recording industry due to their international reputations and GDR music 
infrastructures - as will be shown - were developed in ways to efficiently exploit this. 
 
Considering the shared emphasis on technological transformation and cultural 
aspiration in GDR society, comparatively little investigation has been carried out on the 
overlapping of these realms – namely GDR cultural sound technologies and infrastructures - 
and how these contributed to or were influenced by the broader GDR project. The GDR 
constructed diverse technical infrastructures to deliver culture to its citizens. The maintenance 
of the technical and functional parity of these infrastructures alongside developing international 
standards became important for managing both internal and external perceptions of the GDR’s 
ability to function as a modern technological state. These infrastructures underwent several 
 
1 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus : Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007); Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in 
East Germany 1945-1990, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore; London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
2 Elizabeth Janik, Recomposing German Music : Politics and Tradition in Cold War Berlin (Leiden: Brill, 
2005); Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the 
German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989, Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); David Monod, Settling Scores : German Music, Denazification, 
and the Americans, 1945-1953 (Chapel Hill, N.C. ; London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
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cycles of major technological renewal during the GDR period. This creates several 
opportunities for analysing the capacity of GDR institutions reliant on sound technologies to 
develop or adopt new technical solutions and practices during various stages of their own 
progression under state socialism. These technological renewals often align in revealing ways 
with broader GDR political, industrial and economic contexts. At the centre of many of these 
infrastructures are various media formats often used as quantitative and qualitative bases for 
comparison throughout this thesis. This thesis helps to pluralise formation narratives of cultural 
technologies and media and actively seeks out distinguishing GDR features in these areas, but 
the various exchanges enabled by compatible media formats even across national and 
ideological borders were of profound significance to GDR institutions and its citizens. This 
cultural significance is part of the justification for much of the analysis in this work while the 
shared compatibility of various media formats used in the GDR and across the world helps 
validate their use as sources of interpretation.  
 
In the context of the recording industry, the GDR’s lifetime almost exactly aligns with 
the introduction, peak and decline of the vinyl record as the dominant global music format. 
This thesis will discuss vinyl record production figures in the GDR in Chapter 2 as it offers a 
convenient material analogy for a complicated narrative of success and failure in cultural mass 
production over four decades. In electronics, the GDR’s bridging of the transitional era of 
valve- to transistor-based electronics during the 1960s was one of its most important 
technological successes and helped to fuel productive research and development in audio and 
information technology fields. The GDR’s attempts to maintain pace with the rapid 
progressions of digital technology during the 1980s were seized on by its audio institutions as 
another opportunity to revitalise domestic audio equipment, but the limitations of the broader 
GDR electronics industry constrained progressive research efforts in audio technology areas. 
The discussion in Chapter 5 of a research and development project in the latter days of the 
GDR will bring the impact of these constraints into sharp relief. These examples also combine 
to elucidate conflicting impulses within the GDR. While the GDR political and economic 
project consistently strived towards the creation of a closed system largely independent of 
Western influence, cultural technologies were consistent enablers of a degree of pluralism 
within this. In spite of the regular characterisation of Western cultural imports as an ideological 
threat and intermittent efforts to stem their influx, the GDR’s own audio infrastructures - 
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developing in tandem with Western-led technological paradigms - always remained compatible 
with Western output and served as a conduit for the influx of Western media and culture.  
 
As is habitual in GDR studies, West Germany frequently serves as an important control 
and point of comparison for a period during which both German states were attempting to 
rebuild and reconceptualise their societies and industries. This thesis also makes repeated and 
extensive comparisons between situations and technologies in the GDR with contrasting or 
coincident examples in other – mostly Western – contexts. Such contextualisation is essential 
to deciphering the original research contained within this thesis and can at times allow some 
degree of assessment of the relative success of various GDR efforts. The simplistic labelling 
of technological or other projects as “successes” or “failures” is problematic both in historical 
and contemporary circumstances, but such estimations are additionally fraught in the case of 
the GDR given the acrimonious circumstances of its existence. This thesis offers a collection 
of several narratives across a range of cultural technological endeavours that problematise to 
varying degrees persistent characterisations of the GDR as technologically deficient. The case 
studies of this research also offer opportunities for thinking about technology itself - Paul 
Edwards has emphasised how deterministic views of technological narratives disappear in 
micro-histories and this work should be observed to offer several confirmations of that.3  
 
The contrasting fortunes of the GDR’s record industry during the 1950s and the 1970s 
- discussed in Chapter 2 - offer a pertinent example of the challenges in making sweeping 
qualitative assessments. Difficulties introducing vinyl record production to the GDR during the 
late-1950s were augmented by a dysfunctional administrative system following the 
reorganisation of East German industry and the GDR’s national record industry during this 
period suffered in comparison with the activities and output of the major West German record 
companies. However, such direct comparisons elide recognition of the very different paths the 
reconstruction of sound technology infrastructures took in West Germany and the GDR. East 
Germany initially had possession of critical pre-war broadcasting infrastructure in Berlin, until 
this was acrimoniously disentangled from its grip during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
However, during the same period, practically all of Germany’s pre-war record industry 
decamped to West Germany. This flight of the pre-war German record industry from East 
 
3 Paul Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems’, in Modernity and Technology (Cambridge; London: MIT Press, 2003), 10. 
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German territories and the degree to which the GDR created an entirely new record industry 
infrastructure within a highly fluid administrative and commercial context must thus form part 
of any assessment. Even still, the purpose of the comparative assessments in this thesis are not 
to essentialise circumstances in the GDR but to tease out new insights into an important period. 
Further examples of problematising narratives are attempts by GDR research institutions to 
push the envelope of sound reinforcement approaches and sound distribution systems during 
the late-1970s and 1980s. The GDR had notable successes in these areas - particularly in the 
service of new forms of performance venue discussed in Chapter 4 - and the resultant systems 
and technologies made largely unrecognised contributions to sound reinforcement in Europe 
and beyond both during and after the GDR-period.  
 
Although the GDR encountered many difficulties across diverse areas of technology 
and industry, it consistently pursued research and development activities in audio technology 
areas and maintained a capacity to innovate that resulted in unique technologies, even as its 
economic and industrial capabilities faltered. The degree to which GDR institutions could 
handle the technological cycles that brought new professional and consumer formats and 
disruptive changes in practice depended on the period, the characteristics of the particular 
technology and the latitude given to technical experts and administrators to negotiate restrictive 
circumstances. The GDR maintained independent research processes, but also adopted many 
internationally-developed technologies and consensus formats. The adoption of consensus 
technologies was not a wholly passive process; the introduction of FM broadcasting in the 
1950s had major strategic implications for GDR broadcasting and became an extension of 
existing Cold War electronic fronts. Later, less contentious technologies were regularly 
adapted or reconceived by GDR technicians and engineers to better meet their own 
circumstances and requirements. The GDR also consistently engaged with the foreign 
technology developers and suppliers. International collaborations were consistently critical to 
the progression of the GDR’s audio infrastructures; diverse exchanges of material, technology 
and knowledge between GDR audio institutions and both Eastern and Western European 
commercial and academic collaborators were a lesser or greater feature of nearly every period 
and major development. Technological developments and foreign collaboration had a 
particularly profound shaping influence on the GDR’s record industry. Administrators of the 
GDR’s state record company financed improvements to the domestic record manufacturing 
and recording infrastructure over a period of decades by adapting the company to service 
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international record licensing deals, a source of income greatly enabled by post-war 
improvements made in the US to Germany’s magnetic tape recording innovations. The 
profound influence of this bi-directional technological exchange remains only partially 
investigated, but is raised within this thesis. 
 
Even aside from areas of cultural and technological intersection, considerable scope for 
traditional historical investigation still remains in relation to many of the GDR’s media and 
music institutions and how these organisations negotiated material and technical challenges in 
the political and economic contexts of post-war Europe and industrial reorganisation in the 
GDR. This study attempts to contribute to both of these areas by focussing on original research 
that articulates the records and observations of technicians and administrators directly involved 
with sound technology institutions. This thesis is informed by the disciplines of acoustic 
science, sound studies, sociology and infrastructure studies in the pursuit of a holistic analysis 
of the themes raised by the research material, without being rigidly situated within the 
techniques and procedures. The overall intention is to draw out and discuss illuminating 
confluences of pre-war technological structures, technical development processes and political 
and economic factors, that together combined to shape unique technological forms and 
infrastructures in the GDR.  
 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the GDR’s audio institutions successfully 
assimilated most of the major audio technologies unveiled during its existence on a relatively 
regularised schedule and that they had active and viable technical procurement and 
advancement plans that extended well beyond the unanticipated fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Together, the case studies of this thesis seek to interrogate how GDR audio institutions 
combined straight-forward technical adoption paths with bespoke adaptation and independent 
development processes to sustain sound technology infrastructures in ways that contribute 
some new perspectives on wider GDR industry. These case studies also suggest that the GDR 
was able to innovate in myriad successful ways to adapt international technologies and 
conceptual developments to its own particular ideological and material circumstances. These 
findings are likely to have application for those engaging with the GDR context across  various 
fields of enquiry, but it is hoped that the scope of the technological sample analysed in this 
work mean it will have utility for a wider readership interested in the overlapping of 




0.1  Archival and Primary Sources 
 
The findings of these thesis are predominantly based on primary sources gathered from two 
research institutions during a six month DAAD-funded research trip to Berlin in 2015: the 
Deutches Runfunk Archiv (DRA) and the Bundesarchiv at Lichterfelde. These two institutions 
provided large quantities of material on two separate but interrelated areas of sound 
infrastructure in the GDR: the national radio broadcaster Rundfunk DDR and the national 
record company Deutsche Schallplatten. The greatest single influence on the direction of this 
thesis was the holdings at the DRA on the technical infrastructure and activities of Rundfunk 
DDR. These largely took the form of documents from Deutsche Post’s technical research and 
development organisation, the Rundfunk und Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt (RFZ), which 
was closely involved with Rundfunk DDR. These organisations contributed to the technical 
development of television broadcasting in the GDR, but the holdings at the DRA and, as a 
consequence, this thesis, focus predominantly on music recording, radio broadcasting 
technology and music performance acoustics. The material at the DRA is extensive, extremely 
diverse and unfortunately not-yet systematically organised; I am grateful to Dr. Jörg-Uwe 
Fischer of the DRA for the access I was afforded to this material despite this situation. The 
DRA material consists primarily of technical reports covering a broad spectrum of topics across 
nearly the whole GDR period. These sources prompted investigation of Rundfunk DDR’s 
broadcast infrastructure, acoustics for recording spaces, the development and adoption of 
standardised and bespoke audio recording and playback formats, the introduction of 
transistorised mixing desks, the introduction of digitised mixing desks and the RFZ’s belated 
and escalating involvement with sound reinforcement in the GDR. Apart from a divergence 
into the narrative of Deutsche Schallplatten, prompted by Bundesarchiv holdings on that 
organisation, these topics provide the backbone of this thesis. Moulding a wealth of largely 
untouched primary material into a coherent direction was among the major obstacles in 
constructing this thesis. The DRA also supplied one of the most useful organising sources for 
overcoming this and for resolving the primary research material alongside an instructive pre-
established narrative. This source is Werner Stankoweit’s 1967 Studiotechnik Rundfunk, a 
technical history that emerged from an internal Rundfunk DDR directive in 1966 to author a 
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collective institutional history.4 Although its initial value was its provision of a reference 
chronology for Rundfunk DDR’s technical infrastructure, its ostensibly technical focus 
nonetheless deviates into more diverse areas and it provided a useful preliminary route into 
Rundfunk DDR’s institutional memory and methods of self-conception. Stankoweit’s history 
is undoubtedly a product of a specific ideological moment and this, in itself, was of immense 
value for identifying key areas of technological and political focus worth investigating in this 
thesis. Contemporary GDR print media offered a similar form of insight and corroboration. 
 
The holdings on Deutsche Schallplatten at the Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde are relatively 
ordered and cover the full span of the GDR-period, along with a smattering of documents that 
cover the company’s activities before its nationalisation in 1953. The greatest contribution of 
the holdings towards constructing a solid narrative are the near-complete annual reports. These 
altered in form and title over time, but generally they became increasingly codified and 
detailed, supplying increasingly extensive figures across diverse categories of production, 
record distribution, genre distribution, licensing, income, as well as employment figures and 
employee social programmes. Approaching these reports with little expectation or prejudice 
was rewarded by the steady emergence of clear and impactful narratives in the record 
company’s history across several highly integrated areas of the company’s business model. 
While my reading and annotation of these documents heavily prioritised technical discussions, 
pervasive narratives relating to musical genre distribution and international licensing readily 
emerged despite this emphasis. Only some of these numerous strands have been addressed in 
the final analysis and the Bundesarchiv’s holdings on Deutsche Schallplatten require extensive 
further attention.  
 
Although the trend towards more expansive reports provides a boon for the analysis of 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s later periods, irregular alterations in the reports year-on-year raise 
occasional problems. The terms and categories used to record different areas of production 
sometimes become more ambiguous and thus difficult to compare directly with other years; 
occasionally regular categories are absent in one report before returning the following year. 
The largest deviation of this type to impact this thesis is a shortage of unambiguous vinyl record 
production figures for the years 1960 to 1970. The most revealing changes in record production 
 
4Werner Stankoweit, ‘Studiotechnik Rundfunk: Zusammenfassung der Unterlagen über die Entwicklung der 
Technik des Rundfunks bis 1967, Band I’ (Rundfunk DDR, 1967), Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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in the GDR occur on either side of this date range, but nonetheless this creates an obstacle to 
interpreting this linking period. In general, the figures used in this thesis as a basis for 
comparisons across years and decades may not always be fully equivalent, although every 
effort has been made to use the most unambiguous reports and most readily comparable 
categories. For example, reported income figures from record sales have, for the most part, 
been disregarded in the compiling of this analysis and commentary on the expansion and 
decline of Deutsche Schallplatten activities relies much more upon the reported production 
figures for a variety of record formats. Some ambiguity remains during some periods due to 
the pressing of records for Deutsche Schallplatten under contract abroad, but supplementary 
sources of company correspondence at the Bundesarchiv allow the relative proportion of 
domestic and production to be broadly determined and improving reporting practices makes 
this less of a concern for later periods. Contemporary correspondences, often between Deutsche 
Schallplatten and organs of central government, usually the Ministry for Culture, had additional 
value. Although these often preserve only one side of a conversation, they also provided 
important signposts towards some of the major issues the record company faced, corroborating 
themes suggested by production figures and filling gaps of knowledge and interpretation. They 
also provide some degree of insight into the character of the company’s leadership and the 
rhetoric and tactics used in the midst of substantial upheaval during the company’s insecure 
early period.  
 
Although this thesis does not attempt to construct a history of individual contributions, 
the prominence of some names within the primary sources invites preliminary attention. The 
most consistent of these is the technician and acoustician Gerhard Steinke, who figures to a 
greater or lesser extent in four of the five chapters of this thesis. Steinke’s involvement with 
Rundfunk DDR began as a radio engineer in Dresden and he quickly assumed a leadership role 
in the development of audio technology and recording practice in the GDR when he moved to 
the broadcaster’s Berlin headquarters in the early 1950s. Several areas of Steinke’s 
involvement with audio in the GDR and his extensive technical writings are related within the 
following chapters, but his post-Wende activities are worth noting here. Steinke has been one 
of the most consistent advocates of the reassessment of GDR sound technology and acoustics 
and remains active in this role.5 He has also been critical of the underutilisation of the surviving 
 
5 Gerhard Steinke, ‘Stereo-Ambiofonie und Delta-Stereofonie - zweit Mittel zur Optimierung, denn: Der Raum 
ist das Kleid der Musik’, in Leben für den guten Ton: Kolloquium anlässlich des 90. Geburtstags von Gerhard 
Steinke (VDT Seminar, Berlin: Verband Deutscher Tonmeister, 2012); Ulrich Gutmair, ‘Meet Funkhaus’s 
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resources of Rundfunk DDR’s redundant infrastructure - particularly its highly-specialised 
recording spaces - and with Gisela Herzog published the most comprehensive technical 
description of the GDR’s primary radio broadcasting facility, Funkhaus Berlin. This work, Der 
Raum ist das Kleid der Musik, served as an endlessly useful reference point for Rundfunk DDR 
chronologies but also helped confirm links between recording and performance acoustic design 
and sound reinforcement designs, which were closely interconnected in the GDR.6 The only 
other published work cited in this thesis to demonstrates a similar level of connection to its 
subject is Wolfgang Ahnert and Frank Steffen’s, Sound Reinforcement Engineering.7  
Translated into several languages, both Ahnert and Steffen were closely involved with events 
depicted in the latter chapters of this thesis and their technical commentary on the Delta 
Stereophony System and associated developments was an important supplement to 
contemporary sources stored at the DRA. The director of Deutsche Schallplatten, Harri 
Költzsch, also warrants introduction. His contributions to the record company’s survival and 
later expansion become clear both through his correspondences during contentious periods and 
the proactive strategies adopted by the company during his lengthy tenure. Other recurring 
names within the reports of the RFZ are occasionally noted within the thesis for their 
significance within certain narratives and, in particular, their contributions to often 
unrecognised GDR-technology narratives that extend beyond the lifetime of the state itself. 
 
The historical period discussed in this thesis is such that many participants in the events 
described are still active and the original research plan proposed integrating interviews 
alongside primary documentary research. The volume and quality of primary material 
uncovered in the primary phase of this project made the pursuit of this avenue impossible, but 
further investigations should prioritise engagement with these former GDR audio workers. 
Despite the limitations placed on this work by the absence of reflective commentary from these 
participants, this thesis does attempt to give some voice to technicians, administrators and other 
workers of GDR audio institutions through its reliance on the internal documentation and 
communications that they themselves wrote. The value of this documentation was central to 
the construction of this thesis, but presented its own challenges. Predominantly taking the form 
 
Former Head of Sound Technology’, Red Bull Music Academy Daily, 10 September 2018, 
http://daily.redbullmusicacademy.com/2018/09/gerhard-steinke-funkhaus-berlin-sound-technology. 
6 Steinke, ‘Stereo-Ambiofonie und Delta-Stereofonie - zweit Mittel zur Optimierung, denn: Der Raum ist das 
Kleid der Musik’. 
7 Wolfgang Ahnert and Frank Steffen, Sound Reinforcement Engineering : Fundamentals and Practice 
(London: Spon, 1999). 
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of technical reports, this documentation was primarily intended for an internal specialised 
audience and the language and subject of these reports rarely strayed into overtly political or 
ideological territory. Thus, informative interactions between technological processes and 
broader GDR narratives are wrought from the interpretation of the treatment of equipment, 
development of practice and funding distribution over extended periods. Articulating a 
coherent narrative from fragmentary technical and commercial reports while coming from an 
outside perspective was difficult, but the result offers new insights into how comparatively 
well-understood forces in the GDR interacted with diverse and less-discussed areas of sound 
technology development and implementation.  
 
 
0.2  Methodology  
 
Framing this thesis productively in the light of archival discoveries required several stages of 
thematic realignment and methodological renewal. Early-stage research proposals envisaged 
uncovering documentation and conducting interviews pertaining to classical and popular music 
recording studios in the GDR to develop a picture of recording practice there across a wide 
range of musical forms and to then contrast this with equipment lists and reported session 
etiquette from elsewhere. These original intentions recognised to some extent that most 
focussed writing on recording and studios has usually been centred on specific bands or 
performance ensembles, notable sessions or recordings or recording studios that have strong 
associations with notable recordings, performers or scenes.  Thus an approach that would look 
at such practices for an entire record company or country for a defined period would potentially 
be unique to some degree. Even if this direction had been feasible, it is probable that its 
execution would have been hampered by a lack of counterbalancing investigations in other 
national contexts that could then form a solid basis for informative comparison. In any case, 
the available research materials did not provide sufficient minutiae for such a study and from 
an early stage my inquiries into GDR broadcasting and recording industry primary sources 
began to coalesce around emerging questions relating to much more fundamental and broader 
networks of distribution around technologies, hardware and other physical infrastructure 
related to recorded sound and its dissemination. These technologies  range in complexity from 
early digital sound hardware to deceptively inelaborate rooms designed to capture or enhance 
musical performance. While the implicit motivator of this thesis is an interest in the cultural 
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technologies used by the GDR and a belief that this can tell us something useful about that 
complicated state and its people, this infrastructural turn – motivated by the research material 
– required engaging with a broadening set of literature and an interdisciplinary meshing of 
methodologies. This resulted in a somewhat bespoke amalgamation of qualitative 
methodologies centred on archival research but taking in discourse and media analysis along 
with intermittent incursions into ethnography and architectural criticism. This diversity of 
approaches was a response to the diversity of subjects and themes uncovered and is offered as 
an initial attempt to divulge and interpret new findings and information. 
 
While this thesis is concerned with diverse forms of sound technologies, it makes only 
occasional forays into direct discussions of sound or audio. Initially, there was more of a focus 
on this area. The earliest paper to emerge from this research project focussed on the singer Nina 
Hagen. Hagen’s early career uniquely straddled mainstream success in the very separate GDR 
and West German commercial contexts.8 Initially coming to note as a schlager singer in the 
mid-1970s, she left the GDR and was exposed to punk music while staying in London. She 
amalgamated that influence with her own inimitable vocal abilities in a new group formed 
around her in West Berlin, Nina Hagen Band. In an attempt to discern cultural or political 
subtexts the paper used a comparative analysis of the treatment of voice and space in Hagen’s 
solo and group recordings for the GDR Amiga label and the two albums she made with Nina 
Hagen Band for CBS. The wide stylistic gap between these two segments of Hagen’s career 
was just one obstacle to a research direction fraught with interpretative challenges. The 
Deutsche Schallplatten recording catalogue is extensive and extant in various forms and 
Rundfunk DDR recordings also survive in various media, but the Nina Hagen paper flagged 
the hazards involved in such an approach, even aside from the difficulties in collating or 
defining a representative sample. The availability of extensive archival documentation 
discussing sound technology in various GDR institutional circumstances suggested that an 
analysis of the discourse related to sound and audio concerns and the material forms that 
developed around these would prove more fruitful.  While I believe the results presented below 
bear out the validity of this change in direction, it is one of the factors that positions this thesis 
in its liminal position between several fields of study. There are vulnerabilities in this approach 
- sections of this thesis contain discussions and critiques of sounds and performances to which 
 
8 Cormac Ó Callanáin, ‘Singing Across the Wall: The Voices of Nina Hagen’ (German Studies Association 
conference, Kansas City, 2014). 
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I had only indirect access. In the interest of viability I relied and focussed on the discourses 
that survive around some of the sounds and performances that were produced in the GDR and 
these provided me with echoes of sufficient resolution to make some valuable findings about 
those sounds and the people that surrounded them.  
 
For the reasons outlined above, this thesis predominantly contains detailed technical 
and historical discussions of several technologies and infrastructural systems that have primary 
or significant cultural applications. Nevertheless, the principal area of interest driving this 
research is not so much these things in themselves but the people and society that created and 
used them as part of cultural processes involving the recording and transmission of musical 
performances. Current discussions on information’s continuing trend towards near-ethereality 
have somewhat disrupted rigid conceptions of “technology” as something inescapably material 
- physical tools of varying degrees of complexity for accomplishing a specific or broad range 
of tasks. However, an assumption can remain that technologies emerge conceptually complete 
as bespoke solutions that respond to articulated social desires or requirements. A more 
complicated process of co-construction, with a technology’s purpose, shape and meaning being 
shaped by dynamic interactions between social practices, material realities and other factors 
better reflects the understanding of technology present in this thesis.9 The “recording studio” - 
a technology created at a specific intersection of technical, cultural and social practices - was 
the intuitive entry point to this framing. A central construct in the formation of this research 
project, it also served as a methodological control that assisted in applying this understanding 
to the very different technologies, systems and contexts that emerged in the course of this 
research. 
 
The degree of attention and analysis technology receives and the extent to which a 
particular technology is centred or recognised as part of a larger social process can swing 
between extremes. This may be due in part to the multitudinous roles and forms of technologies 
throughout societies and their tendency to recede from collective awareness as they assume 
ubiquity. This has revealing analogies in the use of technology for cultural performance where, 
depending on the context, technological components may be shrouded for reasons of aesthetics 
or historicity and their contribution excluded from general histories. Conversely, some 
technologies with cultural applications have been itemised and fetishized. A small number of 
 
9 Jonathan Sterne, ‘Bourdieu, Technique And Technology’, Cultural Studies 17, no. 3–4 (2003): 390. 
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recording studios and the aura that has developed around select mixing desks and microphones 
(but other essential recording equipment far less often) provide some good instances of this. 
Such examples can provide useful signposts to technologies that have crossed a threshold from 
a specialised functionality to an acknowledgement of significance in a more general 
consciousness. However, placing them as key to historical or cultural narratives in isolation 
from the wider technical networks and sophisticated systems of social organisation in which 
they are embedded is a problematic omission.10 Whatever the specific capabilities or unique 
attributes of any single technology, it is the fact that any meaning attributed to a technology is 
co-created by the interaction of its makers, users and the technology itself that allows an 
investigation like this thesis to have an extended value.11 This thesis attempts to demonstrate 
the benefits of including technical and technological factors in cultural analysis while 
recognising the pitfalls of seeking answers from inanimate implements without considering 
wider pictures. 
 
Broadening the scope of contextualisation was a key development for interpreting the 
material of this research project. Thinking of a recording studio as a revealing example of 
dynamic cultural, political and technological intersections was one of the starting points for 
this study and initiating queries about sound technology and social interactions remain in this 
final version. However, these have been applied across a more extensive set of circumstances 
than originally anticipated - suggested and enabled by archival sources. Archives can transmit 
their own biases on where attention should be focussed, but in this instance they instigated the 
survey of a wider sample of interconnected national audio institutions. This provided a much 
larger cross section of circumstances for scrutinising if and how the specific circumstances of 
the GDR emerged at various technological and cultural crossovers. Recording studios thus 
remain a feature of this thesis, but more often as just one component within a larger set of 
systems and institutions. Engaging with the relationships between these symbiotically 
intertwined GDR entities constructed a wide field of view that was outside the relatively narrow 
scope of the original research proposal. A search for patterns amongst a gamut of unordered 
research material united mostly through their shared connections to large technical media 
systems led to the slow adoption of an approach somewhat akin to what Lisa Parks describes 
 
10 Brian Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, Annual Review of Anthropology 42, no. 1 (21 
October 2013): 330; Sterne, ‘Bourdieu, Technique And Technology’, 370, 375. 
11 Sterne, ‘Bourdieu, Technique And Technology’, 374. 
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as an “infrastructural disposition”.12 This thesis deals with several different areas of technology 
and with some specific and named technologies, but few of these have much significance in 
isolation from the systems and networks within which they operated and contributed to. This 
work is entitled “Sound Infrastructures”. This was adopted initially as a title of convenience 
for grouping the relatively diverse range of topics covered, ranging between broadcast 
networks, music recording, record pressing, concert hall acoustics, sound reinforcement and 
research and development procedures for sound technologies. However, the investigations 
made in this thesis fit well alongside recent work in the broadening field of critical 
infrastructure studies and other material turns in the humanities. 
 
The term or concept of infrastructure as it is commonly understood and used today 
derives from terminology developed during the expansion and systemisation of permanent 
military installations during the early 20th century.13 It is broadly describable as a network of 
systems that connect people, materials, information or other things across distance.14 Using 
infrastructure as a frame becomes increasingly conceptually useful as technological hardwares 
become more diffuse and interconnected and helpfully captures the duality of systems which 
are often material and highly visible, but also frequently to some extent intangible or 
unobserved, often mechanised, but also heavily dependent on people for functionality and 
meaning.15 Increasingly relevant when critiquing the complex layers of intervention by 
technology across society, critical work on a range of widely varying infrastructural systems 
in the last decade or so has indicated the interpretative value that can be drawn by interrogating 
mundane or spectacular collections of technologies from this standpoint.16 The ubiquity of 
infrastructures in society is demonstrated by how critiques incorporating this approach display 
similar levels of applicability to understanding the still-functioning redistributive powers of 
Victorian sewer works, the implied social promise of road construction or the still-emerging 
force-amplifying powers of social media.17  
 
12 Lisa Parks, ‘Stuff You Can Kick: Toward a Theory of Media Infrastructures’, in Between Humanities and the 
Digital, ed. Patrik Svensson and David Theo Goldberg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2015), 357. 
13 Parks, 355. 
14 Parks, 355; John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), 31; Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 327. 
15 Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 329. 
16 Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox, ‘The Enchantments of Infrastructure’, Mobilities 7, no. 4 (2012): 522; 
Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 327–29; Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural 
Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
17 Susan Leigh Star, ‘The Ethnography of Infrastructure’, American Behavioral Scientist 43, no. 3 (1999): 378; 
Harvey and Knox, ‘The Enchantments of Infrastructure’, 522; Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 31. 
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All but the most informal of infrastructures require substantial capital and organisation 
to construct, making them highly interwoven with associations and expectations a populace 
might have for a state.18 Indeed, terms for connecting or shared material forms or systems that 
precede the coinage of infrastructure - such as public works or municipal works - capture some 
sense of that involvement of the state, even if they do not hint as effectively at the underlying 
complexity associated with a developed infrastructure.19 As well as making better allowance 
for the complexity and interconnectedness of technical systems, infrastructure also “captures 
something about the rhythms and rules of modern institutional life”.20 Infrastructure describes 
not only timetables and building standards but also very human elements of collective 
constructs that “can take on fetish-like aspects that sometimes can be wholly autonomous from 
their technical function”.21 This dualistic element of infrastructure as a critical tool helps return 
technological discussions to the humanities and seems particularly suited to unravelling the 
intricacies of the GDR’s techno-socialist tendencies. While it is relatively recently that there 
has been a concerted return to the issue of infrastructure as an analytical approach, the timeline 
of the GDR itself maps well onto an increasing generalised political awareness of the role of 
infrastructural development as a component of encouraging and meeting societal aspirations 
during the post-war reconstruction period and beyond.22 Infrastructural development as a form 
of social promise is not unique to GDR, similar dynamics were integral to the development of 
capitalism and Western liberalism.23 The material forms of capitalism, most especially those of 
the US, were potent indicators of its ideological vibrancy and forced emulation upon actors 
that also wished to stake a position in the progression towards modernity.24 Constructing 
infrastructural forms suggested by capitalist departures was a practical technical challenge for 
socialist states, but it was additionally complicated by the requirement of a political conversion 
to reframe very similar infrastructures within the ideological requirements of state socialism. 
Drawing attention to the resulting tensions between ideology and technology is to a large extent 
the mission of this thesis. 
 
 
18 Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 31. 
19 Liam Cole Young, ‘Innis’s Infrastructure: Dirt, Beavers, and Documents in Material Media Theory’, Cultural 
Politics 13, no. 2 (2017): 231. 
20 Young, 232. 
21 Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 328. 
22 Young, ‘Innis’s Infrastructure’, 231. 
23 Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 333. 
24 Larkin, 332. 
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The capability of infrastructure to impact the mood of a populace was well recognised 
by socialist organisers in the GDR and directly experienced by its citizenry. The potent imagery 
of large-scale technical infrastructure such as the Berlin Fernsehturm is commonplace in 
depictions of the GDR, but representations of mundane items like a reel of magnetic audio tape 
could also function indicatively of a reassuring technocracy. Less tangible constructions, such 
as the acoustic of a recording space – in conjunction with performers and the tools for relaying 
a performance - may have been complementary sources of reassurance. The proliferation of 
infrastructures has been described by John Durham Peters as a condition of modernity and the 
degree to which a society can safely forget about any particular infrastructure might thus be 
used as a barometer for determining a state’s progression towards “modernity”, a central 
concern for the GDR.25 However, a system that was desperate to highlight its every 
technological achievement but without the consistency to allow these achievements to recede 
into unremarkability was vulnerable to parody, as occurred to initially serious terms used as 
motivating catchphrases like “real socialism” or “actually existing socialism”. The 
overabundance of symbolism that could be attached to much of the GDR’s industrial capacity 
and infrastructural facilities thus sometimes provided a difficult contrast with deficits in actual 
production or functionality.26 Nevertheless, the links between the political intentions for GDR 
infrastructures and their consequent collective interpretation are not always straightforward 
and can raise interesting discrepancies in reductive attempts to assign labels of success or 
failure to GDR undertakings.27  
 
Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox’s work on the deep associations that road 
infrastructure can imbue in a populace has insightful resonances with the GDR case. They 
attribute to generic infrastructures an ability to “produce a generalised sense of social good to 
which the majority of people subscribe”, but even in the face of failure these structures could 
maintain an aura of social promise.28 More broadly,  
 
Infrastructures do not simply reference or represent political ideology but actively 
participate in often unexpected ways, in the processes by which political relations are 
articulated and enacted. Infrastructures can offer a vital means of tracing the co-
 
25 Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 31. 
26 Larkin, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’, 335. 
27 Larkin, 334. 
28 Harvey and Knox, ‘The Enchantments of Infrastructure’, 522. 
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emergence of political and material histories, and in doing so can provide powerful 
accounts of often unacknowledged dynamics of state formation.29 
 
The creation of Funkhaus Berlin, as relayed in Chapter 1, offers a particularly multi-layered 
and deeply resonant tale of radio infrastructure and state formation across a significant early 
period for the GDR that encapsulates much of what became characteristic of the state in 
following decades. Within that larger setting, the recording facilities discussed in the same 
chapter unify social, technological and infrastructural perspectives - in a manner close to that 
envisaged in the early stages of this research - to construct a holistic narrative of the meaning 
and interpretations available for a key GDR cultural project. The emergence of this narrative 
is rooted in an infrastructural and materially-focussed approach but requires considerable 
acknowledgement of human components in the search for its valid interpretation. 
Infrastructure’s acknowledgement that a network is more than the sum of its part allows space 
for the contemplation of the type of associative transference or amalgamating auras that 
collections of wood, brick and mortar or other forms of things can accumulate over time when 
they are parts of people’s lives.  
 
 
0.3  Secondary Literature and Structure 
 
This thesis encompasses a timeframe of more than forty years and a wide scope of cultural 
technologies in both specialised and consumer forms. In its approach, this study attempts to 
navigate a research material-led path that required the interweaving of analyses of 
technological processes, political history, sociology, aesthetics and economics. While total 
precision or expertise is not claimed in any of these areas, the proposed value of this thesis is 
derived from their convergence. The GDR and the global technological paradigm transformed 
immensely during the timespan discussed and this study attempts to account for this through 
rigorous contextualisation. A range of GDR-specific and other specialist studies have made 
major contributions towards creating a setting in which to place the original research work of 
this thesis. This was assisted by the considerable diversification of GDR studies conducted 
over the past three decades and detailed assessments of its large scale industries, its production 
of consumer goods and its cultural landscape have been developed. This thesis depended on a 
 
29 Harvey and Knox, 524. 
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range of publications to provide a broad contextual understanding of the GDR, while a smaller 
selection of more specialised works in GDR and wider technological and cultural areas helped 
develop some of the themes that run through this work. A small number of secondary sources 
provided important augmentation to the primary-source focus of these case studies. 
 
In the broad contextual area, Mary Fulbrook’s work is an important starting point for 
understanding GDR society, while David Crew, Katherine Pence and Paul Betts similarly offer 
useful entry points into consumer and material narratives in the GDR.30 Works by Dolores 
Augustine, Armin Muller and Beate Volker and Henk Flap that engage with Germanic research 
traditions and hierarchical GDR technical and research structures helped prompt this thesis to 
look at institutions and organisations and their administration as sources of insight.31 Papers 
and analyses that pre-date the end of the GDR retain value for offering - similar to many of the 
primary sources cited in this thesis - critical assessments of the state without the presumption 
of an inevitable endpoint.32 Some pre-Wende cultural papers have a similar value.33 Carola 
Kotyczka and Heinz Kroske offer important observations on the GDR’s ill-advised attempts to 
become self-sufficient across a wide range of industrial processes and technological areas.34 In 
a similar vein, Raymond G. Stokes’ economic analysis of the progression of GDR chemical, 
electronics and information technology industries is used regularly in this thesis to align the 
discussed narratives within larger trends, in particular his observation on the contrasting 
success of pre- and post-Second World War technologies in the GDR.35 In the field of 
electronics, the GDR had some basis for restoring the supply of components and products that 
 
30 Mary Fulbrook, ed., Power and Society in the GDR, 1961 - 1979: The ‘Normalisation of Rule’?, 1st ed. (New 
York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2009); Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, Socialist Modern: East German Everyday 
Culture and Politics, Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann Arbor, Mich: Univ. of 
Michigan Press, 2008); David Crew, ‘Consuming Germany in the Cold War’, Socialist Modern: East German 
Everyday Culture and Politics, 2008. 
31 Augustine, Red Prometheus; Beate Volker and Henk Flap, ‘Getting Ahead in the GDR: Social Capital and 
Status Attainment under Communism’, Acta Sociologica, 1999, 17; Armin Muller, ‘Competing Networks: The 
SED and the Old Intelligentsia in the Industry of the GDR’, Historical Social Research/Historische 
Sozialforschung 35, no. 3 (2010): 134–162. 
32 Thomas A. Baylis, ‘Explaining the GDR’s Economic Strategy’, International Organization 40, no. 2 (1986): 
381–420, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027181; Günter Minnerup, ‘East Germany’s Frozen Revolution’, 
New Left Review, no. 132 (1 March 1982), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/docview/1301937321/250653B3B57648FDPQ/29?accountid=10
673. 
33 Günter Mayer, ‘Popular Music in the GDR’, Journal of Popular Culture 18, no. 3 (1984): 145–158, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1984.1803_145.x. 
34 Carola Kotyczka and Heinz Kroske, ‘Technological Change in the GDR and Its Social Consequences’, 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 41, no. 3 (1992): 211–222, https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-
1625(92)90021-K. 
35 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism. 
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relied on vacuum tubes, but developing comparable levels of production in the area of 
transistors - a new key post-war technological paradigm – was a limiting factor to the supply 
of new industrial and consumer technologies. This insight assists the appraisal of trends 
described in the final chapters of this work.  
 
Culture and music in the GDR has been widely discussed, often with a focus on 
classical performance repertoire in the context of denazification.36 Studies in broader cultural 
fields have usefully highlighted the Berlin Wall’s relative “permeability” to cultural 
dissemination, extremely relevant in the area of broadcasting.37 Work has also been done to 
explore the GDR’s unusual and inconsistent treatment of electroacoustic composition.38 The 
primary materials used by this thesis offered opportunity for the investigation of technological 
and infrastructural aspects of this important narrative, particularly during the 1950s, though 
this has unfortunately not been undertaken on this occasion. Studies on popular music in the 
GDR were an important prompt for my investigation of Deutsche Schallplatten primary 
sources. Work by Edward Larkey on GDR pop music and its engagement with the West and 
discographical work by Birgit Rauhut and Michael Rauhut offered important framing 
narratives for this undertaking.39 By approaching music in the GDR from several angles, this 
thesis attempts articulate the importance of the tandem roles of classical and popular music 
within GDR audio infrastructures. 
 
Establishing some familiarity with the development of acoustic theory and practice in 
the twentieth century became critical for contextualising this thesis due to the unique character 
 
36 Toby Thacker, Music after Hitler, 1945-1955 (Aldershot : Ashgate, 2007); Janik, Recomposing German 
Music; Monod, Settling Scores; Mark Carroll, Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe, Music in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
37 April A. Eisman, ‘East German Art and the Permeability of the Berlin Wall’, German Studies Review 38, no. 
3 (2015): 597–616, https://doi.org/10.1353/gsr.2015.0115; Elaine Kelly and Amy Wlodarski, Art Outside the 
Lines : New Perspectives on GDR Art Culture (Amsterdam ; New York : Rodopi, 2011). 
38 Tatjana Böhme-Mehner, ‘The Big Beginning at the End: The Formation of a Fully-Fledged Generation of 
Composers of Electroacoustic Music in the Last Years of the GDR’, Contemporary Music Review 30, no. 1 
(2011): 119–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/07494467.2011.624320; Tatjana Böhme-Mehner, ‘Does the GDR 
Have Its Own Electroacoustic Sound?’, Contemporary Music Review 30, no. 1 (February 2011): 5–13. 
39 Edward Larkey, ‘GDR Rock Goes West; Finding a Voice in the West German Market (1)’, German Politics 
and Society 23, no. 4 (20051222): 45; Edward Larkey, Rotes Rockradio : populäre Musik und die 
Kommerzialisierung des DDR-Rundfunks (Berlin : Lit, 2007); Edward Larkey, Pungent Sounds : Constructing 
Identity with Popular Music in Austria / Edward Larkey, Austrian Culture: Vol. 9 (New York : Peter Lang, 
[1993], ©1993., 1993); Edward Larkey, ‘GDR Rock Goes West; Finding a Voice in the West German Market 
(1)’, German Politics and Society, no. 4 (2005): 45; Birgit Rauhut and Michael Rauhut, Amiga: die 
Diskographie aller Rock- und Pop-Produktionen 1964 - 1990; Mit über 1500 teilweise farbigen Abbildungen 
(Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 1999). 
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of progressive acoustics in the GDR, but this survey also highlighted important general 
absences. The corpus of authoritative works on venue acoustics has expanded substantially 
since the 1950s and most of these large works acknowledge the lengthy historical development 
of venue acoustics before 1900 and the relatively rapid proliferation of rigorous – though often 
still flawed - acoustic designs since the Second World War.40 The steady progress in acoustic 
science theory and its application has not been accompanied by corresponding developments 
in broader analyses of modern-era acoustic developments and applications that place modern 
acoustic and venue designs within ongoing social and political historical progressions. The 
social and political contexts of post-war performance venues have generally only been studied 
in isolation and shared post-war design impulses and their emergence in different acoustic 
forms in venues and recording spaces constructed across the world invite extended analysis. 
Architectural historians, notably Victoria Newhouse, have been more willing than musical 
historians or cultural sociologists to engage with the implications of acoustic designs beyond 
their contributions to reverberation fields.41 Newhouse’s account of the recognition of psycho-
acoustic factors evident in acoustic designs such as the Berliner Philharmonie and its 
descendants, along with interpretations of its auditorium as a “democratised” space, are 
suggestive of a humanistic approach to analysing acoustics that could complement and 
augment the discipline’s scientific base. The design narrative present within the recording 
spaces and performance venues of the GDR and relayed in this thesis makes a strong 
advocation for such an approach. Other historians whose work has contributed to this thesis in 
acoustic and architectural areas include Hugh Campbell, Fiona Smyth and  Carol Anne 
Costabile-Heming, each providing specific contextual insights that fortified findings from 
several lines of enquiry.42 
 
 
40 Leo L. Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses: Music, Acoustics, and Architecture, Second edition.. (New 
York, N.Y.: Springer, 2004); Michael Barron, Auditorium Acoustics and Architectural Design, Second edition. 
(London ; New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010); Vilhelm Lassen Jordan, Acoustical Design of Concert Halls and 
Theatres: A Personal Account (London: Applied Science Publishers, 1980); Robin Mackenzie, Auditorium 
Acoustics (London: Applied Science Publishers, 1975); Vern Oliver Knudsen, Acoustical Designing in 
Architecture (New York ; London: Wiley, 1950). 
41 Victoria Newhouse, Site and Sound : The Architecture and Acoustics of New Opera Houses and Concert 
Halls (New York: Monacelli, 2012). 
42 Hugh Campbell, ‘“The Bright Edifice of Community”: Politics and Performance in Hans Scharoun’s Berlin 
Philharmonie’, Arq : Architectural Research Quarterly; Cambridge 11, no. 2 (June 2007): 159–66, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/10.1017/S1359135507000632; Fiona Smyth, ‘Hope Bagenal and Wallace 
Clement Sabine: A Legacy in Letters’, Acoustics Bulletin 40, no. 2 (2015): 26–30; Carol Anne Costabile-
Heming, ‘The Reconstructed City Palace and Humboldt Forum in Berlin: Restoring Architectural Identity or 
Distorting the Memory of Historic Spaces?’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 25, no. 4 (2017): 441–
454, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2017.1361816. 
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The five case studies of this thesis follow a loose overall chronology and work together 
to offer a coherent historical narrative for several contained aspects of the GDR audio industry. 
While this thesis is thus intended primarily as a holistic work, its constituent chapters do stand 
alone as pointed microhistories and may be approached in isolation. The first two chapters of 
this thesis are comprised of separate investigations of two of the GDR’s major audio 
institutions: Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche Schallplatten. Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche 
Schallplatten have interwoven histories thanks to their recording activities, but the two 
organisations were very different in character. Rundfunk DDR exhibits familiar characteristics 
of a national broadcaster, while Deutsche Schallplatten, even after its nationalisation, was run 
much more similarly to a private company. These differences were important to how each 
developed its recording capacities. Radio broadcasting and music records both have extensive 
pre-war histories in Germany and both chapters concern narratives of restoration and 
technological development involving two very different forms of cultural material. 
Establishing these efforts within a wider historical technical narrative was essential to 
unlocking the themes of this thesis, but rigorous technical histories remain uncommon and thus 
contextual references in this study are often not specific to the GDR or Germany. Walter Leslie 
Welch and Leah Brodbeck Stenzel Burt’s general history of early music formats was valuable, 
but also highlights a shortage of analysis on the material narratives of mechanical musical 
reproduction in every period.43 Broader works on the GDR’s material fabrication industry and 
foreign commercial relations were of more relevance to the investigations of this thesis by 
providing more applicable local and contemporary context.44 Asa Briggs’ history of the BBC 
was of some contextual assistance - despite a lack of focus on technical areas - but the BBC’s 
own annual year books contributed much more to a technical context of broadcasting in Europe 
before the Second World War.45 Within this thesis the BBC is primarily used as a point of 
technical and infrastructural comparison, but its active role in Cold War era broadcasting 
warrants further investigation.46 The infrastructure of Germany’s pre-war national broadcaster, 
 
43 Walter Leslie Welch and Leah Brodbeck Stenzel Burt, From Tinfoil to Stereo: The Acoustic Years of the 
Recording Industry, 1877-1929, Revised edition. (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1994). 
44 Pavel Szobi, ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The ČSSR, the GDR and West European Companies in the 
1970s and 1980s’, European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d’histoire 21, no. 2 (2014): 255–269, 
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German Democratic Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
45 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol. 2, The Golden Age of Wireless. 
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46 Nicholas Pronay and Philip M. Taylor, ‘“An Improper Use of Broadcasting...” The British Government and 
Clandestine Radio Propaganda Operations against Germany during the Munich Crisis and After’, Journal of 
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the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft (RRG), is key to understanding later events in GDR 
broadcasting; work by Günter Pipke and Friedrich Engels provided insights in this area.47 
Nicholas J. Schlosser  and Heather Leigh Gumbert offered broad and detailed analysis of 
technical and journalistic occurrences in GDR broadcasting that was very useful for 
constructing several sections of this thesis.48 Work on broadcasting in West Germany appears 
to delve into perhaps more diverse areas than that seen with studies of the GDR; works of this 
type were beneficial for contextualising various gradations in GDR primary sources across 
different periods.49 
 
Within the case studies that follow are tracings of the trajectories of several fairly 
familiar technologies and the particularities of their introduction into the GDR context. 
Simplified narratives in the historicisation of various technologies attributable to pre-existing 
commercially-constructed chronologies can imperil new technological research and criticism 
by providing easy answers. This remains a hazard in contemporary discourse; excitement and 
anxieties in the interpretation of the continuing unfolding of digital media’s seemingly 
ubiquitous role in society can lead to superficial analyses. Joseph Sterne has warned that “to 
refer to digital media as ‘new’ technologies is to import the value-system of advertisement into 
scholarship, where ‘newness’ is itself an index of sociocultural significance and transformative 
power.”50 Sterne’s characterisation is applicable to how some technological progressions were 
handled in the GDR. Although its system of values had some distinctions to those of Western 
capitalism, the rhetoric of ‘newness’ and ‘progress’ had similarly powerful connotations that 
were co-opted into state-sanctioned narratives of modernity. Several of the technological 
narratives presented in this thesis have been attributed interpretations that can drift between 
inherited and more rigorous and pluralistic assessments. Work elsewhere has sought to 
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dismantle the more deterministic trends in various technological assessments and some of this 
is work is cited below. The case studies presented in this thesis - centred on circumstances 
often distant from the heart of the dominant cultural and technical formations of this period - 
often provide confirming material for dismantling the overriding and conveniently seamless 
sequences routinely attached to vinyl records, stereophonic sound and early digital 
technologies. As an example, recent sound studies work has sought to dispel characterisations 
of stereo’s development as one of linear progression towards an inevitable endpoint of peak 
“naturalness” and the East German case provides ample evidence for further disrupting this 
narrative.51 Nevertheless, engagements with emic narratives and interpretations perform a 
crucial role in this thesis.  
 
Much of the primary material on which this thesis is based is situated within the highly 
politicised rhetoric of progress and modernity that underpinned the competitive technological 
texture of the Cold War era. It is thus worth highlighting the extent to which the GDR project 
was politically and  psychologically invested in the transformative potential of various 
technologies - particularly information technologies in its latter stages - in the hopes that these 
would bridge widening gaps of achievement and production. The GDR’s language of 
technology could undoubtedly aggrandise and distort but there was also deep investment across 
multiple levels of GDR hierarchy in an ideal of technology as a solution to all ails that was 
profoundly integral to sustaining its political and societal project. It was therefore one of the 
more challenging tasks of this research project to walk the line between incorporating 
contemporary GDR technology descriptions and assessments as part of a critical discourse 
analysis, without becoming overly susceptible to internalising the assumptions of that rhetoric. 
While contributing to the clear outlining of several technical narratives is part of the ambition 
of this thesis, describing something of the more general condition of the GDR and it’s people 
and processes is much more central to its mission. The GDR’s position at a nexus between two 
major competing political and technological powers and the value in the continued 
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Chapter 1 draws on a wide range of sources to synthesise a new analysis on the 
development, design and use of Funkhaus Berlin, in particular its recording wing, Block B. 
Reflecting Alfredo Thiermann’s recent observations on the uniqueness of the recording spaces 
in Block B, this thesis demonstrates the worthwhile opportunities for exploration latent in such 
uniqueness.52 The creation of Funkhaus Berlin was fraught and closely linked with 
circumstances surrounding its predecessor, Haus des Rundfunks. Tracking the technical 
progression between these facilities was considerably aided by G. Lubszynski and K. 
Hoffmann’s contemporary technical paper on the facility just after its construction in 1930.53 
The limited architectural commentary in this thesis was assisted by Bernhard Kohlenbach’s 
work on the Funkhaus Berlin architect, Franz Ehrlich, as well as Franz Berger exhaustive run-
through of Funkhaus Köln, frequently used as a control in Chapter 1.54 
 
The initial impetus for Chapter 2 was provided by Lindsay Hansen’s paper, “A Well-
Oiled Machine: The Creation and Dissolution of East Germany's VEB Deutsche 
Schallplatten”.55 Following on from Hansen’s linking of technical processes to Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s success, Chapter 2 deals with physical recorded music formats and how the 
transferral of music records from one material format to another played out under the 
stewardship of general director Harri Költzsch. While the Bundesarchiv material covers the 
full sweep of Deutsche Schallplatten’s existence, the most prominent narrative that emerged 
from these resources demanded a focus on the early lifetime of the company: from the mid-
1950s to the early-1960s. Efforts to produce an analysis of similar scale for Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s latter two decades have been condensed to provide an important contrast to the 
volatility of its early period. Chapter 2 also attempts to begin an analysis of how music genre 
policies at Deutsche Schallplatten were impactful across diverse areas of the company. Some 
West German studies were helpful in this area, but the primary research materials provide most 
of the subjects of discussion.56 Important for positioning the plethora of statistics offered by 
these archival sources were Rémy Louis’ history of Deutsche Grammophon and Horst Lange’s 
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discography of German 78s.57 Classical and popular music were both central to Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s activities and this chapter attempts to give attention to both of these areas.58 It 
is unfortunate that the Recording Industry Association of America’s powerful online US sales 
database tool only offers data from 1973 onward; this could have offered potential points of 
comparison with occurrences in the GDR.59 A broader picture of record production levels in 
West Germany has also not been uncovered in the course of this thesis, other than Louis’ 
previously cited work on Deutsche Grammophon. By contrast, Kevin Tennent’s paper on 
record distribution in the UK provided statistics that were helpful for corroborating or 
contrasting trends with record production in the GDR.60  
 
Chapter 3 details the introduction of stereophonic recording techniques and equipment 
to the GDR during the early 1960, builds on Chapter 1 broadcasting themes and serves as a 
chronological and thematic bridge to the topics of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. It does so by 
covering the transition to stereophonic sound along with the transistorised technologies that 
accompanied the entry of stereo into the consumer sphere; important contextually to 
technological efforts in the GDR during the 1970s and 1980s. FM radio and vinyl records were 
audio technology formats that preceded stereo that required similarly extensive 
reconfigurations of the GDR’s audio infrastructure, but both of these new formats offered 
considerable qualitative and infrastructural advantages over their predecessors. In the case of 
FM broadcasting, adoption of the transmission method ensured the integrity of the GDR’s 
broadcast network during a fraught political period. Richard Merritt’s article on electronic 
media in post-war Berlin helps establish this, while Gary Lewis Frost’s work on FM and its 
early history in the US demonstrates why the format’s technical features are key to discerning 
its role in post-war Europe.61 Andreas Vogel’s article on the introduction of FM to the GDR 
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provides essential information on broadcasting infrastructure in the state during this period.62 
Stereo had far less immediate strategic advantages than an innovation like FM. It provided a 
supplemental qualitative addition to FM radio and vinyl records, but its advantages were much 
narrower in their application and largely reserved to improving music recordings. As an 
infrastructural upgrade, it was thus justified under very different rhetoric and serves better as 
an indication of the GDR’s commitment to cultural infrastructures alongside more general 
broadcasting purposes. Kristine Nielson’s work on elaborate “gifts” from the GDR state to its 
citizens is instructive in this context.63  
 
Stereo’s relatively unproblematic introduction is indicative of the GDR’s relative 
robustness during this period. Stereo is also significant within German narratives due to the 
technology it depended on as its primary recording medium: magnetic recording tape. While 
the German role in the development of tape recording is usually acknowledged in 
comprehensive histories, the post-war route of US-augmented tape recording technology back 
to West Germany and the GDR has had less commentary. The process behind the arrival of an 
international standard for stereophonic vinyl records is similarly obscure. H. E. Roys’ personal 
account of the events that led to the adoption of a universal industry standard is an excellent 
example of a technical innovation deeply embedded in widespread experience, but with little 
accompanying understanding or discussion regarding how it was derived.64 In the context of 
this chapter it helps indicate informal political camps in the technical communities of the 
international record industry. Both magnetic tape and vinyl records are key to unravelling GDR 
audio infrastructures and the application of stereo to these technologies offers additional 
insights. 
 
 Stereo and its associated technologies have become so ubiquitous, it proved difficult to 
find accounts that unpack the formation of these in more than a cursory fashion. Alan Dower 
Blumlein’s association with stereo is well-earned - although his is not the full story of the 
format - and Robert Charles Alexander’s biography provides helpful context on the early era 
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of rigorous stereo experimentation.65 Two accounts proved particularly useful for delineating 
the progress of stereo sound and magnetic tape: John Sunier’s The Story of Stereo and Mark 
Mooney Jr.’s article on magnetic tape both comment on stereo sound as near-contemporaries 
to its systematic introduction.66 W. Lippert’s detailed account of a stereo recording experiment 
conducted in Berlin in 1947 provides a tantalising glimpse of a stereophonic counter-history, 
before US-led experimental work provided the definitive international stereophonic 
paradigm.67 Even subsequent to stereo’s industry standardisation, there were myriad GDR-
specific formations around its execution and usage. Recently, Tom Perchard’s work on audio 
in post-war Britain has delineated interesting interactions between technological developments 
in consumer audio, commercial structures and the gendering of interactions with hifi equipment 
in specialist consumer advertising.68 This raises intriguing points for comparison with the 
GDR’s centrally organised manufacturing and distribution structure and socialist but 
paternalistic consumer electronics press. GDR publications mirrored trends in the West of 
training customers in the correct usage of stereo playback but were more capable of envisaging 
women as specialised listeners.69  
 
The final two chapters of this thesis both concern research projects in the latter years of 
the GDR and are reflective of the GDR’s audio communities’ commitment to independent 
research and development. Chapter 4 discusses the Delta Stereophony System (DSS), a 
bespoke sound reinforcement and venue acoustic modifying system designed to handle the 
complicated technical remit of the large performance venue of the Palast der Republik. This 
venue was configured during a period when sound technologies more commonly used for 
popular music concerts were beginning to be increasingly applied to augmenting classical 
music performance. The DSS installation incorporated boldly technological approaches to 
venue acoustics that can be positioned within larger narratives of GDR acoustic design, 
international acoustics and sound reinforcement development, as well as strategies for 
broadening audience engagement within the GDR. The origins of the DSS concept are of 
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historical note and are addressed cursorily in the chapter, as is the largely unacknowledged 
influence DSS had on sound reinforcement in Europe during and after the GDR-period.  
 
Building on some of the acoustics themes introduced in Chapter 1, the analysis of DSS 
relies heavily on a number of historical case studies to indicate a potential development 
narrative and to draw out the unique elements of the DSS and Palast der Republik designs. Key 
amongst these are Harry F. Olson’s account of RCA’s distributed sound system experiments, 
Parkin and Morgan’s account of the refurbishment of the Royal Festival Hall during the 1960s, 
Rudolf Vermeulen’s Stereo Reverberation experiments and Edgar B. Young and Leo 
Beranek’s accounts of the Lincoln Center design process.70 Mark Poletti’s article on active 
acoustics was useful for historicising these extremely diverse examples within contemporary 
developments.71 The Palast der Republik itself is deserving of far more analytical work than it 
has received to date, but several writers provided important contextual understanding of that 
structure and space.72 Like much of this thesis, DSS and the Palast der Republik became 
subjects of interest due to relevant holdings of the DRA. However, the analysis offered in 
Chapter 4 was only possible due to the relatively wide disseminations the RFZ made on DSS 
during the 1980s, as the organisation attempted to market the system for commercial 
installations. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with System 2000, a long-term project to develop digitally-enabled 
sound technologies to replace the technical infrastructure of Rundfunk DDR and performance 
venues in the GDR. A period of relative technological stability after transistorised equipment 
supplanted valve-based technologies led into another period of technological upheaval as 
microelectronics and digital technologies began to be integrated into sound equipment during 
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the 1970s. The System 2000 development process largely confirms common criticisms of the 
GDR’s straitened electronics industry, but also indicates how the GDR had credible plans to 
maintain its sound infrastructures into the next century. Sound desks rarely receive historical 
attention outside of their associations with particular studios or musical groups, but System 
2000, and the GDR audio technology systems that preceded it are directly tied to an intricate 
national social and political narrative and warrant analysis in this light. 
 
Kevin L. Ryan’s book Recording the Beatles  is largely focussed on technology at 
Abbey Road EMI, but it is a relatively rare example of an authoritative work attempting to 
place audio technology developments within a broader non-technical narrative.73 The book also 
establishes interesting links between important mixing desk designs undertaken in 
collaboration between EMI in the UK and West German record companies. The book provides 
a timeline useful for aligning the important technological developments made at Rundfunk 
DDR during the 1960s. An understanding of the transistor’s role in post-war technologies and 
the dynamics of its production during the Cold War are important keys to understanding GDR 
successes and failures during its latter stages, works by Michael Riordan and Eric Schuster 
contributed to this.74 Closely related to the transistor is the progression of information 
technologies. System 2000 brought Rundfunk DDR into direct engagement with the GDR’s 
information technology industry and a broad set of authors have contributed to disassembling 
this volatile area of the GDR’s industrial efforts. These efforts include works by Gary Geipel, 
James W. Cortada, Simon Donig, Gareth Dale and Dieter Hoffmann and Kristie Macrakis; 
System 2000 engages with the broad narratives provided by these authors in interesting ways.75 
The progression and digitisation of sound recording technology receives little or no academic 
attention and contextualising the efforts of the RFZ on constructing System 2000 required an 
engagement with the specialised US and UK sound industry print media. 
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This thesis adds to academic work conducted by others on the GDR and cultural 
technologies. It is hoped that the enclosed analyses provide a coherent detailing of the 
discussions outlined above and spur some reconsiderations across the areas covered. The 
application to technological narratives and processes of methodologies more rooted in 
humanist practices extends the possibility of novel approaches for investigating intersecting 
areas of culture, technology and politics, both in the GDR and in other contexts, and these 
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Chapter 1:  
Funkhaus Berlin: Broadcasting Houses, Politics and Acoustic Design in the GDR, 1945-
1956 
 
Radio in the GDR, as elsewhere, was one of the most cost-effective ways of disseminating 
state-sanctioned ideologies and notions of culture and broadcasting houses were one of the core 
components to such efforts. Broadcasting houses were monumental representations of the new 
technological departures of the twentieth century; key technologies of the radio age they were 
“temples of transmission that celebrated their own technicity” and recognised as critical 
modern implements in national formation.1 The GDR’s erection of the Berlin Wall remains the 
most potent symbol of the division of Germany, but the disentangling of Germany’s pre-war 
national broadcasting apparatus, particularly in Berlin, underlines the material impact of the 
post-war administrative and political division at a much earlier stage. Significant investment 
into radio broadcasting and music recording facilities was made by Rundfunk DDR, the 
national radio broadcaster, during an early stage of the GDR’s existence to compensate for the 
loss of critical facilities lost during the solidification of post-war political boundaries. Central 
to this new infrastructure was the construction in the early 1950s of Rundfunk DDR’s Funkhaus 
Berlin broadcasting house and its dedicated recording wing, Block B, situated on Nalepastraße 
at the eastern edge of East Berlin. Block B, a bespoke cluster of studios for music and radio 
drama recording, was the largest music recording facility ever built in the GDR. Block B took 
large inspiration from Haus des Rundfunks, the 1930s-built Berlin radio centre that became an 
important component of the broadcasting apparatus of the Third Reich. However, it also 
exhibits strong contrasts with its predecessor and it made distinctive departures in the area of 
acoustics for recording. The respective symphony orchestra recording spaces for Haus des 
Rundfunks (Sendesaal I) and Funkhaus Berlin (Saal 1) will be highlighted in this discussion. 
Notable features of Funkhaus Berlin, including its location and architectural and acoustic 
design, all raise questions about how socialist values and political factors steered an important 
infrastructural and cultural project in the early years of the GDR. The encirclement and 
expulsion of East German broadcasting from West Berlin provided a fraught backdrop to the 
Funkhaus Berlin development and contributed to a narrative of persecution by Western forces 
within the Rundfunk DDR formation mythology. The value of this narrative was recognised 
 
1 John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2015), 33. 
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by the GDR administration and it was actively reinforced by the construction of a 
complementary but artificial interpretation of an accident that occurred during the construction 
of Block B.  
 
Funkhaus Berlin is particularly noteworthy as the first large-scale cultural 
infrastructural undertaking in the GDR and for being among the first opportunities to enact 
socialist approaches to technology and culture in design on a large scale. The GDR was still in 
the throes of establishing a coherent unified approach to design processes and the general 
architectural scheme of Block B exhibits identifiable tensions between historical and practical 
continuities and socialist and modernist ideals. Parallel to these tensions, the designs of the 
acoustic spaces in Block B display a specific negotiation of continuity with the innovations of 
Haus des Rundfunks and the enactment of some radical tangents from the established design 
parameters of European broadcasting houses. These designs were influenced by an entangled 
combination of innovative approaches, ideological motivations and practical considerations 
created by political circumstance. This chapter is an attempt to begin the disentangling of these 
myriad factors, particularly with regard to Funkhaus Berlin’s most distinctive recording space: 


















Part 1: Technological and Political Narratives in GDR Radio Broadcasting 
 
Germany was at the forefront of the radio revolution in Europe in the early twentieth Century. 
National radio in Germany began with the formation of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft 
(RRG) (Reich Radio Corporation) in 1925. The Weimar-era principles that informed this new 
enterprise meant efforts were made to maintain the political independence of the RRG; the 
radio company was entirely responsible for programming and central government took 
responsibility for the development of radio infrastructure.2 The new medium proved popular; 
in the years from 1923 to 1926 the number of radio licences in Germany rose from just 460 to 
over 2 million.3 By 1930, Germany and the UK had the most developed radio audience figures 
in Europe with nearly three million radio licenses each.4 This dawning of the radio age led to 
the construction of buildings specialised to facilitate radio broadcasting. Haus des Rundfunks 
located on Masurenallee in the west of Berlin was completed in 1931. BBC Broadcasting 
House, an analogous facility located in London, was opened in 1932. These buildings and the 
acoustic and technical facilities they encompassed represented a significant maturation of 
broadcasting technology and helped establish the technological template for national radio in 
Europe. 
 
The principles behind the layout of Haus des Rundfunks were centred around acoustic 
and signal-path considerations. The most clearly demonstrable example of this is the placement 
of the recording studios. The studio spaces are situated at the heart of the building while the 
street-facing administrative spaces act as a sound buffer to potential environmental noise-
pollution. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 give a sense of this. Although the recording spaces and 
administration offices are internally contiguous, the sections holding the recording spaces are 
laid on separate foundations to preserve their acoustic isolation. Similar approaches to 
preserving acoustic isolation were also adopted at BBC Broadcasting House.5 Further areas of 
innovation elaborated in contemporary accounts of the new facility in Berlin focussed on the 
progress made in power distribution, the centralisation of amplifiers and other electrical and 
electronics-based services.6  
 
2 Günter Pipke, Rundfunk und Politik, kleine Geschichte des Rundfunks in Deutschland. (Hanover, 1961), 14. 
3 Werner Stankoweit, ‘Studiotechnik Rundfunk: Zusammenfassung der Unterlagen über die Entwicklung der 
Technik des Rundfunks bis 1967, Band I’ (Rundfunk DDR, 1967), 16, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
4 ‘Table of Wireless Licenses for Various Countries’, BBC Year Book, 1930, 130, americanradiohistory.com. 
5 ‘Broadcasting House’, BBC Year Book, 1931, 126, americanradiohistory.com. 
6 Lubszynski and Hoffmann, ‘The Broadcast Installations in the New “House of Radio”’. 
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Figure 1.1: An image of Haus des Rundfunks, Berlin taken from the Berlin Funkturm during the mid-1930s. 
The structures housing the recording studios can be seen within the external boundary of the street-facing 




Figure 1.2: A floor plan of Haus des Rundfunks with Sendesaal I labelled in the centre. The distinctive 
quadrilateral floor plan of Sendesaal I and the other visible recording spaces (2, 2a, 3, 3a) are an important 
component of the facility’s acoustic design enabled by the building’s dedication to a single purpose.8 
 
 
Haus des Rundfunks was also innovative in the area of studio acoustics, particularly for 
music. Studio acoustics until this point were heavily influenced by restrictions relating to 
contemporary recording media; the reproducible frequency range was narrow and dynamic 
range was also extremely limited. The wax discs to which performances were initially recorded 
 
7 E.K., ‘“Haus Des Rundfunks” - The Headquarters of German Broadcasting’, Wireless World, 30 July 1937, 
americanradiohistory.com. 
8 G. Lubszynski and K. Hoffmann, ‘The Broadcast Installations in the New “House of Radio”’, Proceedings of 
the Institute of Radio Engineers 19, no. 11 (1931): 1956. 
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were not robust enough to withstand playback and they were primarily used as a template for 
electroplating metal stampers that could steam press many copies of the recording made from 
a relatively more hardy combination of shellac and other constituents. The mineral content of 
gramophone discs contributed a prominent and characteristic hiss; this inherent background 
noise on the reproducible format created a problematic noise floor with which the performer 
and recording engineer had to compete. Microphones were not yet a feature of recording 
practice and the acoustic energy of the musical performance directly contributed the 
mechanical energy that caused the needle to etch a simulacra of the performance. The 
sensitivity of this system in comparison with later electrical methods was very limited. These 
technical limitations strongly influenced the recording methods utilised before the adoption of 
electrical recording. Early recording practices included the favouring of loud singers and 
arraying musicians closely around the recording horn. Recording spaces were also specialised 
to enhance recordings within their limited parameters; a common approach was to counteract 
room reverberation and deaden the acoustic by hanging heavy drapery or other similar methods. 
The arrival of the radio age, accompanied by such innovations as microphones and electronic 
signal amplifiers, allowed a reappraisal of the design of specialised acoustic spaces for 
recording. The heightened sensitivity of electrical microphones and the ability to increase gain 
levels using amplifiers meant it became possible to transmit an improved representation of a 
musical performance, without the same compromises necessary for recording to gramophone 
records. These improved recording technologies exposed the limitations of these recording 
spaces as “boomy” or “dead” and unflattering for musical performance.9 Reverberation, which 
had hitherto been suppressed in recording, now became one of the primary foci for improving 
studio acoustics for music recording, in line with its recognised role in live performance. The 
qualitative significance of reverberation for live musical performance was first described and 
quantified by the acoustician Wallace Clement Sabine, and directly applied in his influential 
acoustic design for the Boston Symphony Hall of 1900.10 Haus des Rundfunks and BBC 
Broadcasting House were among the first major dedicated recording facilities where the 
acoustic design of the recording spaces much more closely resembled the performance spaces 
from which music originated. This was a significant shift from the paradigm that had developed 
to support early recording formats and was demonstrated most visibly by the studios designed 
for orchestral performance. Both Haus des Rundfunks and Broadcasting House have large  
 
9 ‘Studio Acoustics’, BBC Year Book, 1931, 286–87, americanradiohistory.com. 
10 Michael Barron, Auditorium Acoustics and Architectural Design, Second edition. (London ; New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2010), 6. 
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Figure 1.3: A recording facility at Haus des Rundfunks in 1931. Visible on the two tall stands are two disc 
recorders (probably wax-based) with associated playback and patching equipment in the background. Initially 
an analytical tool for calibrating the acoustic designs of recording spaces, music recordings made at Haus des 




recording spaces for symphony orchestra: Sendesaal I in Berlin and the Concert Hall in London. 
The Concert Hall at Broadcasting House, though smaller than Sendesaal I, has a volume nearly 
four times greater than that of the biggest recording studio at the BBC’s previous headquarters, 
Savoy Hill.12 Both spaces emulated the characteristics and conventions of symphony concert 
halls, notably by incorporating seating for audience. Initially most concert sessions were 
broadcast live – in part to bypass the technical limitations of recorded formats - and audiences 
were an integral part of such performances.  
 
Germany was also at the forefront of improved recording formats, with magnetic-wire 
dictation devices coming into use during the 1920s.13 The BBC used similar magnetic steel 
wire and steel tape recording devices from 1926.14 The audio quality of these devices was 
limited by the standards of the day, but the flexibility they offered broadcasters was quickly 
recognised. The RRG’s ability to make its own in-house recordings was significant to the 
 
11 Lubszynski and Hoffmann, ‘The Broadcast Installations in the New “House of Radio”’, 1968. 
12 ‘Ten Years of Technical Progress’, BBC Year Book, 1933, 49, americanradiohistory.com. 
13 Mark Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, HI-FI Tape Recording, February 1958, 21, 
americanradiohistory.com. 
14 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol. 2, The Golden Age of Wireless. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 99. 
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completion of the acoustic design of Sendesaal I, located at the heart of Haus des Rundfunks. 
Sendesaal I existed in experimental form between 1931 and 1933, with major alterations made 
to the stage, seating arrangements, walls and seating. 15  After each alteration, analytical 
recordings were made until the Sendesaal I design was finalised, Figure 1.3 shows a recording 
facility at Haus des Rundfunks from this period.16 In 1935 AEG unveiled the Magnetophon 
tape recorder at the Berlin Exhibition in 1935.17 It was the first tape recorder to use magnetic 
tape with a plastic base. This device had the best audio quality of the era and the reel-to-reel 
tape format also allowed recordings to be considerably longer than those possible on disc.  
 
The Magnetophon granted RRG a level of flexibility in programming and an ability to 
re-broadcast both speech and musical programme content that was unmatched technologically 
by the BBC or US broadcasters at the time. The Magnetophon was further refined during the 
war and Magnetophons captured by the Allies later became the initial basis for audio tape’s 
commercial development and the introduction of stereo recording in the US in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. This is examined in closer detail in Chapter 3. The capabilities of the 
Magnetophon had immediate implications for how Sendesaal I was used. As the improved 
recording set-up at Haus des Rundfunks made it feasible and efficient to use Sendesaal I for 
making orchestral recordings in addition to live broadcasts, the existing acoustic became 
problematic. The acoustic had been calibrated to account for the presence of an audience. In 
their absence, the bare wooden seats extended the reverberation time problematically; the 
short-term solution was to string absorptive panels across the seating rows.18 Despite these 
complications, Sendesaal I was a major influence on European broadcasting. The conjunction 
of public concert hall and national broadcasting centre became a template for a series of 
publically accessible broadcasting halls built across Europe before, during, and after the 
Second World War. Many of these implemented specific design features as attempts to 
reconcile the conflicting acoustic roles of concert hall and recording studio. However, the 
degree to which the GDR’s orchestral recording space at Funkhaus Berlin, Saal 1, later deviated 
towards prioritising its recording function places it as an outlier in this context. This can be 
 
15 Gerhard Steinke and Gisela Herzog, Der Raum ist das Kleid der Musik: Musik-Aufnahmesäle und 
Hörspielstudios im Funkhaus Berlin-Nalepastrasse sowie weitere Aufführungs- und Hörräume (Berlin: Verlag 
Kopie & Druck Adlershof, 2012), 176. 
16 Lubszynski and Hoffmann, ‘The Broadcast Installations in the New “House of Radio”’, 1968. 
17 Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, 24. 
18 Stankoweit, ‘Studiotechnik Rundfunk: Band I’, 8. 
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1.1.1  Intersections of Broadcasting and Politics in Germany  
 
The Nazi Party - or Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) - recognised the 
political utility of radio broadcasting and their rise to power was characterised by an integrated 
use of radio to announce and legitimise their regime.19 Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was 
announced on radio by President Hindenberg in January and the exploitation of RRG’s national 
infrastructure by the NSDAP escalated steadily in the run-up to the decisive March 1933 
election.20 Legitimising political coverage replaced normal programming after the election and 
Hitler’s policy declaration on 22 March was the first broadcast ever made from within the 
Reichstag chamber. 21  The speech was recorded and later re-broadcast. 22  RRG’s music 
broadcasting capabilities were also a significant element of the political transition; 
broadcasting services on election day ended with the live relay of the third act of Die 
Meistersinger from the Staatsoper (Berlin State Opera), attended by the cabinet.23 Goebbels 
established a characteristic pattern by instructing the RRG to focus on entertainment 
programming in the aftermath of the election as a tactic for maintaining the listening public’s 
engagement with the medium.24 Radio license figures - depicted in Figure 1.4 - show that the 
radio audience in Germany continued to expand in the lead-up to the Second World War and 
both factual and entertainment broadcasting remained a constant tool of the NSDAP until the 
fall of the regime.25 Audience penetration by radio contributed to the effectiveness of NSDAP 
propaganda but Germany’s sophisticated radio technologies, including the Magnetophon, 
which assisted the dissemination of political speeches and morale-boosting concert 




19 Pipke, Rundfunk und Politik, kleine Geschichte des Rundfunks in Deutschland., 19; ‘News of the Week - 
Government Broadcasts in Germany’, Wireless World, 1 June 1932, americanradiohistory.com. 
20 ‘German Revolution and Broadcasting’, Broadcasting, 1 May 1933, 11, americanradiohistory.com. 
21 ‘German Revolution and Broadcasting’, 11. 
22 ‘German Revolution and Broadcasting’, 11. 
23 ‘German Revolution and Broadcasting’. 
24 ‘The Re-Organisation of German Broadcasting’, BBC Year Book, 1934, 295. 
25 Stankoweit, ‘Studiotechnik Rundfunk: Band I’, 381. 
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Figure 1.4: The above chart depicts the proliferation of radio licenses in Germany between 1924 and 1938. The 
rough figures give a sense of a rapidly developing radio listenership in the lead up to the Second World War.26 
 
 
The strategic value of Germany’s radio broadcasting infrastructure meant occupiers 
prioritised its acquisition after the fall of the Third Reich. The Soviet Army captured Haus des 
Rundfunks after the Battle of Berlin on 2 May 1945 and worked with German technicians to 
quickly restore Berlin broadcasting.27 A 1967 collaborative technical history of Rundfunk DDR 
collated by Werner Stankoweit offers insights into the GDR broadcaster’s interpretation of 
these events. Stankoweit’s account characterises the capturing of Haus des Rundfunks as “Die 
Stunde Null” (“zero hour”).28 This account continues its alignment of radio broadcasting events 
within broader German history by referring to the first post-war radio transmission in Germany 
as “Geburtsstunde des DDRs” (“the birth of the GDR”).29 This occurred on the evening of 13 
May with the transmission of a speech by Nikolai Berzarin, the Soviet Commander of Berlin, 
delivered and broadcast from the site of the Tegel transmission tower in north-west Berlin.  
Due to the destruction of communications infrastructure during the Battle of Berlin, the initial 
post-war broadcasts from Tegel were heavily reliant on the use of Übertragenswagen (Ü-
wagen) (mobile broadcasting trucks), which operated in lieu of Haus des Rundfunks and other 
broadcasting centres. Self-contained, flexible and often the only surviving un-damaged 
components of radio infrastructure across much of Germany, the mobility of these surviving 
Ü-wagen was essential in re-establishing the German radio network. A field-telephone line run 
 
26 Stankoweit, 381. 
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between the Tegel tower and Haus des Rundfunks enabled the live transmission of the first 
post-war broadcast concert from Sendesaal I on 18 May, under the conductor Leopold 
Ludwig. 30  Haus des Rundfunks was restored to functionality, but this was not without 
interruption as the line to Tegel was prone to failure. The ability to pre-record broadcasts to 
tape was thus crucial to the maintenance of the broadcasting schedule, with recordings 
delivered by hand to the Tegel transmitter until the connection was stabilised.31   
 
By the time US troops arrived in Berlin in June, the Soviets had established a new radio 
entity, Berliner Rundfunk, which was already broadcasting nineteen hours a day from Haus 
des Rundfunks.32 For almost a year Berliner Rundfunk was the only radio broadcaster of scale 
in Berlin; regional broadcasting in East Germany did not recommence for several months.33 
This allowed Soviet-sponsored narratives to be broadcast unchallenged during a period that 
included the Nuremberg trials and the merging of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Communist Party, an important milestone on the road to formation of the GDR as a single-
party state.34 The Soviets stonewalled the Western Allies from any meaningful participation in 
the running of the broadcaster, leading the US to found Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor 
(Radio in the American Sector) (RIAS) as a counterweight in 1946.35 Despite possessing a less-
developed radio infrastructure than Berliner Rundfunk, RIAS was able to quickly develop an 
impressive journalistic reputation among both West and East German listeners. This was 
established by active reportage during major periods of unrest, including the Berlin Blockade 
and the 1953 Uprising. This reputation, gained during the late-1940s and early-1950s, was 
maintained among GDR listeners throughout its existence at the expense of trust in Rundfunk 
DDR’s journalistic integrity; RIAS and other West German broadcasters remained important 
alternative sources of news and media in the face of the steady erection of administrative, 
physical and electronic borders. 
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Broadcasting conflicts between East and West during the Cold War period were often 
conducted along electronic fronts, but their initiation in Germany was rooted in material 
infrastructure. As Berliner Rundfunk enacted a partisan programme, the lines that defined the 
four occupation zones of Berlin began to solidify and to sever connections, tangible and 
ephemeral. The communication lines that interconnected the restored broadcasting 
infrastructure of Berlin were fragile and Berliner Rundfunk’s reintegrated broadcasting 
apparatus was sprawled across Berlin. Haus des Rundfunks was in the British sector and the 
Tegel transmitter was in the French sector. The telegraph exchange at Winterfeldstraße was in 
the American sector and would eventually become the permanent home of RIAS. As the 
relationship between the allies deteriorated, the possession and administration of these 
infrastructural resources by the Soviet military administration and, subsequently, the GDR, 
became increasingly tenuous. The escalating enforcement by the Western allies of the 
administrative borders of the occupied zones steadily targeted transgressive components of the 
East German broadcast infrastructure, forcefully enacting the borders between the opposing 
spheres of influence and foreshadowing the later erection of the physically impassable – though 
electronically bypassable - Berlin Wall.  
 
In 1946 and 1947 intermittent disruptions to the communications line between Haus 
des Rundfunks and Tegel were attributed by Berliner Rundfunk to US sabotage action.36 
Workers at the broadcaster resorted to extracting personal promises from US army personnel 
that repair works would not be interfered with, but a steady policy of disruption was 
suspected.37 A seminal event was the demolition of the Tegel transmitter by the French Army 
on 16 December 1948.38 Safety concerns over the landing paths of aircraft at Tegel airport were 
used by the French authorities to justify this, but the demolition was condemned as politically 
motivated by the press in the Soviet occupied zone.39  The loss of the tower required the 
rerouting of all Haus des Rundfunks transmissions through the radio tower at Potsdam until a 
new transmitter was erected at Königs Wusterhausen.40 This left Haus des Rundfunks as the 
only remaining major piece of broadcasting infrastructure in West Berlin that was still in the 
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hands of the Soviet military administration. In May and October 1949, the division of Germany 
into two states was confirmed with the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic. In the spring of 1950 power to Haus des Rundfunks was cut for 
eighteen days.41 This was again interpreted as part of a Western policy of encroachment related 
to the newly formalised territorial situation. Independent power generators, a much-lauded 
feature of the original installation in the 1930s, allowed work to continue there without much 
disruption and the new East German state initially retained a firm hold on Haus des 
Rundfunks.42  
 
In 1952 the Soviet administration was preparing to cede full control of the East German 
broadcasting network to the GDR. This involved the formation of the Staatliches Komitee für 
Rundfunk (State Broadcasting Committee) along the lines of a Soviet model of centralised 
radio management and restructured East German radio broadcasting under the name Rundfunk 
DDR.43 This period was also marked by a major escalation in attempts to remove the GDR 
presence from Haus des Rundfunks. On the morning of 3 June 1952, British forces established 
a boundary around the facility.44 The day’s broadcasting began as normal but GDR radio 
workers were informed by British soldiers that they would be allowed to leave but not re-enter. 
Rundfunk DDR responded to the blockade by diverting most of its radio workers to its auxiliary 
radio centre, Funkhaus Grünau. This was a converted former row house on the outskirts of 
Berlin that was then in use as an overflow production facility. It now became an important 
tactical fall-back position for Rundfunk DDR in its efforts to maintain scheduled programming. 
Haus des Rundfunks continued to broadcast, with assistance from Funkhaus Grünau, but a full 
programme was not possible.45 Haus des Rundfunks’ telephone lines were still connected and 
at the end of the first day, a decision was made to have the radio workers remain and occupy 
the building. 46  The original group of occupiers worked through until 11 June, when the 
blockade was lifted and the staff rotated out.47 The blockade was raised again several days later 
but once Funkhaus Grünau was capable of maintaining a full programme, plans were made to 
permanently vacate the building.  
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The blockading and ultimate loss of Haus des Rundfunks was characterised as a violent 
trauma and injustice to Rundfunk DDR, its employees and the wider GDR public. Rundfunk 
DDR, unlike its West German counterparts, traced its origins to the immediate aftermath of the 
defeat of the Nazis. It regarded this and the efforts of its technicians to restart broadcasting in 
Berlin as a justification for its inheritance of the centrepiece of German national radio 
infrastructure. General Berzarin’s broadcast speech in 1945, the “Geburtstunde des DDRs”, 
was not just a historical marker, it was a deeply formative moment directly experienced by 
many of Rundfunk DDR’s staff. Stankoweit’s history, which focusses primarily on technical 
narratives, nonetheless relates recollections of General Berzarin supplying groceries to the 
radio engineers that worked on that first broadcast and the recommencement of broadcasting 
was idealised as a collaborative effort between Soviet engineers and ideologically motivated, 
anti-fascist German radio engineers. 48  The Haus des Rundfunks blockade was also 
mythologised and Stankoweit’s account includes anecdotal details that humanise the narrative 
of events it describes. The senior staff member amongst the occupiers, Karl-Eduard Schnitzler, 
was remembered for greeting British Army soldiers with a new tie each morning for the 
duration of the first blockade, despite the shortage of fresh clothing available to the occupiers.49 
The actions and dignity of the Rundfunk DDR staff members who occupied Haus des 
Rundfunks through the blockade were seen as characteristic of the spirit of the broadcaster’s 
employees, who continued to absorb the loss of essential broadcasting assets due to hostile 
Western advances. This narrative of historical continuity through broadcasting continuity and 
the sacrifice and dignity of GDR radio workers in the face of adversity was contrasted against 
characterisations of the post-war West German broadcasters, in particular RIAS. RIAS was 
painted as a foreign broadcaster in GDR technical media; it was US-formed and stocked with 
US equipment, so not only did it lack a historical German lineage, it was not even 
technologically German.50 The Haus des Rundfunks blockade spanned five weeks and was 
ended by negotiation between the West Berlin Senate and the Soviet military administration.51 
Haus des Rundfunks remained nominally in Soviet hands until it was handed over to the West 
Berlin authorities during a period of relative détente in June 1956.52 It was renovated and 
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became the headquarters of Sender Freies Berlin in 1957. For Rundfunk DDR, the loss of Haus 
des Rundfunks remained influential within its institutional psyche, internalised within a 
formation narrative used to motivate the broadcasters counter-capitalist efforts. Beyond the 
psychology of the institution and its workers, the Haus des Rundfunks saga was also central to 




1.1.2  Locating and Forming Funkhaus Berlin  
 
The loss of Haus des Rundfunk to political manoeuvrings was an enduring source of 
grievance for Rundfunk DDR, but short- and long-term preparations suggest that it was 
regarded as an inevitability. In the weeks and months preceding the blockade, valuable 
instruments, tape archives and equipment were removed in anticipation.53 Funkhaus Grünau 
played an important stop-gap role during the blockade - the facility ensured broadcasting did 
not cease and it acted as an intermediate headquarters and production centre - but it was never 
intended to serve as a long-term facility. The use of Funkhaus Grünau aligned well with the 
make-do attitude that pervaded many aspects of post-war recuperation in the GDR, but it had 
a severely limited production capacity, sub-par acoustics, old equipment and was really only 
well-suited to preparing speech work.54 A long-term strategic solution for broadcasting in the 
GDR was actually already well-advanced by the time of the Haus des Rundfunks blockade. 
The decision to found a new Funkhaus had been taken in 1951 and renovations began on a 
vacant factory building adjoining a brownfield site in Oberschöneweide by June of that 
year.55Although the new Funkhaus Berlin was not in a state of preparation that could allow it 
to take over seamlessly from Haus des Rundfunks when the blockade occurred, some radio 
production had begun there in the month prior to the blockade.56 The blockade led to the 
acceleration of efforts to complete Funkhaus Berlin and the new facility contributed pre-
recorded material that was broadcast from Funkhaus Grünau during the blockade. 57  By 
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September 1952, Funkhaus Berlin began assuming the role of primary radio broadcasting site 
in the GDR.  
 
The encirclement of Haus des Rundfunks had a deleterious impact on the GDR 
broadcasting schedule, but the pre-initiation of the Funkhaus Berlin project allowed Rundfunk 
DDR to complete a major transfer of its broadcasting resources within about three months of 
the start of the blockade. A factor in the relative success of this transfer may have been the 
secrecy that initially surrounded the Funkhaus Berlin project.58 Preparations were underway 
for almost a year before knowledge of the project became widespread and the East German 
public at large only became aware of the new Funkhaus around the time it began contributing 
broadcasts during the blockade.59 A contributor to the success of this clandestine aspect of 
Funkhaus Berlin was the new facility’s relative isolation. Located in an industrial area on the 
fringes of East Berlin associated with the Rummelsburg and Klingenberg power stations, this 
contrasts with the comparatively urbanised location of Haus des Rundfunks and an established 
pattern of locating radio broadcasting houses close to city centres. This connection between 
broadcasting centres and urban city locations was still being renewed by contemporary 
developments like Funkhaus Köln in West Germany, completed in 1952, which was located in 
the heart of the old city adjacent to the city’s cathedral. Funkhaus Köln serves as a useful 
control in comparing the divergent approaches of Funkhaus Berlin from its predecessor and 
contemporaries and will be referred to throughout this analysis. Rundfunk DDR’s relocation 
to Funkhaus Berlin altered its relationship to the city in a way that mirrored its reactive 
approach to journalism and which also had implications for the design of its acoustic spaces. 
 
Funkhaus Berlin’s comparative distance from East Berlin can be mapped onto 
journalistic trends established during this period, inferable from occurrences in Berlin during 
the 1953 Uprising. RIAS had already established itself as an energised and directly engaged 
broadcaster during the Berlin Blockade and it confirmed this reputation among listeners in the 
GDR during the 17 June uprising. RIAS’s reportage was frequently updated throughout the 
day but was met by relative silence from Rundfunk DDR, whose journalistic models were still 
undergoing significant and disruptive transformation.60 During the rising, the GDR premier, 
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Walter Ulbricht, ordered the maintenance of normal programming and the first Rundfunk DDR 
news report was in the evening, meaning Soviet and GDR officials were themselves reliant on 
RIAS for up-to-date information during the day.61 While Rundfunk DDR reporters, unlike 
RIAS, were not engaged in direct, on-the-scene broadcasting, Funkhaus Berlin itself had one 
notable direct engagement with events. As an important communications hub a radio centre 
was a likely site for disruption, but its new and distant location seemed to protect it from any 
focussed confrontation. Stankoweit’s history again offers an entry point to Rundfunk DDR’s 
interpretation of its engagement with major historical events, as it includes three subtly 
differentiated accounts of the disturbance that did occur on 17 June. The first describes how 
radio workers faced difficulties in getting to work that day but collaborated to minimise any 
disruption; a group of agitators arrived and urged radio workers to leave their posts but were 
turned away.62 The second account is more visceral and describes how Funkhaus Berlin was 
attacked by rebels who caused some damage but did not manage to disrupt broadcasting.63 This 
account directly accuses the RIAS of orchestrating the upheaval in line with the official GDR 
interpretation and aligns with earlier accounts that relate of Funkhaus Berlin being “stormed”.64 
The final account, an entry in a historical timeline, simply states, “Provokation in Berlin. 
Kollektiv beweist seinen Zusammenhalt.” (“Provocation in Berlin. Team demonstrates its 
togetherness.”)65  What these accounts help to indicate is an alignment between Funkhaus 
Berlin itself and the defensive and reactive approach of Rundfunk DDR’s news reporting.66 
The broadcaster, which regarded Berliner Rundfunk as its progenitor, had enjoyed uncontested 
control of the airwaves over Berlin only a few years previous. In response to the drawn-out 
loss of its inherited infrastructure, to a large extent it had fallen back into a protective stance. 
Its comparatively passive approach to covering the greatest period of unrest in the GDR before 
the fall of the Berlin Wall contributed to the bolstering of West German broadcasting’s role in 
East German. Its new sequestered broadcasting centre was a further symptom of this stance 
and these altered circumstances indirectly contributed to the shaping of the acoustic design of 
the second phase of Funkhaus Berlin. 
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Figure 1.5: Front page article from Neues Deutschland, April 1955. The article – and others like it – folded 
Funkhaus Berlin into the broad anti-West narratives of the era by depicting Arno Bade in Block B re-enacting 
his supposed act of sabotage.67 
 
 
One of the positive attributes of the Oberschöneweide site was the presence of a pre-
existing building suitable for conversion and which minimised requirement for new materials. 
This building, a former furniture and war-time munitions factory, was reconfigured for radio 
production and served as Rundfunk DDR’s new administrative headquarters.68 However, from 
the beginning the ambitions for Funkhaus Berlin extended beyond this single repurposed 
factory block, known as Block A.69 These ambitions were realised with the construction of 
Block B, a dedicated music and drama recording facility, begun in 1953 and fully completed 
in 1956. Block B blended proven acoustic design features with bold new elements and 
incorporated four music recording spaces of varying size and intention alongside two Hörspiel 
(radio drama) recording complexes. However, even before Block B was completed, it was 
given a prominent role in the continuing narrative of Western attacks on East German 
broadcasting. This was triggered by a fire that broke out on the evening of 16 February, 1955, 
destroying the interior of the two largest recording spaces.70 At the time of the fire, Block B 
was nearing completion: the fundamental structure was complete, the studios were partly clad 
and workers were installing the climate control plant and electrical systems. The fire and the 
extent of the damage was reported in the national press on 18 February.71 By 19 February the 
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GDR media started to label the fire as an act of sabotage, referring to reports from police.72 A 
report on the fire carried in the New York Herald Tribune on 17 February, which cited the West 
Berlin-based Committee of Free Jurists, was taken as corroboration by the GDR press of the 
involvement of foreign espionage services.73 On 14 April, a worker involved with the Block B 
construction, Arno Bade, was arrested and accused of arson, to which he confessed.74 Bade was 
one of 521 “American agents” rounded up in the immediate aftermath of the fire. As 
reproduced in Figure 1.5, Bade featured on the front page of the Neues Deutschland newspaper 
re-enacting his act of arson in the charred remains of Block B alongside a picture of the 
accelerant he was reportedly supplied from New York.75 The institutional reaction prompted 
by the fire highlights the pitch of tensions running through GDR polity during this period of 
Cold War paranoia, as well as specific anxieties surrounding its broadcast architecture. 
 
The fire at Funkhaus Berlin was directly used to galvanise a response from Rundfunk 
DDR construction workers and to inspire solidarity actions amongst the general GDR public. 
In the weeks following the fire, employees of various radio-related companies volunteered 
4000 hours of labour.76 GDR media emphasised the collective nature of the assault. Neues 
Deutschland quoted a worker saying, “der Brand im Rundfunkhaus… hätte ebensogut bei uns 
gelegt werden können” (“the fire in the Rundfunkhaus… could just as easily have happened to 
us”).77  Bade’s name became a frequent touchstone for GDR media during discussions of 
Western espionage actions and was still used in this way as late as 1979.78 Although an arson 
attack remained the official GDR narrative for the fire, the writer Jan Eik found this to be a 
construct in his investigation of several GDR-era scandals. Eik found that the original fire 
officer report attributed the cause of the fire to faulty or badly-placed temporary electrical 
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lighting.79 There were previously reported instances of bad work-practice involving temporary 
lighting that resulted in melted or smouldering building elements.80 The GDR’s readiness to 
machinate an elaborate propaganda construct allowed a work-place accident to be used to 
prolong a narrative of injustices perpetrated against Rundfunk DDR and its predecessor, which 
began with the destruction of the Tegel transmitter in 1948 and culminated with the ejection 
from Haus des Rundfunks in 1952. Together, the 1953 Uprising and the manipulation of the 
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Part 2:  
The Expression of Technological and Political Narratives in the design of Block B 
 
Block B was completed in January 1956, almost exactly a year after the fire, and entered 
operation in February 1956.81 The restoration of the facility was characterised as a direct retort 
by GDR workers to the actions of Arno Bade and the generalised threat of Western saboteurs 
and presented as another example of adversity overcome by Rundfunk DDR and the GDR more 
widely.82 Block B, much more than Block A, offered an opportunity for considering how 
architectural and acoustical design for a recording complex could advance and respond to their 
placement within new technological, political and geographical contexts. This section looks at 
general architectural features of Block B and how they were formed by its acoustic functions, 
some of the specific acoustic design features of the studios themselves, and attempts to 
contextualise these within the eventful narrative that preceded its construction. While Block B 
was recognised over several decades as a successful and practical design for a demanding 
purpose, it is possible to identify tensions between elements of the building and the ideological 
underpinnings of design in the GDR that were being solidified contemporaneously with the 
construction of the recording complex. Other features of Block B - and the acoustic design of 
Saal 1 in particular – are indicative of a radically progressive approach to broadcasting house 
conventions that align with how cultural ideology developed in the GDR. The team responsible 
for designing Block B was diverse and this analysis will focus on a relatively small number of 
informative design components attributed to a variety of contributors; these range from 
fundamental structural features to decorative details.  
 
The noted architect and designer, Franz Ehrlich, oversaw the Block A renovation and 
was also the lead architect for Block B. A product of the Bauhaus school, he was a socialist 
from his youth and had worked with Hans Pölzig, the architect of Haus des Rundfunks.83 He 
was sent to a concentration camp before the war began and later served in a penal battalion in 
the Balkans.84 Upon his return to Germany, Ehrlich was closely involved with attempts during 
the early 1950s to develop a design aesthetic that could serve the ideological and practical 
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requirements of the GDR; active as an architect during the 1950s, he also designed mass-
produced consumer goods like plastic chairs.85  Ehrlich’s first involvement with Funkhaus 
Berlin - the renovation and extension of Block A - was undertaken under severe time 
constraints as Rundfunk DDR attempted to pre-empt the loss of Haus des Rundfunks. The 
preliminary design work was done by Ehrlich’s five-person team in just eight days and parts 
of the building were occupied by radio workers after just six months of building work.86 Block 
A was never intended to serve as Rundfunk DDR’s primary recording facility; the idea of a 
dedicated recording wing for music and drama was part of the Funkhaus Berlin concept from 
the beginning and construction commenced almost immediately after the completion of Block 
A.87 Ehrlich had developed some preliminary ideas for a new  broadcasting house between 
1948 and 1949, when a new facility was planned for Dresden but eventually cancelled.88 
Ehrlich was dedicated to practical and economical design but resisted an aesthetic that was 
merely functional, which exposed him to controversy. Other than Ehrlich’s own design 
aesthetic, important influences on the final design of Block B include contributions made by 
Rundfunk DDR on specialist features, material shortages and restrictions imposed by the site. 
Identifying Ehrlich’s particular contributions in the context of a largely collaborative effort is 
challenging, but interpretation and the identification of incongruencies is possible by drawing 
on his own writing, interviews, architectural plans of Block B and accounts of how usage of 
the recording complex developed over forty years. 
 
The formation of a layout for Block B that integrated its acoustic functions in a practical 
and economical form was a collaboration between Ehrlich and Gerhard Probst, the head 
technician of Rundfunk DDR. 89  As Block A already incorporated the administrative and 
general broadcasting facilities for Rundfunk DDR, Block B did not require the integration of 
these functions - as seen in the Haus des Rundfunks design – and Block B is thus a rare example 
of a large-scale building built explicitly for the single purpose of recording. Many of the 
successful acoustic features utilised at Haus des Rundfunks and emulated across Europe were 
also carried forward into Block B: separate foundations isolated each studio acoustically from  
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Figure 1.6: Floor plan of Block B with the main recording spaces labelled. The plan shows how the irregular 
forms of the recording spaces were enclosed within a comparatively regularised and economical building plan.90 
 
 
other parts of the building and non-parallel walls - as found in Sendesaal I - were a feature of 
all the new Block B recording spaces. Effective acoustic isolation secured the operability of a 
building running simultaneous recording sessions and non-parallel walls helped mitigate a 
number of acoustic defects, particularly flutter echoes and standing waves. While the large 
recording spaces at Haus des Rundfunks occupied semi-independent enclosures within the 
open spaces surrounded by that building’s administrative facade, the layout of Block B was 
condensed in comparison by laying the six main recording spaces contiguously within a single 
structure. The irregular floor-plans created by the non-parallel walls utilised in the acoustic 
designs of the spaces thus became a major factor in the design of the building’s layout.  
 
Block B is divided into three sub-sections: two wings or sub-blocks linked by a curved 
connecting section. Analysis of Block B’s studio floor-plans, as depicted in Figure 1.6, within 
the context of these enclosing sections shows that Ehrlich and Probst used two approaches to 
incorporate the irregular floor-plans of Block B’s studio spaces within a comparatively regular 
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building ground-plan. The first of these approaches was applied to Block B’s two largest 
recording spaces, Saal 1 and Saal 2, housed within the larger of the two wings. Saal 1 and Saal 
2 are laid so that the wider end of each of the two quadrilateral spaces lies alongside the 
narrower end of its counterpart. This maximised the available volume for each recording space 
within the enclosing structure; beneficial to the acoustic requirements of large scale classical 
recordings, while also conserving building materials. This general approach to economising 
the use of space is also evidenced by the location of the marble-clad main entrance foyer within 
the same the wing as Saal 1 and Saal 2. Water table issues meant Saal 1 and Saal 2 were raised 
in the design to the first floor.91 This facilitated the inclusion of the entrance foyer directly 
below the recording spaces. The second wing at the opposite end of Block B houses the larger 
of the two radio drama studio complexes, a cluster of small irregular recording spaces enclosed 
within a largely regular form. These two sections are coupled by a connective building section 
that also encloses Saal 3 (chamber music), Saal 4 (popular music) and the smaller radio drama 
studio. This connective section is where Ehrlich and Probst applied their second approach to 
rationalising irregular spaces within a unified structure. In contrast with the square structure 
that encloses Saal 1 and Saal 2, here they allowed the quadrilateral recording spaces to direct 
the layout of this section by arranging the spaces to form a curve. This creates an elegant uniting 
form for this section of Block B that functionally encloses the recording spaces without 
material or space wastage. Using these methods, Ehrlich and Probst successfully integrated the 
specialised forms used by acoustic spaces for recording within a largely-standardised and 
economic building form. 
 
Externally, Block B largely emulated and took reference from the subdued and 
functional form of Block A, as well as the nearby Kraftwerk Klingenberg.92 Block B was 
conceived and executed at a time when debates over formalism in architecture were reaching 
their peak in the GDR.93 Ehrlich was controversial within GDR architectural circles due to his 
usage of non-functional decorative features and his commissions dwindled during the 1960s.94 
Some aspects of Block B’s exterior that can be described as decorative left it vulnerable to such 
critiques. Ehrlich’s defence of the Block B design centred on its unification of architecture and 
broadcasting technology to form a practical and functional facility, but one which could also 
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make a creative statement.95 Economic circumstances in the GDR at the time meant this had to 
be achieved prudently and Ehrlich was at pains to emphasise the economising measures that 
informed Block B’s construction and decoration. A consistent justification was that Block A 
and Block B had functionally replaced the extensive capabilities of Haus des Rundfunks at a 
very reasonable cost. The newspaper Neues Deutschland reported that Block B cost half the 
price of Haus des Rundfunks, although the basis of comparison is not made clear. 96 
Justifications of Block B as good value for money were tempered by Ehrlich’s assertion that 
“wir haben die Sparsamkeit nie in enge Knausrigkeit ausarten lassen” (“we have never allowed 
thrift to degenerate into stinginess”), and some internal decorative features can be directly 
linked to Ehrlich’s belief that spaces for musical performance warranted adornment.97 The most 
notable instances of decoration within the acoustic spaces of Block B occur in Saal 1 and Saal 
3. These are discussed in turn and in the latter case are suggestive of unresolved hierarchies of 
regard towards the different genres of music accommodated by Block B. Ehrlich’s aversion 
towards complete functionalism also emerges elsewhere. Although the decoration of the 
interior of Block B’s non-acoustic spaces and access areas was completed quickly and cheaply 
by using plaster as the predominant finish, more traditional and expensive finishes were used 
for selected areas; marble and timber finishes were applied in the main foyer and some of the 
building’s break out and reception areas. In addition to the delineation and prioritisation of 
certain areas by their decoration, elements of Block B’s structural layout for acoustic and access 
purposes appear to promote the segregation of certain forms of audio work. These structural 
features are also discussed. In some of these cases, technological developments interacted with 




1.2.1  Orchestral Recording Spaces in German Broadcasting Houses 
 
For the design of Block B’s interior acoustic spaces, Probst was instrumental in 
assembling a team that had experience from previous Funkhaus developments. This team was 
headed by Lothar Keibs, the lead acoustician of Deutsche Post - the governmental 
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communications infrastructure organisation with oversight of Rundfunk DDR - and assisted by 
Gisela Herzog. Herzog was a member of Deutsche Post’s important research unit, the 
Laboratory for Radio and Television (Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk- und Fernsehen) 
(BRF).98 At the time of Block B’s construction, musical recordings for Rundfunk DDR were 
being undertaken in ad hoc recording spaces across East Berlin.99 These included a large room 
at the Ministry of Finance and a Kultursaal (culture room) at Funkhaus Berlin that pre-dated 
the Block A renovation.100 This latter room continued to host occasional recording sessions and 
received the designation “Saal 5” after the completion of Block B. Block B was constructed to 
definitively conclude the use of unsatisfactory acoustic spaces for Rundfunk DDR cultural 
recordings following the loss of Haus des Rundfunks by rationalising and centralising the 
recording of music and drama in a single location. The capital outlay made during a difficult 
economic period was justified by its national function; regional broadcasters received technical 
upgrades during the GDR-era, but Funkhaus Berlin’s music and drama production resources 
were intended to meet the majority of the cultural broadcast production needs for the entire 
state. 
 
With the exception of Saal 2, the second largest recording space at Block B, all the 
music recording spaces at Block B were conceptualised along strict genre lines and with little 
intention for cross-usage.101 The degree to which the usage of Saal 2 changed and broadened 
in terms of genre marks it out among the four music recording spaces. Visually resembling a 
decoratively subdued ballroom and shown in Figure 1.7, Saal 2 was originally intended to be 
useful for recording the Unterhaltungsorchester and Tanzorchester (“light music” and dance 
orchestras) popular in Germany during the period of its design.102 Saal 2 proved to be more 
flexible than anticipated and was increasingly used for large symphony recordings: originally 
intended to be the sole responsibility of Saal 1. It also played an important role in introducing 
stereo recording techniques to popular music at Rundfunk DDR in the early-1960s.103 While 
each of the Block B recording spaces warrants an extended analysis, the historical and political 
significance of pioneering orchestral recording spaces in broadcasting houses like Haus des  
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Figure 1.7: Image of Saal 2 taken from the centre of the space. Saal 2 had perhaps the least rigid genre strictures 
of any recording space at the time of Block B’s inception and it proved to be one of the most flexible. The two 
doorways depicted lead to the technical service corridor.104 
 
 
Figure 1.8: An image of Saal 1, taken from the main entrance and looking toward the recessed performance area 
and organ. Saal 1 combined traditional features of concert performance spaces with an unusual approach to the 
placing of the orchestra.105 
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Rundfunks, added to the ideological weight symphonic music held in the GDR’s cultural 
hierarchy calls for a focus on Saal 1, Block B’s largest recording space. 
 
In addition to being the largest, Saal 1 – a partial view of which is reproduced above in 
Figure 1.8 - is also Block B’s most unique recording space, highly specialised to accommodate 
full-scale performance and recording of symphony orchestra, choir and organ, separately or in 
tandem. It is Saal 1 that most definitively situates Block B’s acoustic designs in a dialogue 
between progressive innovation and historical emulation, further complicated by the 
enveloping political context. Saal 1 also explicitly evokes the re-weighting of acoustic design 
priorities for orchestral music in a broadcasting house undertaken by its designers, who 
departed decisively from the example of its predecessors and contemporaries. While an 
examination of Saal 1’s distinctive features makes this re-weighting clear, the relative 
weighting of the causes that resulted in its final form are comparatively difficult to delineate. 
The contextual backdrop detailed in Part 1 combined with more immediate and functional 
concerns to create a complicated intermeshing of driving factors: acoustic reprioritisations for 
practical purposes, opportunities for innovation due to geographical and political 
considerations, and the facilitation of secondary but well-established functions of performance 
spaces in broadcasting houses. The most unambiguous alteration enacted by Saal 1 in 
comparison with its predecessor, Sendesaal I, is the centring of the performers and the 
recording acoustic in the space’s acoustic design and the consequent diminishment of the 
accommodation made for concert performance or a live audience as part of the recording 
process. The designation “Saal 1” in itself is a very deliberate departure from its predecessor; 
the omission of the prefix “Sende” from all the recording spaces at Block B removes the 
assumption of a live broadcast and acknowledges the shift in practice from live broadcasting 
concert performances to broadcasting pre-recorded performances, which occurred shortly after 
Sendesaal I was first inaugurated in the early 1930s. 106  By contrast, the recording and 
broadcasting spaces of Funkhaus Köln, fully completed in 1952, retain the Sendesaal 
designation.107 However, Saal 1’s designation only confirms its design priorities, which are 
hard-coded into its design through a re-configuration of allocated space and novel positioning 
approaches applied to both performers and audience. 
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A cursory analysis of Saal 1 could perhaps overlook its underlying radical nature. Of 
all the Block B recording spaces, its decoration is the most historicised and potentially familiar. 
Referencing banqueting and guild halls – and perhaps some of the temporary “culture rooms” 
utilised for orchestral recordings by Rundfunk DDR in the years between Haus des Rundfunks 
loss and the construction of Block B – the walls and ceiling display prominent pilasters, trellises 
and decorative cornicing. The specialised function of the room is signalled by a seating bank 
and an area for musical performance is designated by a recess in the floor, backed by an organ 
that dominates the space and serves as a visual focal point. Although Ehrlich was not chiefly 
responsible for the acoustic design of the recording spaces, similar critiques to those directed 
at him could be made about the ostensibly non-functional decorative features of Saal 1. 
However, these details had potentially better grounds for defence. Keibs and Herzog could 
refer to acoustic considerations and historical precedents of good-sounding rooms as the 
motivation for the decorative features. Although West German acousticians during this period 
were beginning to rely less on historicised features in their designs, acoustic design in the 1950s 
- for orchestral performance spaces in particular - remained an incomplete union of empirical 
modelling predictions, guesswork and direct historical emulation.108 In contrast with the muted 
decorative scheme of Sendesaal I between 1933-1956, Saal 1 appears somewhat opulent in 
comparison, but the majority of the historicised decorative features of Saal 1 have explicitly 
acoustic functions, alternatively diffusing or absorbing sound to control the acoustic response 
of the space. More significantly, in making significant departures from the broadcast concert 
hall model established by Sendesaal I, Saal 1 enacted a radical design agenda that contrasts 
with its superficially historicised surface. 
 
Saal 1’s departure from orchestral broadcasting hall conventions emerges readily in 
comparisons with its predecessor, Sendesaal I, and close contemporary, the Großes Sendesaal 
of Funkhaus Köln (now known as the Klaus von Bismarck Saal). Sendesaal I made some of 
the first integrated technical provisions for the broadcasting of orchestral performances by 
incorporating audio services into the design of a space largely derived from the example of 
conventional concert halls. These technical provisions for broadcast were equally utilisable for 
making orchestral recordings, but fundamental features of Sendesaal I carried over from 
concert halls were less compatible with the shift to a recording paradigm. The original acoustic 
design of Sendesaal I served the needs of three demographics: the musicians, the attending 
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audience and the broadcast audience (through the intermediation of broadcast engineers). 
Ideally, the measures taken to optimise the separate acoustic requirements of each of these 
constituencies can overlap and combine holistically, but changing usage of Sendesaal I exposed 
unforeseen shortcomings in how these measures were balanced. Musicians and live audiences 
were well served by Sendesaal I’s adoption of many concert hall design conventions. The 
orchestra performance area was a raised stage with several provisions made for optimally 
arranging the musicians of the orchestra; a flat front area for the string section and large steps 
rising towards the rear for other sections of the orchestra. An acoustic shell at the rear of the 
stage helped direct sound towards the audience but the most fundamental accommodation made 
for an audience in Sendesaal I was its 1200 seats. As related in the early stages of Part 1, the 
bare wooden seats of Sendesaal I became problematic as the space was increasingly used as a 
recording studio, as the absence of the acoustic absorption provided by the audience led to an 
excessive degree of reverberation.109 While the inclusion of audience seating in Sendesaal I 
maintained a historical continuity of practice with the very early days of radio broadcasting 
and allowed audience applause to be retained as a familiar component of orchestral music 
broadcasts during the first years of broadcasting from Haus des Rundfunks, the provisions 
made in Sendesaal I for an attending audience became detrimental to the experience of the far 
larger audience of a recorded performance.  
 
This particular shortcoming in Sendesaal’s I suitability for use as a concert venue and 
stand-alone recording studio has been addressed in subsequent designs for dual-function 
orchestral spaces. A common approach in these kinds of spaces is to install heavily upholstered 
seating as Schallschlucker (sound absorbers), so as to preserve a constant level of sound 
absorption in the absence of an audience. The 1957 renovation of Sendesaal I by Sender Freies 
Berlin applied this approach, as did the 1950 650-seat Großes Sendesaal of Funkhaus Köln. 
Saal 1 in Block B makes prominent use of the upholstered-seating solution, but primarily 
addresses the functional problem of maintaining an acoustic constant through a reconfiguration 
of layout that prioritises the recording of the orchestra above accommodating an audience. As 
with most typical concert halls, audience seating dominates the floor plan of Sendesaal I in 
comparison to the performance area; the stage in Sendesaal I accounts for less than a quarter 
of the total floor area, with the remainder given over to the audience seating and overlaid with 
additional seating in a balcony section. The 1957 renovation altered aspects of the stage and 
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seating layout along with the acoustic finishing of Sendesaal I, but largely preserved the stage-
to-seating dynamic of the original design.110 The Großes Sendesaal of Funkhaus Köln is smaller 
than Sendesaal I, but preserves a similar stage to audience area ratio and also incorporates a 
balcony.111  
 
The re-evaluation of acoustic priorities in Saal 1 is signalled by the inversion of the 
ratio of performance area to audience area, although this is not in itself an acoustic design 
solution. The performance area of Saal 1 occupies the vast majority of the available floor space 
and the remainder accommodates a seating bank of just 260 seats. These features announce the 
jettisoning by Saal 1’s designers of its potential role as a public concert hall so as to focus its 
design on the primary task of optimising orchestral music performance and recording. This was 
not a trivial decision and the conceptual significance of the Saal 1 approach has only begun to 
be recognised outside of former-Rundfunk DDR worker circles.112 At the time of Saal 1’s 
inception there was no dedicated public concert hall in East Berlin and the link between 
broadcasting centres and public concert halls was still being renewed by facilities like 
Funkhaus Köln, which boasted two public concert halls and a public street-facing façade. The 
geographic location of Funkhaus Berlin mitigated against its suitability as a concert venue. 
While not particularly distant from central Berlin, Funkhaus Berlin was relatively inaccessible 
to the public and did not have transport links comparable to the urban location of Haus des 
Rundfunks. The relative isolation of Funkhaus Berlin is attested to by how it was safeguarded 
from attention during the 1953 Uprising and recurring accounts of visiting performance 
ensembles turning up late for recording sessions due to trouble finding it.113 Eliding the concert 
hall role allowed Saal 1 to occupy its own design niche. Sendesaal I was originally designed 
for the live broadcast of concert music before a live audience. Saal 1 was designed to take full 
advantage of developments in sound recording since the 1930s; it is a room designed for the 
age of tape recording, which allowed orchestral performances to have enduring utility and 
value for broadcasters beyond their original performance by providing a source of broadcast 
material independent of record companies. While Sendesaal I (after its renovation) and the  
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Figure 1.9: The seating bank in Saal 1. The density of the bank and the bulky upholstery of the individual seats 
indicate their acoustic purpose and point towards a presumption of infrequent usage.114 
 
 
Großes Sendesaal of Funkhaus Köln make substantial provision for dual usage, the Saal 1 
acoustic design is much more committed to servicing a listenership beyond the confines of its 
walls.  
 
Recording spaces for orchestra without seating are not unusual. One of the most famous 
orchestral recording spaces in the world is Abbey Road’s Studio One, which makes no 
permanent provision for an audience. Saal 1 is difficult to align with such studios. Its 
construction and ownership by a broadcaster rather than a record company, in addition to its 
unusual connection to Sendesaal I, places it within a different lineage. Classification of Saal 1 
is further complicated by its vestigial seating bank, shown in Figure 1.9. In the context of both 
Sendesaal I and the Großes Sendesaal, 260 seats for a symphony orchestra performance space 
could potentially exclude it from categorisation as a concert hall, but it is not an insignificant 
number and the seating bank has an appreciable presence within the space, even while vacant. 
While the design departures of Saal 1 in favour of its recording audience were bold in the 
context of other broadcasting houses, the seating bank indicates Rundfunk DDR was not 
prepared to completely relinquish the capability of hosting live performances. Even if the 
capacity of such a capability was greatly reduced, it could still be utilised for special 
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performances for invited guests or visiting dignitaries, during a period when the GDR had no 
dedicated concert hall in East Berlin.115 The marble entrance foyer, the historicised décor of 
Saal 1 and its seating bank can all be linked back to this purpose. However, in their execution, 
these accommodations for live performance reveal themselves as decisively subordinate to Saal 
1’s primary design goals. Block B’s main foyer, clad in expensive materials, introduces a 
procession of columns that lead towards a large staircase and the Saal 1 entrance foyer. 
However, the cramped height of the ceiling in proportion to its length and the awkward natural 
side-lighting of this entranceway are indicative of its origins as an opportunistic use of auxiliary 
space leftover from the necessary placement of Saal 1 and Saal 2 on the first floor. The 
functionality of the main foyer was further undermined by the foot-bridge that connects Block 
A and Block, built during the early-1960s. The design of the seating bank itself is equivocal 
towards the regular presence of an audience. The seats are even more heavily upholstered than 
the seats of the Großes Sendesaal at Funkhaus Köln and other comparative dual orchestral 
performance and recording spaces. They are steeply raked and tightly packed to form a single 
stable acoustic body and their redundancy was largely confirmed by the scarcity of usage they 
received. During the GDR-era, Saal 1 never hosted a public concert and the rare invited-
audience performances for which the seats were intended ceased entirely from the mid-
1960s. 116  This noncommittal approach to facilitating live concert performance at Saal 1 
preserved its overriding design aims, but also locate it within an uncertain space between 
recording studio and concert hall. These heavily under-utilised and largely superfluous seats, 
nonetheless remain a present and important feature of the space. While the design of Saal 1 
greatly reconfigures the role of an attending audience in favour of an audience that is not 
physically present, the spatial relationship and dynamic between performance space and 
audience space is still preserved and has to be approached in when considering Saal 1’s most 
distinctive and radical feature: the Orchesterwanne (Orchestral Tub).  
 
 
1.2.2  The Orchesterwanne and Contested Acoustics 
 
Many features of Saal 1 distinguish it from other broadcasting halls and recording 
studios, but none more so than its innovative positioning of the orchestra. Standard practice in 
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concert halls places the orchestra on a raised stage or platform for both acoustic and sightline 
considerations, with the back rows of orchestral sections often further raised on rostra or 
additional levels. Sendesaal I, the Großes Sendesaal and the concert hall at BBC Broadcasting 
House all exhibit these features. The rebalancing of priorities in Saal 1 presented an opportunity 
to trial a radical new approach for spatialising orchestra within a recording space. The 
Orchesterwanne was a suggestion of Siegfried Mitlacher, Rundfunk DDR’s Cheftonmeister 
(chief sound engineer) during the construction of Block B and executed by the BRF acoustic 
consultants.117 The Orchesterwanne does stagger the orchestra in line with convention, but 
inverts the direction of travel. Instead of raising the orchestra higher from stage level, each row 
of the Orchesterwanne descends progressively further into the ground. The layout of the 
Orchesterwanne facilitates the familiar arrangement of orchestral musicians without resorting 
to mobile rostra or a fixed stage, but it is also an essential component of the Saal 1 acoustic 
concept. The steps themselves, in conjunction with the lower sections of Saal 1’s walls, provide 
early sound reflections for the musicians to comfortably monitor their playing. The upper, more 
elaborate sections of Saal 1 function to develop the broader sound of the space. The plaster 
pilasters and cornice-work act as diffusers, while the lattice-covered rockwool and fabric 
sections of the wall help control the degree of reverberation by absorbing sound.118 Rockwool-
filled semi-cylinders on the ceiling combine diffusive and absorbent qualities.119 Together these 
features work towards dual, complementary purposes: the creation of an optimised acoustic 
environment for musical performance, within a broader sound field enhanced for recording.120 
Despite the specific and innovative provisions made in the space for musical performance, it 
was a contingent of orchestral musicians and conductors that proved most resistant to accepting 
the suitability of the new recording space during its initial use and who mounted a challenge to 
the validity of the Saal 1 design. 
 
During 1956 and 1957, extensive recording sessions were conducted at Block B to 
evaluate the recording spaces and technical procedures as the facility transitioned from initial 
trials into full production. Recording sessions were undertaken with all the major Rundfunk 
DDR ensembles, as well as a number of popular GDR dance orchestras. International 
ensembles and singers from Poland and the ČSR were also recorded during this period, along 
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with the Italian tenor Gianni Poggi.121 It was during this transitional period that Gerhard Steinke 
started to gain prominence within the acoustic and technical narrative of Rundfunk DDR and 
commenced a long association with Funkhaus Berlin. Appointed as the leader of a problem-
solving unit within the BRF in 1956, Steinke established his reputation with his involvement 
in the development of an early synthesiser, the Subharchord.122 Not directly involved with the 
design or construction of Block B, Steinke was tasked with overseeing the development of 
recording practices in the new facility during its first two years of operation.123 Steinke was 
closely involved with the formation of the Rundfunk DDR Hörgruppe (listening group) for 
“die subjecktive Bewertung akustisch-musikalischer Probleme sowie für Kontrolle der 
gesamten Musik production” (“the subjective evaluation of acoustic-musical problems and the 
management of all music production”).124 The membership of the Hörgruppe was drawn from 
a broad cross-section of workers with audio and musical expertise including the BRF, 
Rundfunk DDR sound engineers, technical and production staff and music department staff. 
From 1956, weekly meetings were inaugurated that analysed and discussed Block B’s recorded 
output and worked towards establishing internal standards and shared means of assessment.125 
Steinke regarded the Hörgruppe as a route towards aligning Rundfunk DDR with international 
best practice and also foresaw a role for its members in conducting international visits and 
collaborations and preparing Rundfunk DDR for impending audio technology developments, 
such as stereo.126 The Hörgruppe became an important resource for maintaining and advancing 
procedures and technical standards at Rundfunk DDR; in the 1970s its remit was expanded to 
allow it to contribute to major sound reinforcement projects in the GDR, detailed in Chapter 4. 
By the end of 1956 thorough assessment of the Block B recording spaces resulted in only a 
small number of minor adjustments, mostly to reverb chambers and elements of the radio 
drama complexes.127 The first alteration made to the acoustic response of any of the music 
recording spaces was a slight extension of the reverberation time of Saal 2 at 1000 Hz, likely 
achieved by the trial and error manipulation of the absorptive material backing the space’s 
modular wall panelling.128 While this end-of-year assessment was an emphatic validation of 
the work of the Block B acoustic designers, responses by Rundfunk DDR musicians and 
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conductors to the Saal 1 acoustic earlier in the year led to a brief but factious dispute between 
musical and technical staff. 
 
The BRF’s own empirical analyses of Saal 1 in early 1956 were broadly positive, but 
musicians from the Rundfunk DDR orchestral ensembles began to complain about “Hörbarkeit” 
(“audibility”) problems almost immediately.129 Some of these complaints focussed on the form 
of Saal 1 and the orchestra’s placement within it, core to its innovative approach.130 These 
complaints were taken seriously by the BRF at first and practical efforts were made to address 
them by improving early reflections within Saal 1 through the introduction of additional 
temporary reflective surfaces.131 These efforts did not halt complaints and the situation appears 
to also have been an expression of generalised tensions between technical recording staff and 
the members and conductors of some of the performance ensembles. An employee of the BRF, 
Horst Nutscher, wrote a detailed, though partisan, account of interactions between technical 
staff and the Rundfunk DDR performance ensembles during this period. Usually based in 
Dresden, Nutscher was assigned to trial recordings conducted in Block B between January and 
May 1956.132 Initial responses from the conductors of the Rundfunk DDR ensembles were 
largely negative. Helmut Koch, the choir master of the Großen Chor des Berliner Rundfunks 
(Berlin Radio Large Chorus), reportedly suggested that anyone recording or rehearsing in Saal 
1 was a “Scharlatan” (“charlatan”), although Nutscher does not elaborate on the rationale 
behind Koch’s comment. 133  Nutscher considered Otto Dobrindt, conductor of the 
Unterhaltungsorchester des Berliner Rundfunks (Berlin Radio Light Orchestra), difficult to 
deal with and he was associated with a comment that was picked up by other conductors and 
musicians and regularly directed at technical staff around this time: “die Technik versklavt die 
Kunst” (“technology enslaves art”). 134  This criticism encompassed sound engineers and 
technicians along with microphones and other recording technologies, but may have been 
particularly directed at the recording staff’s insistence on technical rehearsals.135 Hermann 
Abendroth, the chief conductor of the Berlin Rundfunksinfonieorchester, was more collegial. 
He reportedly warmed to the acoustic of Saal 2 first, after witnessing a trial recording of the 
Adolf Fritz Guhl Orchestra, and subsequently attempted to have a Rundfunksinfonieorchester  
 
129 Nutscher, ‘Versuchsbericht 345/7 b: Bericht Über Kunstlerisch-Technische Fragen Im Block “B”’, 1, 3. 
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Figure 1.10: A choir rehearsal in Saal 1 c. 1958. The empty chairs in the image depict how an orchestra was 
placed within the Orchesterwanne for a mono recording during this period.136 
 
 
session moved there. 137  Rolf Kleinert, initially the deputy conductor of Berlin 
Rundfunksinfonieorchester until Abendroth’s death in May 1956, was particularly critical of 
the Saal 1 acoustic and obstructed the recording of orchestral rehearsals.138 Nutscher identified 
him as the most committed source of criticism and claimed he galvanised resistance to Saal 1 
among musicians.139 Nutscher reported him as claiming that his orchestra would be “versaut” 
(“soiled”) for several months if they ever rehearsed or recorded in Saal 1 again.140  
 
The dispute escalated before its eventual resolution; Nutscher claimed that the 
Rundfunksinfonieorchester attempted to mobilise an unnamed West German conductor to visit 
Saal 1 and speak out against the space.141 Additionally, Franz Konwitschny, the conductor of 
the Leipzig Gewandhausorchester, was briefed against Saal 1 ahead of his arrival for a 
recording session.142 When he became aware of this, Nutscher contacted Konwitschny directly, 
with whom he had an existing professional relationship, in an attempt to counter-balance the 
negative representations.143 After conducting his session, Nutscher reported that Konwitschny 
came out in favour of the Saal 1 acoustic.144 In continued efforts to respond to the musician’s 
complaints that they could not hear each other ( “hört sich einander nicht” ), time was allocated  
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Figure 1.11: An instrument and microphone layout of Saal 1 from 1967 for a stereo recording of orchestra 
without choir. The transition to stereo recordings required new equipment but also the reconsideration of how 
instruments were placed in the space.145 
 
 
for comparative test recordings that placed the orchestra in different locations within Saal 1.146 
The musicians had advocated for a seating arrangement that placed them in a corner of Saal 1, 
as they believed this would provide the best conditions for mutual audibility during 
recording.147 This configuration instead produced the least musical recording (“die musikalisch 
schlechteste Aufzeichnung”) of these positional trials, which appears to have been recognised 
by the musicians and the dispute de-escalated from this point.148 Sessions resumed with the  
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Figure 1.12: A detail of the Orchesterwanne, with the filled-in lowest step partially discernible in the centre. 
Altered during the early stages of its usage, this renovation was the only significant physical alteration made to 
the acoustic design of Saal 1.149 
 
 
orchestra configured within the Orchesterwanne (examples of conventional arrangements from 
the 1950s and 1960s are imaged in Figure 1.10 and 1.11) and both Kleinert and Koch appeared 
to settle into and accept Saal 1. The episode seemed resolved by June 1956, with Nutscher 
declaring: “Saal 1 nach heissen Kämpfen “hörbar” (ist)” (“after heated struggle, Saal 1 (is) 
“audible””).150 Nutscher attributed the genesis of the quarrel to discipline problems within the 
performance ensembles, but also acknowledged an existing antagonistic relationship 
exacerbated by an absence of tact on the part of technical staff.151  
 
Criticism of the Saal 1 acoustic by musicians and conductors was initially generalised, 
but the subsequent focus on the orchestra’s layout suggests that the unfamiliarity of the 
Orchesterwanne layout was a factor. This is borne out by details of the single permanent 
alteration made to Saal 1 as an outcome of the dispute, the filling-in of the lowest step of the 
Orchesterwanne - just visible in Figure 1.12.152 While not a drastic alteration to the overall 
acoustic design of Saal 1, this reconfiguration of the Orchesterwanne provided additional space 
on its lowest level that facilitated an improved arrangement of the string sections and helped 
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to appease the musicians’ concerns about audibility. This action is significant not just because 
it marked the end of the dispute between musicians and technicians; the most distinctive 
expression of Keibs, Herzog and Mitlacher’s collaboration weathered a concerted critiquing 
with just a single alteration to its most novel aspect. Subsequent to this alteration, Saal 1 proved 
to be among the most stable acoustic designs of Block B during its use by Rundfunk DDR, a 
further endorsement of their innovative approach. 
 
That the resolved dispute returned the orchestra to its original placement within the 
Orchesterwanne invites final consideration of the dynamic between the performance and 
audience functions of Saal 1. The performance area within the space allowed enough flexibility 
for several performance configurations to be considered, as evidenced by the experimental 
layouts reported by Nutscher. However, the acoustic designers’ intentions – encoded into the 
space by the construction of the Orchesterwanne and its single curved end – impose a pre-
determined optimised arrangement of the orchestra within the space that preserves a familiar 
positional relationship between the performers and the potential audience of the seating bank. 
The significance of this positional relationship in the context of Saal 1 and its contribution to 
the optimal use and acoustic outcome of the space was confirmed by the combative approval 
process that attempted to drastically modify orchestral positioning away from the designers’ 
intentions. Although the Orchesterwanne came about as part of Saal 1’s broad departure from 
the conventions of standard concert halls and is a stark visual designator of this design tangent, 
it simultaneously reinforces the space’s engagement with aspects of the concert hall model 
through its interaction with the seating bank. A radical reconfiguration of the audience and 
performer positional dynamic in concert halls was successfully applied by the enwrapment of 
the performance area by audience seating on all sides at the Berliner Philharmonie concert hall 
in West Berlin in 1963. The Philharmonie was influential on concert hall design in East 
Germany and beyond and is discussed in the context of GDR performance venues in Chapter 
4, but Saal 1 can be interpreted as a foreshadowing of this “democratised” acoustic due to its 
extensive efforts to serve a wide listenership. 
 
 





Figure 1.13: The original designations and relative layout of the Saal 1 and Saal 2 technical rooms. The 
additional capacity of the playback rooms proved useful at several junctures in Block B’s history by allowing 
major technical upgrades to be undertaken without sacrificing existing functionality.153 
 
 
Figure 1.14: A view from the floor of Saal 2 towards the control space originally designated as Abhörraum 2 
(Playback Room 2). The original Regie 2 (Control Room 2) is also just visible to the right. The control and 





153 Gerhard Steinke, Wolfgang Hoeg, and M. Wasner, ‘Einrichtung eines Experimental-Regieraumes für 
Mehrkanal-Aufnahmetechnik im Funkhaus Berlin Oberschöneweide’, RFZ Information, September 1963, 
31/26/1/3 - 31/26/1/6, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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The design impulses that influenced the form of Saal 1 can be interpreted as technologically 
and politically progressive. They applied new concepts alongside proven techniques to create 
a space optimised for producing recordings and skipped the opportunity to have a new concert 
hall in East Berlin in order to prioritise recording practices that could benefit a broader public 
listenership. However, the confluence of design influences and political and economic factors 
that resulted in Saal 1’s progressive form were not expressed uniformly throughout Block B. 
While the design of Saal 1 and the other recording spaces were directed towards unifying 
performers with radio listeners, some other co-existing design elements of Block B express 
impulses that attempt to partition different kinds of work or performance, which can be 
interpreted as conflicting with socialist ideals.  
 
The dispute over the attributes of Saal 1 and the layout of the orchestra within that space 
brought tensions between technicians and musicians to the fore, but these pre-existed the move 
to Funkhaus Berlin. An awareness of these problems may have instigated a major feature of 
the Saal 1 and Saal 2 control spaces. The co-location of Saal 1 and Saal 2 allowed the placement 
of a shared, acoustically isolated, control room complex in the void between the two large 
recording spaces. The most distinctive feature of these control spaces is the assignation of two 
control rooms to each recording spaces, both of similar size and design with visual access to 
the corresponding recording space through large sound-insulated windows. The layout and an 
external view of one of the control rooms are given in Figures 1.13 and 1.14. Initially, one each 
of these served as the recording control room for the adjacent recording space, with the 
ancillary rooms serving as Abhörräume (playback rooms) to allow orchestra conductors and 
other non-technical decision-makers to listen back to recording takes independently of the 
recording engineers and tape operators. This generous allocation of space to analytical listening 
is noteworthy in the context of both broadcasting houses and commercial recording studios, 
where space is typically at a premium. The attachment of independent listening rooms for 
artistic assessment was justified as an innovative and functional approach for facilitating 
recording sessions, but the partitioning of technical and artistic audio workers also occurs 






Figure 1.15: A view of the main access corridor of Block B. This corridor is wider and features more natural 
light than the parallel service corridor on the other side of the building.155 
 
 
The most fundamental aspects of Block B that enact a segregational impulse are the 
two parallel curved corridors that run on either side of the building’s central connecting section 
and which link the two wings of the recording complex. The two corridors contrast each other 
markedly. The main corridor, pictured in Figure 15, links through from the main foyer to the 
smaller musical spaces and radio drama complexes. One of the brightest spaces in Block B, the 
corridor faces south-west over the Spree, features floor-to-ceiling windows and was featured 
in photographs that accompanied Ehrlich’s own 1956 article on the design of Block B.156 This 
corridor was intended as access for the musical and acting talent working at Block B. As 
indicated on the floor plan reproduced in Figure 16, the main corridor is mirrored on the 
opposite side of the building by a narrower, darker, service corridor for technical staff and 
services. Ehrlich explicitly recognised this active partitioning and justified it on practical 
grounds of technical logistics and safety, but he also qualified it by stating “dieses System  
 
155 Cormac Ó Callanáin, Main Access Corridor, 1 July 2014. 
156 Ehrlich, ‘Aufnahme- und Studiogebäude des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees’, 407. 
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Figure 1.16: Floor plan of Block B with some of the primary access features labelled. The relative floor plans of 
the two parallel corridors can be discerned, indicating how Block B had differentiated accessways. 
 
 
schuf organisch die notwendige Trennung zwischen technischen und künstlerischen 
Mitarbeitern” (“this system organically enables the necessary segregation of artistic and 
technical workers”). 157  While Funkhaus Köln includes two concert halls that require the 
facilitation of public access, it does not exhibit a similar degree of partitioned or duplicated 
access. Ehrlich also endorsed delineations of esteem demarked by a particular decorative 
feature of one of the Block B recording spaces. Apart from Saal 1, Saal 3 has the most 
historicised decorative scheme in Block B. Most of the finishing in Saal 3 has explicitly 
acoustic functions, but, unique to this space, a fleur-de-lis motif is painted onto the stretched 
artificial leather wallpaper and other sections of the walls. Unlike Saal 1, Saal 3 has no 
permanent provision for a live audience and Ehrlich instead justified the decorative elements 




157 Ehrlich, ‘Aufnahme- und Studiogebäude des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees’. 
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Die mit Goldmalerei versehene Kunstledertapete im Kammermusiksaal, die übrigens 
ebenfalls akustische Aufgaben hat, ist ein Aufwand, der für diesen bestimmten Raum, 
der den qualifiziertesten Musikern zum Arbeitsraum dient, wichtig ist.158 
 
The artificial leather wallpaper in the chamber music hall, which is decorated with gold-
painting, also has an acoustic function; but it is a detail which is important for this 
particular room, which serves the most qualified musicians in the field. 
 
These varied and potentially contradictory features within the holistic Block B design, 
along with the formalist critiques Ehrlich received, suggest an incomplete integration of GDR 
design orthodoxies. These were still being formed contemporaneously and the unification of 
the GDR’s cultural and socialist missions in acoustic and architectural design was executed 
more rigorously in later decades in structures like the Palast der Republik, discussed 
extensively in Chapter 4. These discordant elements do provide some degree of insight into 
design and architectural approaches and priorities as applied to a rigorous and specialised 
purpose under time and material constraints and during a formative period in GDR history. 
Also of note is how the implications of the above highlighted design features were largely 
overridden by the practices and procedures developed at Funkhaus Berlin, which reinterpreted 
available space in line with practical considerations over the following decades. One of the 
most visible and lasting departures from the original delineations of Ehrlich and Probst’s 
technical layout was the redesignation of the Saal 1 and Saal 2 control spaces.  
 
The original usage of the playback rooms did not last long. In the early 1960s, 
upgrading technical recording capabilities at Block B took precedence and the playback room 
for Saal 1 was converted into Rundfunk DDR’s first stereo-capable control room and then run 
in tandem with the original mono-equipped control room. This established a regular procedure 
for upgrading recording facilities in Saal 1 and Saal 2 and the playback rooms offered important 
operational flexibility for both recording spaces, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Additionally, the segregation of technical and artistic recording work as a work-flow concept 
enacted by the functional divisions of the Saal 1 and Saal 2 control spaces was consistently 
rejected by the new generation of technical radio personnel that developed their practice at 
Funkhaus Berlin. One of the earliest broad developments to recording practice undertaken by 
 
158 Exner, ‘Schönheit ohne Verschwendung’. 
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the Hörgruppe was addressing what they considered to be the unsuitability of the then-current 
division of technical responsibility for recording sessions. Influenced by observations on 
perennial communication problems between Toningenieurs (sound engineer/sound technician) 
and Tonmeisters (producer/sound engineer) during sessions, the Hörgruppe sought to merge 
the roles in line with developing practice in Italy and West Germany.159 Steinke advocated a 
pedagogical approach by offering musical education opportunities to sound technicians, 
inspired by a female technician for the Bruno Saenger Orchestra who was able to rise to the 
position of Tonmeister by undertaking musical training to augment her technical 
competencies.160 The Hörgruppe developed broad training opportunities for Rundfunk DDR 
staff alongside its main activity of overseeing recording standards, but its activities met some 
resistance. Nutscher wrote that he and Steinke were seen as “lästige Störenfriede” (“annoying 
troublemakers”) in a workplace that had imported rigidly established technical practices and 
which initially resisted the presence of women at technical rehearsals, but the Hörgruppe 
persisted in its pursuit of continuous development procedures and Rundfunk DDR came to rely 
on a large proportion of technicians who were women.161 
 
Finally, although Ehrlich’s comments on Saal 3 confirm there was some disparity in 
the relative esteem afforded the various forms of music recorded at Block B, the provisions 
made by genre were diverse for the era and technically and acoustically fit-for-purpose. Popular 
music eventually received specific technical attention as the commercial and artistic value of 
popular music was better acknowledged in the GDR from the 1970s. During the 1980s, a major 
research effort to develop a digital mixing desk (System 2000) capable of handling the kinds 
of large sessions demanded by developments in popular music was first trialled in the Saal 4 
space. This was a marked turnaround from previous decades when all technological 
improvements focussed almost exclusively on improving classical music recordings in the first 
instance. This had been the case with advances like stereo and the introduction of transistor-
based equipment, but popular music did receive consistent attention in Rundfunk DDR upgrade 
schedules. Technical facilitation of popular music recording contrasted well with provisions 
made for electro-acoustic music, which was among the most restricted musical genres under 
GDR orthodoxy. Concerted attempts by Steinke and others to establish an electro-acoustic lab 
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Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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during the 1950s were thwarted, but electro-acoustic approaches and the BRF-developed 
Subharchord were used to provide backing music for radio dramas.162 The rigidity of the Block 
B genre assignations blurred somewhat over time and even Saal 1 found extended application 
beyond its primary symphonic remit during the GDR-era.163 The current status of Funkhaus 
Berlin as a privately-owned cultural production and event space has extended the genre 
distribution within the Block B spaces far beyond any projection of the original designers. Saal 
1 has hosted corporate music events utilising large sound reinforcement systems and the 
smaller music recording spaces and radio drama complexes host a diverse spectrum of music 
recording studios.164 Most of these uses continue to confirm the viability of the holistic acoustic 
concepts applied at Block B. 
 
 
1.2.4  Conclusion 
 
Funkhaus Berlin and Block B proved their functionality over forty years of broadcasting and 
recording, but this analysis attempts to draw out the degree to which they were embedded 
within historical acoustic and contemporary political narratives particular to the GDR. 
Funkhaus Berlin is indicative of the GDR’s impressive technological and cultural broadcasting 
capabilities, but it can also be seen as emblematic of a loss of political initiative within GDR 
broadcasting or a component of a deceit conducted by the GDR upon its citizens and radio 
workers. The first decade of East German broadcasting was characterised by the forced 
deconstruction of broadcasting infrastructure it had initially claimed and the volatile 
altercations that accompanied East German broadcasting during this period are an inescapable 
component of the formation of Funkhaus Berlin. Rundfunk DDR constructed a lineage that 
emphasised the activities of its broadcast workers in the overthrow of fascism and genuine 
traumatic and combative experiences for Rundfunk DDR staff during the 1950s were fed into 
its institutional memory as motivational anti-capitalist grievances. This narrative of 
besiegement was considered valuable enough to be opportunistically extended by the 
transformation of a workplace accident into one of the most notorious acts of sabotage in GDR 
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history. This overarching narrative influenced a defensive infrastructural stance, embodied in 
Funkhaus Berlin’s location and reflected in Rundfunk DDR’s journalistic approach, 
contrasting starkly with the Soviet-sponsored infrastructural and journalistic initiative 
Rundfunk DDR’s predecessor organisation possessed in the immediate post-war period. This 
defensive configuration helped to provide the opportunity for acoustic designs that combined 
established and experimental acoustic approaches. 
 
Haus des Rundfunks’ Sendesaal I made important strides for radio broadcasting 
acoustics and Saal 1’s deviations from its example emphasises the contextual aspects of its 
formation, discussed extensively in this analysis. The Saal 1 design prioritises performers and 
a broad listenership, but interpretation of this clearly-signalled departure is complicated by 
decorative references to historical performance contexts and a restrained accommodation for a 
potential live audience. The historical references of Saal 1 nonetheless cloak a substantial 
diminishment in the provisions the space makes for a privileged live audience that can be 
regarded as demarking it in some senses as a progressive, though physically inaccessible, 
cultural space. Determining the public impact of this space’s unique attributes is beyond the 
scope of this investigation, but its contribution to a nationalised soundscape may be worth 
considering in comparison with the recognised influence of other national radio networks.165 
Saal 1’s “socialist acoustic” can also be positioned within Block B’s contributions to the 
development of a “socialist” approach to architecture and design, but problematic divisions of 
labour and prestige within the hierarchies of space in Block B suggest a slightly distorted 
application of GDR ideology. However, these were not disruptive to activities at Block B and 
these elements were steadily overridden or adapted by the progressions of practice over time.  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis discusses the performance venue within the Palast der Republik 
- a more coherent union of GDR cultural and architectural ideologies - which emphasised the 
inclusion of a diverse audience and which responded to the “democratised” acoustic of the 
Berliner Philharmonie using technological means. Linking Block B and the Palast der Republik 
raises interesting questions regarding GDR design approaches to specialisation and flexibility 
in cultural and performance spacess. Saal 1’s uniqueness is predicated on the specific degree 
to which it specialised towards a single purpose, while the performance venue of the Palast der 
 
165 Emily Ann Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of Listening 
in America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge; London: MIT Press, 2002), 301. 
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Republik is unique due to the degree and manner in which it accommodated a wide range of 
uses. Other venues constructed and restored during the GDR-era, including the Leipzig 
Gewandhaus, Kulturpalast Dresden and the Konzerthaus Berlin, pose similar questions. Saal 
1’s liminal position between concert hall, broadcast hall and recording studios, may allow it to 
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Chapter 2:  
Deutsche Schallplatten: Records and Recording in the GDR, 1949-1990 
 
 
Die Schallplatte gewinnt damit eine außerordentliche Bedeutung als Mittel der 
Kulturpropaganda, das noch dazu den Vorteil hat, sich selbst zu finanzieren und unter 
Umständen sogar Devisen einzubringen. Es muß allerdings betont werden, daß auf dem 
internationalen Markt nur Langspielplatten von hervorragender Qualität Aussicht auf 
Erfolg haben.1 
 
The gramophone record has gained extraordinary importance as a means of cultural 
propaganda. It has the advantage of being able to finance itself and to even raise foreign 
currency. However, it must be noted that only those records of the most outstanding 
quality can be successful on the international market. 
 
The pre-war German record companies, including Deutsche Grammophon, Electrola 
and Telefunken, quickly restored production in the post-war period and served an expanding 
market during the 1950s. However, none of these companies were directly involved with the 
revival of a record industry in East Germany. The GDR’s record industry was instead founded 
primarily on the remains of a single small pre-war record label. Initially focussed on a 
restoration based on the 78rpm gramophone record pre-war format (78), the new company 
expanded steadily once nationalised and from this point quickly began to pursue distinctive 
commercial and cultural policies. This initial period of growth was disrupted by the 
technological shift in the international record industry from the 78 to the vinyl record. Deutsche 
Schallplatten, and the GDR audio industry generally, was ill-prepared for the arrival of the 
vinyl record and the record company was left to pursue survivalist policies as it attempted to 
retool its manufacturing base and build an entirely new supply chain. Despite the exodus of the 
pre-war record industry from Berlin and East German territories, collaborations and exchanges 
between the East and West German record industries were integral from an early stage. 
Deutsche Schallplatten depended on relationships with West German and Western European 
record companies and suppliers for hard currency and technical equipment, but its survival also 
 
1 Wiese, ‘Vorschlag zur Bildung eines Internationalen Schallplattenkartells der sozialistischen Länder’ 
(Deutsche Schallplatten, 19 November 1956), DR 1/257, BArch.  
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depended on securing essential materials from Eastern Europe. The establishment of these 
dynamic interactions between components of both the wider Western and Eastern European 
record industries secured Deutsche Schallplatten’s viability, but only after extended periods 
where Deutsche Schallplatten’s domestic production of records appeared unsustainable.  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten came to rely heavily on the hard currency income it could 
generate by licensing classical music recordings for worldwide distribution, primarily, though 
not exclusively, through West German record companies. These earnings financed spending 
on Western recording and record manufacturing equipment, but these were disproportionately 
allocated to the enhancement of the quality of its classical music recordings and pressings. This 
was in harmony with general GDR cultural priorities but also acknowledged a global 
perception of where GDR musical value resided; during the 1950s and 1960s Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s international licensing income was derived almost entirely from classical music 
recordings by established musical ensembles located in the GDR. Preserving this income led 
to a consistent policy of directing funds towards maintaining Deutsche Schallplatten’s classical 
music recording standards. This had implications for allocations made for the recording of 
other musical genres, despite the dominance of non-classical forms of music in terms of 
domestic sales during the era of 78s. Deutsche Schallplatten’s prioritisation of classical music 
is also evident in its record production figures. During the difficult transition to all-vinyl record 
production, a focus on classical music LPs skewed the genre distribution of records produced 
in the GDR during the 1960s significantly. The rapid escalation of vinyl record production 
during the late-1960s and 1970s subsequently re-established a more familiar distribution of 
genre in the company’s output of records and popular music latterly achieved better recognition 
and prioritisation within Deutsche Schallplatten hierarchies. 
 
 
Part 1: 78s, Vinyl Records and Material Narratives in the GDR Record Industry 
 
Germany was an enthusiastic adopter of the record; its oldest record company, Deutsche 
Grammophon Gesellschaft was founded in 1898. Although Germany later made important 
technical contributions to the recording industry, the initial technical initiative for a record 
industry in Germany came from Britain and the US. The first record presses were imported 
from the US and the first matrices pressed in Germany were delivered by the Gramophone 
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Company in England.2 By 1900 there were 45 presses operating from the label’s manufacturing 
base in Hannover and in 1908 Germany’s largest record company, Deutsche Grammophon, 
pressed 6.2 million records.3 The First World War impacted production, in 1917 production 
bottomed out at 400,000 records.4 Production levels at Deutsche Grammophon remained 
volatile during the following decades, ranging as high as nearly ten million in 1929 and as low 
as 1.4 million in 1937, before rebounding to 4.1 million in 1938. 5   
 
During the Second World War, the major German record labels were integrated into 
the nationalised manufacturing companies Siemens and AEG and German record companies 
continued to make new recordings throughout the Second World War.6  However, records were 
only pressed in small quantities and these were prioritised for distribution in neutral or Nazi-
occupied territories.7 Record industry activities recommenced quickly after the end of the War. 
The major pre-war record companies received permission to re-commence production from the 
Western Allies and began the process of reactivating their pre-war manufacturing 
infrastructures. Deutsche Grammophon recovered rapidly and pressed 1.8 million records in 
1948.8 Deutsche Grammophon pressed records in both Berlin and Hannover for a period after 
the war but ceased its Berlin operation after the Berlin Blockade and consolidated production 
at its primary manufacturing site in Hannover.9 Electrola’s historic manufacturing base was 
located in the east of Berlin and it initially recommenced pressing records there.10 In 1950, 
Electrola followed Deutsche Grammophon’s example and moved its entire production and 
administrative base to Cologne.11  
 
The restoration of a record industry within East German administrative structures was 
more fitful than what occurred in West Germany and had far less access to pre-war recording 
and record manufacturing infrastructures. In 1946, the actor Ernst Busch was able to secure 
permission from the Soviet military administration in Berlin to record, manufacture and release 
 
2 Rémy Louis, Deutsche Grammophon: State of the Art: Celebrating over a Century of Musical Experience 
(New York: Rizzoli, 2010), 12. 
3 Louis, 23. 
4 Louis, Deutsche Grammophon. 
5 Louis, 29. 
6 Louis, 32. 
7 Horst Heinz Lange, Die deutsche ‘78er’ Discographie der Hot-Dance- und Jazz-Musik : 1903-1958, 2., erw. 
Aufl. (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1978), 40. 
8 Louis, Deutsche Grammophon, 41. 
9 Louis, 41. 
10 Lange, Die deutsche ‘78er’ Discographie der Hot-Dance- und Jazz-Musik, 24. 
11 Lange, 24. 
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records, as well as song sheets and manuscripts. His company, Lied der Zeit, was the only 
official record company and record manufacturer operating in the Eastern Sector.12 Busch’s 
primary interest was in socialist worker’s songs, but Lied der Zeit also released classical and 
popular music under the Eterna and Amiga sub-labels. These labels went on to become the two 
defining music labels of the GDR. Lied der Zeit was able to exploit small undestroyed remnants 
of the pre-war German record industry to restart record production. Its most important resource 
was the factory of the former Tempo label; Tempo Schallplatten GmbH was an independent 
popular music record label that continued pressing records at its Babelsberg factory until about 
1944.13 Tempo occupied the cheaper end of the music record market but it developed a good 
reputation for the technical and artistic quality of its recordings, which were mostly in-house 
productions apart from some American and Hungarian releases.14 The Tempo label’s heritage 
continued to directly contribute to Lied der Zeit’s efforts as late as December 1949, when more 
than 600,000 record sleeves were uncovered from Tempo’s old stores and re-entered into the 
manufacturing cycle.15 In March 1947 Lied der Zeit secured a twenty-year lease agreement for 
Tempo’s Babelsberg factory.16 It received a one-off enterprise grant but was left to otherwise 
fund and organise the renovation of the factory itself.17 Initially a private company, Lied der 
Zeit did receive additional government assistance in the form of loans from Rundfunk DDR 
between 1948 and 1951, prompted by solvency issues within the record company.18 Lied der 
Zeit began pressing recordings of political songs, spoken word and classical and contemporary 
music in 1947.19 Some of the records pressed were music recordings made by the Soviet-
administrated and East German-run broadcaster Berliner Rundfunk and issued under a short-
lived Radiophon label.20 Production capacity was severely limited at this stage, probably only 
in the tens of thousands.21 The public distribution of Lied der Zeit records was also restricted; 
many of the records that were pressed were given as state gifts to politicians and international 
guests rather than publicly sold.22 Between 1947 and 1950 nearly 100,000 records were used 
 
12 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 1950, 18, DR 135/1, BArch. 
13 Lange, Die deutsche ‘78er’ Discographie der Hot-Dance- und Jazz-Musik, 41. 
14 Lange, 41. 
15 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 16. 
16 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, Anlage II. 
17 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, Anlage II. 
18 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, Entwurf. 
19 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 18. 
20 Lange, Die deutsche ‘78er’ Discographie der Hot-Dance- und Jazz-Musik, 37. 
21 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 16. 
22 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 19. 
 99 
for these purposes and this likely represents a substantial proportion of the total records 
pressed.23  
 
By 1950 Lied der Zeit was beginning to operate like a conventional record company 
and records of expenditure on recording and record production are available from this period.24 
Busch received credit for re-establishing a stalled industry and the company managed some 
expansion during his stewardship; in February 1951, Lied der Zeit secured a lease for a second 
small record factory in Ehrenfriedensdorf. This factory was most significant for its ability to 
process the shellac required for pressing 78s.25 At the same time, Busch was progressively side-
lined during a period that saw much of GDR industry brought under central government 
control.26 Lied der Zeit was nationalised as Deutsche Schallplatten in 1953 and Busch was 
removed.27 Investment in recording and production began to climb and an expansion in 
documentation from this period onward indicates the company’s recordkeeping became 
progressively more methodical from this date. Deutsche Schallplatten inherited the assets and 
facilities of Lied der Zeit: this included the administrative headquarters and recording studio at 
Taubenstraße and the two pressworks. Lied der Zeit was retained as the name of one of the 
organisation’s sub-labels, but Busch’s specialty of spoken-word political recordings and 
workers’ songs became an ever-smaller proportion of the company’s output. Busch’s 
relationship with the new company was occasionally acrimonious but he continued to release 
records periodically.28  
 
Along with its nationalisation, a significant event for the record company was the 
arrival of Harri Költzsch in 1954.29 Just 27 when he took up the role of General Director, he 
remained in the position until 1988.30 Költzsch was tasked with developing a recording and 
manufacturing capacity sufficient to enable Deutsche Schallplatten to become the GDR’s 
 
23 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 19. 
24 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, 11. 
25 ‘Lied der Zeit: Finanzbericht 1950’, Anlage II. 
26 Karl Schönewolf, ‘Die Schnulze hat leider noch das Vorrecht’, Sonntag, 25 August 1957, 34 edition, DR 
135/51, BArch. 
27 ‘Nachweis über die Überplanmäßige Selbstkostensenkung IV/1953’ (Deutsche Schallplatten, 4 March 1954), 
DR135-2, BArch. 
28 ‘Bericht über die Erfüllung des Aufnahmeplanes 1957 des VEB Deutsche Schallplatten’ (VEB Deutsche 
Schallplatten, 26 February 1957), DR 1/257, BArch. 
29 Peter Wicke and Lothar Müller, Rockmusik und Politik : Analysen, Interviews und Dokumente, 1. Aufl. 
(Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1996), 111. 




primary source for recorded cultural and educational material. 31 There were substantial 
obstacles impeding his ability to achieve this kind of volume of production. Germany’s major 
pre-war record companies, now all residing in West Germany, had recommenced with a large 
amount of dormant pressing capacity - this contrasted sharply with Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
two small pressworks. In 1953 Deutsche Schallplatten was just beginning to produce records 
in serious volume, pressing about 1.6 million 78s that year - less than Deutsche Grammophon’s 
total for 1948.32 West German record companies remained the most important source of records 
for East German customers as Deutsche Schallplatten attempted to rapidly escalate its 
production levels. Költzsch’s leadership was energetic and his actions during this period 
shaped the character of the GDR record industry in terms of manufacturing, recording policies, 
technical upgrades and foreign sales and supply deals. Költzsch’s administrative efforts and 
the improved resources provided by nationalisation had immediate initial success; Költzsch 
oversaw a substantial jump in production in his first year with total output more than doubling 
to nearly three and a half million records.33 Production in 1955 was similarly impressive, 
increasing by nearly two million records to 5,366,000 and establishing Költzsch’s leadership.34  
 
While Költzsch was able to oversee an increase in production, Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
position within the unsettled GDR economy and its relationships with newly-formed GDR state 
organs and administrative structures created challenging conditions during the mid-1950s and 
beyond. Deutsche Schallplatten was highly sensitive to import restrictions and the GDR’s 
administrative systems for commercial imports made procuring even mundane low-value items 
problematic. In December 1955 Deutsche Schallplatten placed an order to a Copenhagen firm 
through the relevant GDR organisation (Deutsche Handelszentrale Elektrotechnik und 
Feinmechanik-Optik (DHZ)) for twenty sapphire cutting elements used by record lathes to cut 
masters for pressing 78s.35 After a delay of six months Költzsch resorted to asking the Minister 
for Culture, Alexander Abusch, to intercede with the order, as Deutsche Schallplatten was 
facing a complete shutdown of the production of new titles. The delivery of five sapphire 
elements was secured via airmail through direct communication with the Copenhagen firm, but  
 
31 Harri Költzsch, ‘Plan der Einführung des technischen Fortschritts im VEB Deutsche Schallplatten zur 
Aufnahme der Schallplatten-Produktion 17cm/45 UpM.’ (Deutsche Schallplatten, 29 November 1955), 1, DR 
1/255, BArch. 
32 ‘Abschlußbericht über den Verkauf 1953 von Schallplatten (Eigene Produktion), Schallplatten (Supraphon), 
Handesware’ (Deutsche Schallplatten, 1953), DR135-2, BArch. 
33 ‘Schallplattenproduktion (TStck.)’ (VEB Deutsche Schallplatten, 22 October 1957), DR 1/257, BArch. 
34 ‘Schallplattenproduktion (TStck.)’. 
35 Harri Költzsch, ‘Harri Költzsch to Alexander Abusch #2’, 18 June 1956, DR 1/255, BArch. 
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Figure 2.1: A 1957 satirical cartoon from the Sonntag newspaper. The cartoon articulates perennial frustrations 
with the slow pace of new releases by Deutsche Schallplatten during the 1950s.36 
 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s future relationship with that firm was endangered when their invoice 
was not honoured by DHZ.37 
 
The re-organisations of GDR industry during the early 50s also contributed to the 
instability of Deutsche Schallplatten’s record distribution network. There was a prolonged and 
complicated pattern of responsibility for record distribution being shifted between various 
organisations under different chains of authority, adding to disruption within the record supply 
chain. Until 1954, Deutsche Schallplatten directly supplied the GDR’s record wholesaler 
organisation (Schallplatten-Großhandel), which was under the remit of the Ministry for 
Culture.38 In 1955, rationalisation efforts folded the record wholesaler into the 
Großhandelskontor für Kulturwaren (GHK), under the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade 
and Supply.39 The combination of ongoing production shortages and persistent distribution 
difficulties led to reputational damage for Deutsche Schallplatten among record-shop owners 
and record customers. A Dresden record seller claimed that customers’ primary complaint was 
not the quality of records, but the limited catalogue, alleging that in 1955 only 25% of the sixty 
Tanzmusik (“dance music”) titles promised by the record company’s release schedule were 
actually received in stores.40 Similar sentiments are expressed in the cartoon reproduced in 
Figure 2.1. Deutsche Schallplatten was itself dissatisfied with its relationship with record 
 
36 Schönewolf, ‘Die Schnulze hat leider noch das Vorrecht’. 
37 Költzsch. 
38 ‘Die Organisation des Schallplatten-Groß- und -Einzelhandels und seine Verbesserung’ (Deutsche 
Schallplatten, 1958), 1, DR 1/258, BArch. 
39 ‘Die Organisation des Schallplatten-Groß- und -Einzelhandels und seine Verbesserung’, 1. 
40 E. Lämmel, ‘Ein Wort zur Schallplatte’, Der Musikalienhandel, 6 November 1955, DR 1/255, BArch. 
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sellers and wholesalers, particularly in the areas of staff training and knowledge and a reticence 
to promote sections of the record company’s output:  
 
Hinzu tritt die völlig mangelhafte Fachkenntnis des Verkaufspersonals im 
Einzelhandel, und das Bestreben, möglichst große Umsätze ohne Einkaufsrisiko zu 
tätigen… nachweislich liegen Platten des ernsten Repertoires beim GHK am Lager, die 
in der Mehrzahl der Verkaufsstellen nicht geführt werden.41 
 
Add(ed) to the lack of expertise of sales personnel in the retail sector, and the desire to 
make the largest possible turnaround without purchasing risk… it has been shown that 
records of the serious repertoire are kept in storage at the GHK, the majority of which 
are not distributed to retail outlets. 
 
The treatment of genre by Deutsche Scallplatten is one of the company’s most 
interesting aspects and the distribution of genre during the company’s years of peak 78 
production provides a useful control for later developments, with Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
classical Eterna label and its diverse popular music Amiga label serving as the focus for 
analysis. During the years of 78 production, Amiga heavily dominated output and was the main 
driver of Deutsche Schallplatten’s first period of expansion. In 1955, Eterna records amounted 
to less than 50,000 units of the more than five million Deutsche Schallplatten records sold. 
This distribution is visualised in Figure 2.2 - all graphs in this chapter have been compiled 
using figures from various Deutsche Schallplatten administrative records, primarily annual 
reports (Jahresberichts, Geshäftsberichts etc.). Cultural-political factors in the GDR favoured 
classical music production and substantial fluctuations in the ratio of classical to popular music 
records produced were influenced by these policies. Periods of technical change - such as the 
transition to vinyl records - made parallel genre policies explicit in recording areas, but pricing 
was also used to influence the sales of classical and popular music from an early stage. In 1953, 
Eterna records were Deutsche Schallplatten’s most expensive, at an average cost of 3.46 DM 
per record.42 Unterhaltungsmusik (“light music”) records released by Amiga averaged between 
2.38 DM and 2.72 DM per record, respectively.43 By 1959, under-pricing of records deemed  
 
 
41 ‘Die Organisation des Schallplatten-Groß- und -Einzelhandels und seine Verbesserung’, 2. 
42 ‘Abschlußbericht über den Verkauf 1953 von Schallplatten’. 
43 ‘Abschlußbericht über den Verkauf 1953 von Schallplatten’. 
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Figure 2.2: This graph shows production figures of 78s for Deutsche Schallplatten’s two main music labels 
between 1953-1956. Apart from giving a sense of the overall level of production by the company, it depicts 
several important trends: the rapid escalation in production after the company’s nationalisation, the decline of 
the 78 after 1955 and also the complete dominance of popular music record production during this initial period. 
 
 
culturally or politically significant was standard policy for Deutsche Schallplatten.44 This 
policy was applied preferentially to the Eterna label and spoken word and folk music records - 
Amiga releases progressively became the most expensive domestic records sold in the GDR.45 
 
The restoration of the record industry across post-war Europe was founded on the pre-
war format of the 78 rpm electrically-recorded gramophone record, made from varying 
combinations of shellac and mineral fillers. During the 1940s, poly-vinyl chloride-based micro-
groove records emerged as a viable format. Although new methods meant there was potential 
to improve the audio quality of the 78, vinyl records had several attributes that made them 
better suited to the ambitions of the record industry.46 Using vinyl allowed record 
manufacturing to be independent of the East Asian shellac supply chain, disrupted by both 
previous World Wars.47 Vinyl records had lower surface noise, allowed a significantly longer 
playing duration due to their narrow grooves and slow revolving speed and they were also 
substantially more durable. These features made vinyl records a suitable vessel for continuing 
improvements in recording and playback standards and the playing length, in particular, offered 
 
44 ‘Begründung zur Preisanordnung für Schallplatten Waren-Nr. 59173000’ (Arbeitskreis für die Bildung von 
Festpreisen für Schallplatten, 1959), DR 1/258, BArch. 
45 Birgit Rauhut and Michael Rauhut, Amiga: die Diskographie aller Rock- und Pop-Produktionen 1964 - 1990; 
Mit über 1500 teilweise farbigen Abbildungen (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 1999), 8. 
46 Richard Osborne, Vinyl: A History of the Analogue Record (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 67. 


























Figure 2.3: This graph of overall 78rpm record production by Deutsche Schallplatten between 1953-1959 makes 
explicit the rapid escalation in the production of 78s and their equally rapid (and permanent) decline after local 
factors precipitated an early end to the shellac-era in the GDR. 
 
 
many new potentialities.48 Vinyl had further attractions from a manufacturing point of view. 
The petrochemically derived materials for vinyl records could be controlled to a much more 
regularised standard of quality than shellac, a qualitatively volatile derivative of the natural 
excretions of the lac beetle. During the early 1950s vinyl records began to overturn the decades-
long dominance of 78s in a booming US record market. In West Germany, Deutsche 
Grammophon pressed its first LPs in 1951 and pressed some 45s in 1953.49 Although it took 
several more years for the market there to develop a demand for these new formats, Deutsche 
Grammophon and the West Germany record industry staged a comparatively controlled 
switchover. Deutsche Schallplatten was far less prepared. In 1953 Deutsche Schallplatten sold 
12,660 LPs, but these were Supraphon label releases distributed on behalf of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic (ČSSR) cultural publisher Artia Prague, which negotiated terms between 
Deutsche Schallplatten and the ČSSR record industry.50  
 
 
48 Osborne, 67. 
49 Louis, Deutsche Grammophon, 51 and 57. 
























Deutsche Schallplatten’s ill-preparedness for the shift to vinyl records was exposed by 
sudden upheaval in the domestic gramophone record market in 1956. The previously cited 
Deutsche Schallplatten production figure of 5,366,000 records for 1955 is again of historical 
note. It represented the largest increase in production managed by Deutsche Schallplatten in its 
first decade, but it was also the peak of production of 78s in the GDR.51 As vinyl records and 
record players became available in West Germany, GDR record sellers were unsettled and 
responded by sharply reducing their wholesale orders.52 Consequently, the Ministry of Trade 
and Supply, which by then had responsibility for the wholesale of records, cut the year’s total 
order by one and a quarter million records.53 This was directly translated into Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s end-of year figures for 1956, which slumped to 3,754,000.54 This order 
cancellation was the starting point for the terminal decline of the production of 78s in the GDR, 
detailed in Figure 2.3, which by 1959 was less than one and a half million records. While the 
decline of the gramophone record was inevitable and well-signalled internationally, Költzsch 
attributed its abrupt character in the GDR to the actions of the Ministry of Trade and Supply.55 
Writing about West Germany, which had a more developed vinyl market, the discographer 
Horst Lange called 1958 ““Sterbejahr” der 78er Schellackplatten in Deutschland” (““year of 
death” of the shellac record in Germany”).56 This suggests that the fall in demand for 78s may 
not have been as precipitous as anticipated by record sellers in the GDR.  
 
Lange’s observation is corroborated by the transitional dynamic that occurred in the 
UK record manufacturing industry. Reported production figures show that the production of 
78s there was stable and actually increased during this period; from 47 million to 51 million 
between 1956 and 1957.57 This was in the context of a UK record industry that was already 
producing significant quantities of vinyl records; in 1957, the total production of LPs and 45s 
briefly coincided at 13 million apiece.58 As in West Germany, 1958 was also the “Sterbejahr” 
of the 78 in the UK; production declined massively to 28 million that year and just 8 million in 
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1959.59 The mismanagement of the GDR’s record supply chain and pre-emptive curtailment of 
the production of 78s is further confirmed by the actions of the Ministry of Trade and Supply 
itself, which belatedly increased its 1956 order due to a resurgence in demand towards the end 
of the year.60 Deutsche Schallplatten’s slow production turnaround times meant it was unable 
to respond with a compensatory increase in production for the Christmas market.61 The 
production of 78s in the GDR never recovered, although they remained a significant proportion 
of the overall record market for a few more years and demand in Eastern European export 
markets remained steady, particularly in the Soviet Union. In 1959, 216,200 Deutsche 
Scallplatten 78s were exported to the Soviet Union; 16% of the record company’s total 
production of 78s.62 Nonetheless, the episode brought failures in the record supply chain and 
weaknesses in Deutsche Schallplatten’s operational development into sharp focus, highlighting 
the precarity of the record company’s position after a run of early successes. Record wholesale 
and distribution was reorganised several more times over the following years – in 1964 
Deutsche Schallplatten began supplying record stores directly – and the record company came 
under increasing scrutiny regarding its efforts to begin vinyl record production.63 
 
One of the most immediate impacts of the 1956 slump was how it influenced Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s interpretations of developments within the industry; exemplified by a brief 
dispute between the record company and Rundfunk DDR in late 1956 and early 1957. The two 
GDR institutions had an intimate relationship in the recording field, but also in the area of 
distribution; Rundfunk DDR radio programmes were central to the promotion of Amiga 
releases in particular and the broadcast of the label’s titles was regulated by contract.64 
Dysfunction within the GDR record supply chain also extended to broadcast distribution and 
there were some existing tensions due to misalignments between the promotion of Amiga 
releases on the airwaves and the belated delivery of physical records to shops, by which time 
they were considered “veraltet” (“stale”).65 On a visit to Electrola in Cologne during December 
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1956, Költzsch was told rumours of a deal signed between Rundfunk DDR and the record 
company Teldec that would favour the broadcasting of West German artists in the GDR.66 
Költzsch was alarmed by this report and made contact with Rundfunk DDR’s legal department 
head, Friedrich Karl Kaul, by telephone before Christmas to demand a copy of the supposed 
agreement.67 Költzsch followed up this call with a 4 January letter to Hans-Georg Uszkoreit, 
the head of the Department of Music at the Ministry of Culture, to castigate the deal and the 
impact it would have on the broadcast of Amiga releases.68 Költzsch subsequently tracked the 
relative proportion of West German and GDR titles broadcast by Rundfunk DDR during the 
first week of January and alleged that a clear pattern of discrimination had already begun.69  
 
The incident came to a head at a 23 January meeting attended by Rundfunk DDR, 
Deutsche Schallplatten and the Ministry for Culture.70 Rundfunk DDR disputed Költzsch’s 
account of the label distribution in its broadcasts and disawowed the existence of a deal with 
Teldec, although it affirmed its right to enter one.71 Rundfunk DDR made some concessions to 
favouring Amiga releases, even though a later analysis of Rundfunk DDR’s popular music 
broadcasting conducted by Uszkoreit confirmed this was already the case; in 1956 Amiga 
contributed four of the top five titles in the Rundfunk DDR Schlagerlotterie (Hit Parade).72 The 
episode marked the start of new protectionist policies within Deutsche Schallplatten; Amiga 
had previously habitually released recordings by West German artists without limitation, but 
in 1957 it began to restrict the proportion of these releases to 50% and Rundfunk DDR later 
adopted a similar policy towards broadcasting West German titles.73 Deutsche Schallplatten 
also began to actively entice GDR singers that had signed deals with Polydor to return to Amiga 
with improved conditions.74 These measures contrast with the high degree of collaboration that 
was beginning to take place between Eterna and Deutsche Grammophon and other West 
German record companies and which became so integral to Deutsche Schallplatten’s survival.  
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2.1.1  The Path to Vinyl Records 
 
While Költzsch could point to external GDR actors for catalysing the decline of 78s, it was 
more difficult for him to deflect criticism that Deutsche Schallplatten’s preparation for the shift 
to vinyl records was deficient. Serious efforts by record company to begin the domestic 
production of vinyl records only began in 1955 when it was directly tasked by the 25th plenum 
of the SED Central Committee with the production of a selection of 45s for the 1956 Leipzig 
Fair.75 The Leipzig Fair records were to consist of ten Ernste Musik (classical music) records, 
ten Tanzmusik records, two Unterhaltungsmusik records and a single Volkmusik (folk music) 
record; potential artist and repertoire selections were not recorded. This selection of records 
was then to form the basis for a rapid transitioning from test-pressings to full-scale production 
by the end of 1956. This plan entailed a steady escalation of production through the four 
quarters of 1956: 5,000 records were to be pressed in the first quarter, climbing to 144,000 in 
the final quarter for a total of 300,000 45s in the first year of vinyl record production in the 
GDR.76 This target had genre-based allocations: 80,000 classical records, 20,000 light music 
records and 200,000 dance music records.77 None of these targets were reached. Just over 
150,000 LPs and 45s were actually produced under the auspices of Deutsche Schallplatten in 
1956, with the final genre allocation skewing from the planned ratios in favour of Eterna, with 
78,000 LPs and 45s - more than 50% of the total.78 Deutsche Schallplatten’s production figures 
during this period do not distinguish between records pressed domestically and records pressed 
abroad under contract, but company correspondence from this period makes it clear that a very 
small proportion of these 45s and none of the LPs were pressed by Deutsche Schallplatten 
itself.79 During the early years of Deutsche Schallplatten’s vinyl record production the vast 
majority of records were pressed by the Gramofonové závody pressworks in Loděnice by 
arrangement with Artia Prague in the ČSSR.80 The planned production totals for 1956 were 
still not reached, as Artia Prague ceased taking orders from Deutsche Schallplatten halfway 
through the year.81 The outsourcing of record pressing became a frequent short-term solution 
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for Deutsche Schallplatten during the 1950s due to a shortage of presses and the absence of a 
domestic supply of vinyl compound. Deutsche Schallplatten’s dependency on Artia Prague, in 
particular, for essential materials and services became a defining feature of the GDR record 
industry, but Költzsch made several attempts to escape it. The limitations of the GDR chemical 
industry meant he was only able to partially alter its character.  
 
Preparing an independent vinyl record pressing capability for Deutsche Schallplatten 
required the acquisition of equipment for each production stage. An important initial step - and 
one of the most straightforward - was the purchase of a record lathe for cutting lacquer disc 
masters. A reliance on Scandinavian record pressing equipment began when a Lyric-brand 
record lathe from Denmark arrived without complication in December 1955.82 Lacquer discs 
for creating pressing masters were one of the few key consumables for producing vinyl records 
that Deutsche Schallplatten never attempted to have produced in the GDR. They were readily 
available from several manufacturers in the UK, France and the US and they were one of only 
a few key items for which Deutsche Schallplatten’s supply chain was never seriously 
threatened. Deutsche Schallplatten’s first order in December 1955 was for 500 French Pyral-
brand lacquer discs.83 The majority of Deutsche Schallplatten’s other vinyl production-related 
acquisitions during the 1950s were not as straightforward, particularly in regard to vinyl record 
presses and securing a regular supply of vinyl compound. Government directions to focus on 
domestic suppliers led Deutsche Schallplatten to take delivery of a record press manufactured 
by the GDR company Schulze in Köthen.84 This press was rejected as unsuitable after an 
assessment at Babelsberg and Deutsche Schallplatten never attempted to purchase or develop 
a GDR-made record press again. However, this press may have been the source of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s limited test runs of 45s in 1956, which it repeatedly claimed to be of superior 
quality to those supplied by Artia Prague.85 Procurement plans for vinyl record presses turned 
decisively towards foreign suppliers but were thwarted on several occasions. Two presses for 
45s were ordered from the Copenhagen-based Johannessen & Lund in December 1955 with 
delivery initially anticipated for mid-1956, and which can be linked to the projected ramping 
up of production associated with the Leipzig Fair order, as previously described.86 Although 
 
82 Költzsch, ‘Plan der Einführung des technischen Fortschritts im VEB Deutsche Schallplatten zur Aufnahme 
der Schallplatten-Produktion 17cm/45 UpM.’, 4. 
83 Költzsch, 7. 
84 ‘Geschäftsbericht 1956’, 8. 
85 Hagemann, ‘Hagemann to Schneiderheinze’, 15 November 1956. 
86 Költzsch, ‘Harri Költzsch to Alexander Abusch #2’, 18 June 1956. 
 110 
there was regular direct contact between Deutsche Schallplatten and Johannessen & Lund, the 
order needed to be submitted through a GDR export intermediary and seven months later the 
order had still not been delivered.87 Administrative complications related to securing the 
requisite hard currency funds further complicated the order and the presses did not arrive until 
February 1957. 88 Efforts in early 1957 to secure additional presses for 45s were again 
hampered, as administrative delays led to the presses being sold on by the supplier.89 Similar 
patterns accompanied the import of LP vinyl presses.90   
 
Even more than securing vinyl record presses, by far the most critical supply issue for 
Deutsche Schallplatten for nearly four decades was the basic record material itself: vinyl 
compound. Different proprietary formulations of vinyl have been used by various record 
companies since its introduction, and the material used for LPs and 45s can also vary. In the 
case of Deutsche Schallplatten, the surviving documentation does not make any distinction 
between supplies of vinyl compound for LPs or 45s. “Langspielmasse” (long-playing mass) or 
just “Masse” are the most consistent terms, but “Langspiel” in this context was primarily used 
to distinguish vinyl compound from “Normalmasse” or “Schellackgranulat” (shellac). In the 
early years of vinyl record production, strategic plans consistently incorporated the assumption 
that the GDR chemical industry would eventually produce enough vinyl compound to cover 
the entirety of domestic record production. One of the largest chemical factories in the GDR, 
the VEB Leuna-Werke “Walter Ulbricht“, was tasked in 1955 with developing the processes 
and production line necessary to supply the initial production of 45s at Babelsberg.91 The Leuna 
factory was one of a cluster of GDR chemical facilities that were key in cooperative 
development schemes for the Eastern Bloc chemical industry and large quantities of capital 
were expended on developing their manufacturing capabilities.92 It was originally expected that 
the Leuna factory would be ready to begin a vinyl compound supply by mid-1956 and some 
test pressings using material from Leuna were made at Babelsberg.93 However, beyond this 
small test-order the Leuna factory did not contribute any practical proportion of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s production needs that year. In a reactive attempt to meet the 1956 production 
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goals, Költzsch used contingency funds to make several attempts at directly importing thirty 
tonnes of vinyl compound from West Germany, Poland and the ČSSR.94 By November, these 
efforts resulted in a delivery of just two tonnes from West Germany.95 This was used for further 
test runs of 45s, but failed to provide a basis for regularised production. The infrastructural 
steps taken by Deutsche Schallplatten in 1956 to secure domestic vinyl record production did 
not cohere in 1957 and securing technical equipment and raw materials remained a complicated 
and uncertain task of cross-national negotiation. In June 1957, Költzsch still expected the 
Leuna factory to be able to provide the required quantities of vinyl compound by the following 
year.96 By December of the same year, this plan had evaporated, the Leuna factory had given 
up any attempt to produce vinyl for record industry purposes and Deutsche Schallplatten was 
left entirely dependent on its own ability to secure an alternative supply.97 Leuna’s 
shortcomings in assisting Deutsche Schallplatten’s vinyl record production efforts were 
indicative of wider deficits in the GDR chemical industry, but they also came close to 
prompting the end of record production in the GDR.98  
 
Even amidst the context of significant reorganisation within larger sections of the GDR 
economy, Deutsche Schallplatten’s travails during 1956 and 1957 did not escape notice from 
central government. The volatility of the gramophone market, combined with the failures in 
vinyl production, prompted a major intervention in Deutsche Schallplatten’s strategic planning. 
In June 1957, the Ministry of Culture and Deutsche Buchexport (the GDR’s publishing and 
intellectual copyright export organisation) negotiated a preliminary agreement with Artia 
Prague to produce the GDR’s entire supply of vinyl records indefinitely, without the 
involvement or agreement of Deutsche Schallplatten.99 The terms of this proposal were 
intended to facilitate a large increase in vinyl record supply: from 1.5 million records in 1959 
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to 4 million records in 1960 and annual increases of 10% thereafter.100 The plan gave Artia 
Prague total responsibility for the entire manufacturing process; Deutsche Schallplatten would 
supply edited tape recordings and Artia Prague would cut the masters, press the records and 
deliver them pre-packaged.101 One of the plan’s few concessions to Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
progress in developing its own vinyl record production capacity was its then ongoing efforts to 
source vinyl compound from within the GDR. The proposed agreement suggested that both 
Deutsche Schallplatten and Artia Prague should continue to develop their sources of vinyl 
compound and whichever country could produce the superior grade of vinyl would go on to 
supply the entire order for both countries.102  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten appeared to have some intimation of the Ministry for Culture’s 
intention to cease vinyl record production in the GDR; the record company was internally 
formulating counter-arguments and developing reactive plans to bolster the domestic recording 
industry as early as February 1957.103 One of the components of this early defensive 
formulation was an appeal to the incongruence of a country with some of the world’s most 
famous musical ensembles being technically unable to produce its own records.104 After 
receiving the Ministry of Culture’s specific proposals, Költzsch responded in a June 1957 letter 
to Hans Pischner, then Deputy Minister for Culture and former head of music.105 Költzsch was 
strongly set against the out-sourcing of vinyl record production and his tactics to neutralise this 
proposal can be placed in two broad categories: emphasising how quickly vinyl record 
production in the GDR could be escalated and disparaging Artia Prague’s claims about its 
capabilities. Unable to point to any concrete results from his efforts to press vinyl records at 
Babelsberg, Költzsch nonetheless argued that production of 45s could be quickly normalised 
using the two presses then available at Babelsberg.106 The production of LPs could also soon 
be accommodated at Babelsberg by the deprioritisation of 78s and the impending arrival of LP 
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presses.107 Költzsch targeted several aspects of Artia Prague’s track record as justification for 
maintaining domestic production. Artia Prague had demonstrably expanded the scale of its 
vinyl record production at an impressive rate and it was the largest Eastern Bloc producer of 
vinyl compound apart from the Soviet Union, but Költzsch queried its ability to meet the targets 
suggested by the Ministry of Culture’s proposal on several grounds. Staff at Babelsberg could 
testify towards a historical pattern of missed deliveries of shellac material for 78s prior to the 
beginning of vinyl record production.108 There were also historical quality control issues. In 
1955 Deutsche Schallplatten rejected nearly 23 tonnes (30% of the total delivery) of Artia 
Prague-supplied shellac on quality-control grounds.109 In 1956, in the region of 140,000 
Deutsche Schallplatten 78s were returned by distributors and subsequently destroyed due to a 
variety of technical defects.110 Deutsche Schallplatten attributed these defects to problems with 
the Artia Prague shellac supply.111 Unfulfilled deliveries also became an established pattern 
when Artia Prague began to supply Deutsche Schallplatten with completed vinyl records under 
contract. In 1955, Artia Prague’s pressed 52,000 LPs for Deutsche Schallplatten, but this was 
nearly 30% less than the contracted order. 112 The 1956 shortfall of LPs and 45s previously 
discussed was particularly damaging for Deutsche Schallplatten’s reputation, as it had 
undertaken to supply Deutsche Buchexport with 90,000 vinyl records for export.113 Quality 
concerns also accompanied Artia Prague’s vinyl record deliveries, Költzsch alleged that 
substantial quantities of these records were destroyed due to quality concerns.114 Költzsch 
regularly contrasted Artia Prague’s vinyl record short-comings with the purportedly better 
quality of the few test-pressings Deutsche Schallplatten did make in 1956, using vinyl 
compound imported from West Germany.115 An extra element of distrust around the 
involvement of imported vinyl compound was introduced after a visit Költzsch made to the 
Nobel vinyl factory in West Germany in January 1957. Költzsch reported that he was told that 
Artia Prague was importing vinyl compound from West Germany, in addition to manufacturing 
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its own.116 In light of his experience of the quality disparity between the vinyl compound 
supplied from Eastern and Western European sources, Költzsch interpreted this to mean that 
Artia Prague was pursuing a dual policy in regard to its contracted vinyl production: the 
pressworks in Loděnice was using superior West German vinyl for the orders it was taking 
from Western European customers and reserving the inferior vinyl for customers including 
Deutsche Schallplatten.117 
 
Költzsch also cast aspersions about Artia Prague’s international reputation. He claimed 
that Western record companies had previously shared record masters with Deutsche 
Schallplatten on the condition that they wouldn’t be pressed at Loděnice.118 This was allegedly 
due to their bad technical reputation and a suspicion that the records they pressed were also 
finding their way to the black market.119 Költzsch may have been playing on contemporary 
fears within the recording industry; court cases were taken in New York against US labels 
pressing German war-time tape recordings without paying copyright fees.120 Overall, Költzsch 
argued that Deutsche Schallplatten would soon be in a position to meet the Ministry for 
Culture’s production targets using predominantly domestic means.121 However, even in 
Költzsch’s best-case scenarios for GDR-based production and despite his dismantling of Artia 
Prague’s technical standards and capabilities, cooperation with Artia Prague was still a 
prerequisite for all his plans. In the short-term, Deutsche Schallplatten needed Artia Prague to 
supply shellac for 78s and vinyl compound, as well as pressed LPs. Despite the extent of this 
dependency, Költzsch was adamant that the degree to which Deutsche Schallplatten relied 
upon Artia Prague would steadily decline and that the company should be kept aware of its 
status as a stop-gap solution.122 His argument justified the short-term subcontracting of LP 
production and import of vinyl compound as the most pragmatic means of serving the GDR’s 
immediate expectations, while always aiming at a fully independent industrial base. Költzsch 
pressed the Ministry for Culture for a quick response and, despite some of the implicit 
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contradictions present in his strategic plan, the complete outsourcing of vinyl record production 
to the ČSSR did not occur.123 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s large-scale strategic response to the problem years of 1956 
and 1957 and the Ministry of Culture’s intervention was contained in a Seven-Year Plan 
enacted from 1958. This expanded on Költzsch’s reactive proposals and previously developed 
strategic plans for consolidating vinyl record production with a concurrent controlled decline 
in the production of 78s.124 This was characterised within the company by the shutting down 
of the Ehrenfriedersdorf factory in June 1958 and the consolidation of all production expansion 
and modernisation efforts at Babelsberg.125 The Seven-Year Plan laid out steady annual 
increases across many categories: the amount of music recorded by the label was projected to 
nearly double between 1960 and 1965 and the amount of music acquired through tape 
exchanges was to increase by 150% over the same period.126 Pressing of 45s was projected to 
rise by at least 300,000 records each year.127 Expectations for LPs were more modest. Domestic 
LP production would reach 400,000 records a year by 1962, but was not projected to expand 
beyond that during the timescale of the Seven-Year Plan.128 Overall LP production expansion 
instead remained reliant on sub-contracts with Artia Prague, which were expected to reach 
800,000 records a year by 1965. By 1965 the target for total records produced, including those 
sub-contracted through foreign contracts, was 5,200,000.129 This was still a hundred thousand 
fewer records than the number of 78s the GDR had produced by itself in 1955, although this is 
not an entirely equivalent comparison. While the production figures of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s Seven-Year Plan were less ambitious than the 1957 proposal of the Ministry 
for Culture, it provided a framework for maintaining steady improvement within an industry 
that was still undergoing significant change. Költzsch gave Artia Prague little credit for its 
involvement in the GDR record industry, but this commercial relationship was critical to the 
introduction of Deutsche Schallplatten LPs and it remained essential to Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s own pressing of vinyl records throughout the GDR-era.  
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2.1.2  Vinyl Record Production at Babelsberg 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten began to make more impactful infrastructural improvements to its vinyl 
record production during the late 1950s; a graph of the company’s total record production 
during this period is reproduced in Figure 2.4. In 1959 more than 1.5 million Deutsche 
Schallplatten 45s were pressed, the first time the number of vinyl records it produced exceeded 
78s, which stood at 1.34 million.130 While Babelsberg and Artia Prague production is not 
separated in these figures, the vastly increased quantities of vinyl compound imported by 
Deutsche Schallplatten in 1959, in excess of 75 tonnes, indicates that the majority of these 
records were domestically produced.131 More than 300,000 Deutsche Schallplatten LPs were 
also produced in 1959; these figures incorporate the first domestically pressed runs of LP 
records after the arrival and installation of two LP presses that year.132 1959 also had positive 
features for Deutsche Schallplatten’s material supply chain. Finding a domestic supplier for 
vinyl compound was retained as a component of the Seven-Year Plan, despite the dismal 
outcome of the Leuna factory collaboration in 1956. Apart from ideals of GDR self-sufficiency, 
these efforts were galvanised by the insecurity of foreign supplies. In 1959 Babelsberg ordered 
75 tonnes of vinyl compound from Artia Prague and West German suppliers but was 
undersupplied by 30 tonnes.133 The second attempt at producing vinyl compound within the 
GDR involved a new collaborator, Elektrochemisches Kombinat Bitterfeld (Bitterfeld), and 
1959 was the first year GDR-produced vinyl made a significant contribution to record 
production. The start of regular vinyl compound deliveries from Bitterfeld to Babelsberg in 
April of about 500 kg of vinyl compound a week was a source of relief to workers there and 
helped make up for a 40% overall shortfall of import projections for that year.134 
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Figure 2.4: Figures for the total production of vinyl records by Deutsche Schallpatten between 1955 and 1959, 
likely including records pressed under license outside of the GDR. The figures reflect the company’s 
prioritisation of the production of 45s over LPs.  
 
In 1959 and 1960, Deutsche Schallplatten’s vinyl record production chain remained a 
complicated criss-cross of East-West commercial collaborations. Edited studio recordings 
were sent to West Germany on tape for cutting to lacquer and the electro-plating of masters 
and stampers.135 Some of these were then sent east to Loděnice, where they were pressed and 
returned for distribution in the GDR, while others were sent directly to Babelsberg. In 1960, 
initial misgivings held about the quality of Bitterfeld’s deliveries of vinyl compound were 
gradually confirmed. The trial-batches of Bitterfeld vinyl were rough on the record presses and 
there were also aesthetic concerns due to the colour of the finished records, which had a bluish 
tinge unlike the familiar jet-black.136 These issues were initially deemed acceptable quality-
control problems associated with the starting of a new production line and quality-wise the 
records were judged sufficient in the short-term for certain sections of the company’s 
repertoire. 137 This equated to using the Bitterfeld vinyl for pressing Amiga records only, in line 
with broad policies that prioritised the preservation of technical standards for Eterna records. 
During the same period, Deutsche Schallplatten was maintaining a policy of using imported 
recording tape for Eterna recordings, while continuing the use of lower-grade domestic-
manufactured Agfa-Wolfen tape for Amiga recording sessions.138 
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Meetings held between Deutsche Schallplatten, the Ministry for Culture and 
representatives of Bitterfeld and other GDR chemical firms in April 1959 to resolve questions 
related to quality and delivery concerns revealed rapidly escalating discrepancies between the 
various parties’ expectations.139 Deutsche Schallplatten was seeking a rapid increases in line 
with the progressive production projections of their Seven-Year Plan: 115 tons for 1960 and 
270 tonnes by 1963.140 Bitterfeld could offer no increase in production during 1961 due to its 
own supply chain problems, but was seeking huge increases beyond that in order to maintain 
the viability of the production line: 500 tonnes in 1962 and 2000 tonnes in 1965.141 Any 
discussion of funnelling Bitterfeld’s excess production towards export and supplying foreign 
record companies was not noted in the meeting’s record. A further meeting of the same work 
group in June discussed progress in meeting Babelsberg’s short-term supply requirements; 
Bitterfeld was limited to a theoretical maximum of 55 tonnes for 1960, leaving Deutsche 
Schallplatten to again seek vinyl compound supplies from abroad.142 Bitterfeld actually over-
fulfilled its order of vinyl compound for 1960 and delivered 60 tonnes by September.143 
Babelsberg continued to segregate the Bitterfeld vinyl for use with Amiga records.144 After 
September deliveries from Bitterfeld began to dwindle and by November they were less than a 
tonne for the entire month.145 Around the same time that Bitterfeld’s deliveries began to tail 
off, Költzsch learned from documents at the Ministry for Culture that Buna Werke Schkopau, 
Bitterfeld’s most important supplier, had suggested that Deutsche Schallplatten would be better 
off importing vinyl compound.146 Deutsche Schallplatten’s unfruitful interactions with the 
domestic chemical industry foreshadowed larger failures of scale and quality that impacted 
wider sections of GDR industry during the 1960s.147 The relationship with Bitterfeld fell away 
and the following year was characterised by the start of a pivot towards a near-total dependency 
on Artia Prague for vinyl compound deliveries, which remained stable for three decades.  
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In 1961 Deutsche Schallplatten’s total order of vinyl compound was 170 tonnes, with 
120 tonnes on order from Artia Prague and 50 tonnes from West Germany.148 84 tonnes and 30 
tonnes were received in the first half of the year from these respective suppliers, but deliveries 
then stalled, leading to an emergency order of 58 tonnes from England to cover production 
until the end of the year.149 Vinyl compound deliveries from Western Europe in these quantities 
were unusual and Artia Prague’s overall contribution to Deutsche Schallplatten’s production 
requirements increased steadily over the following years, although quality problems with vinyl 
compound deliveries persisted. In 1962 Deutsche Schallplatten pressed its first commercial run 
of stereo records using imported Artia Prague vinyl compound; many of these were faulty and 
were returned by wholesalers.150 Deutsche Schallplatten attributed this to a deficiency with the 
material as previous trial runs of stereo records, using West German vinyl, had given good 
results.151 These problems aside, 1962 was an important year for Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
production of LPs; it more than doubled the previous year’s total to 624,000, exceeding targets 
by 10%.152 In 1963 the quantities of vinyl compound supplied by Artia Prague continued to 
increase, although quality-control concerns were particularly acute in relation to the production 
of stereo records.153 In September 1963 Deutsche Schallplatten applied to the GDR’s import 
agency to request a delivery of 5 tons of vinyl compound from the West German Kalkhoff 
supplier to allow it to re-run stereo trials.154 Deutsche Schallplatten’s technical reports 
consistently favoured West German vinyl compound suppliers but the company’s records do 
not give a clear indication as to why they did not pursue regular supplies as a definitive solution, 
although price and fluctuating import restrictions are likely factors.  
 
The continued uncertainty surrounding vinyl deliveries and their quality during the late 
1950s and early 1960s prompted changes of practice at the pressing plant in Babelsberg. In 
1959 Költzsch credited the workers there for their role in the turnaround of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s production figures that year: 
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Dieser Stand in der Prokopfleistung der Producktionsarbeiter konnte nur durch den 
energischen Kampf gegen die beeinflußbaren Ausfallstunden erreicht werden.155 
 
This level in the per capita performance of the production workers could only be 
achieved by an energetic fight against the influence of lost hours. 
 
Babelsberg began hedging materials as soon as it had its first surplus supply of vinyl 
compound, beginning with 18 tonnes of unused vinyl at the end of 1963.156 In 1964, informal 
economising strategies at Babelsberg began to be systematised. This was initiated by a detailed 
analysis of production procedures at Babelsberg conducted by the economics department of 
the Ministry for Culture in July 1964.157 This analysis was wide-ranging and supportive of 
many of Deutsche Schallplatten’s arguments for capital investment, but it was also critical of 
aspects of the company’s production processes.158 It was particularly focussed on electroplating 
and record pressing practices at Babelsberg, stating: 
 
Die Materialverbrauchsnormen für die Schallplattenproduktion sind nicht 
eingehalten.159  
 
The material consumption standards for record production are not being observed. 
 
Babelsberg’s existing economising strategies were encouraged, particularly attempts to save 
vinyl by reducing the weight of records. Engineers managed this firstly by changing the default 
shape of the record from a tapered edge at the rim to a flatter beaded edge (Wulstrand), which 
had previously been common with shellac records. 12” LPs pressed at Babelsberg in the early 
1960s averaged around 210 grams in weight, the new approach reduced this to around 180 
grams.160 A trial run of 300,000 records using the new shape was calculated to have spared ten 
tonnes of vinyl material in 1963.161 This was another example of a production process that was 
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applied predominantly to Amiga records.162 However, the Ministry for Culture economists 
suggested additional savings were possible and the pursuit of ever-lighter records would remain 
a feature of the production of records at Babelsberg into the 1970s and reductions in weight 
continued over the following years.163  
 
Inefficiencies were also identified in Babelsberg’s electroplating processes. Initially, 
Babelsberg’s electroplating division was regarded internally as one of its most dependable 
technical processes and Deutsche Schallplatten had reasonable success using domestic sources 
of nickel, although import nickel was also a component.164 The economising report sought 
improvement in the electroplating standards at Babelsberg in the hopes of further cost-savings. 
In theory, a nickel record stamper for 45s was capable of pressing 5,000 records. Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s own target was 2,000 pressings, but reports indicated they were achieving less 
than 1,000 pressings per stamper.165 Steady improvements in the electro-plating processes were 
carried out over the following decade. Between 1969 and 1970 Babelsberg was able to improve 
the durability of nickel stampers by an average of 200 pressings per stamper.166 Aside from 
these economising efforts, the factory at Babelsberg was also steadily modernising. The 
original steam plant, now decades old, began to receive attention to allow it to supply adequate 
pressure to the growing number of presses and to provide heat to help improve other processes. 
It had taken time for heat-management to be recognised as an important part of the pressing 
process; historically, production had sometimes been stopped during winter months due to 
simple heating problems. In 1964 heated storage cupboards were installed to preheat the 
individual vinyl biscuits used for each record.167 These heated cupboards were quickly replaced 
in December 1965 with the introduction of five semi-automated vinyl pre-heaters.168 These 
mundane additions to the production process were carried out in addition to the upgrading of 
Babelsberg’s Swedish and Danish record presses and together contributed to increasing the 
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productivity levels of each press by increasing total output and lowering failure rates.169 While 
supply problems persisted, rationalisation and expansion efforts at Babelsberg during the 1960s 
were important precursors to improved production output during the 1970s. 
 
 
Part 2: Licensing Deals, Recording Studios, and the Deutsche Schallplatten “Model” 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten faced technical challenges other than the logistics associated with 
pressing records. Upon its formation, Lied der Zeit was short of recording equipment and it 
often relied on the assistance and generosity of colleagues in Rundfunk DDR and West German 
record companies.170 Studio facilities and equipment remained a consistent concern during the 
early Deutsche Schallplatten-era; an excerpt from a report about a proposed recording 
involving the Berliner Ensemble and the Berlin Rundfunksinfonieorchester in 1956 gives some 
flavour of the recording landscape at the time:  
 
Eine entscheidene Frage ist der Tontechniker, der die Aufnahme leitet. Busch selbst 
will ausprobieren die Qualität von Rudnik (Deutsches Theater). Göhr hätte eine 
Möglichkeit, einen sehr gutem Techniker aus Westdeutschland für diese Arbeit zu 
beschaffen. Noch eine Frage: In welchem Saal könnten die Plattenaufnahmen gemacht 
werden? In der Akademie der Künste kann nur nach 18.00 Uht bzw. Nachts gearbeitet 
warden. Der Saal im “LIED DER ZEIT” ist nicht viel besser und ruhiger. Es müsste 
das Staatliche Rundfunkkomitee einen guten Aufnahmesaal zur Verfügung stellen.171 
 
A crucial question is the sound engineer who will lead the recording. (Ernst) Busch 
wants to try out the quality of Rudnik (Deutsches Theater). (Walter) Göhr can possibly 
get a very good technician from West Germany for this work. One more question: In 
which room could the recordings be made? In the Academy of Arts, you can only work 
after 6 pm or at night. The room at "LIED DER ZEIT" is not much better and quieter. 
The State Broadcasting Committee would have to provide a good recording room. 
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The excerpt suggests a critical lack of recording spaces, as well as the regular use of Rundfunk 
DDR recordings spaces as a contingency backstop. Deutsche Schallplatten’s own recordings 
studios at Taubenstraße were in habitual use, but its capacity was restricted and its suitability 
for classical recordings was very limited.  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten was particularly reliant on outside technical assistance for large 
scale recordings of its major classical performance ensembles, such as the Staatskapelle 
Dresden and the Thomaskirche Boys Choir.172 In 1956 the failure of an order by Deutsche 
Schallplatten for eight condenser microphones from DHZ Elektrotechnik highlighted technical 
deficiencies at the record company. The order was supposed to replace microphones that had 
been on extended loan to Deutsche Schallplatten by colleagues from Deutsche Grammophon 
and which were now due to be returned.173 Given its limited microphone stock, the situation 
was a serious threat to Deutsche Schallplatten’s ability to continue to make recordings and, 
despite these stakes, the company found it difficult to arrange funds for repairing the Deutsche 
Grammophon microphone and importing replacements.174 Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
negotiation of a route towards a degree of financial independence and technical security began 
to coalesce during the same year as the above complication. In 1956 Deutsche Schallplatten 
received a payment of 40,000 DM from Deutsche Grammophon for a collaborative recording 
made in the Leipzig Kongresshalle.175 Although this was not the first such arrangement, it does 
mark the beginning of an escalating pattern of collaboration with Deutsche Grammophon and 
other West German and Western European record companies on classical music recordings.  
 
Formal recording collaborations between Deutsche Schallplatten and West German 
record companies became more frequent and the value of stand-alone tape exchanges deals 
were also quickly realised. By 1957, Deutsche Schallplatten was making focussed technical 
investments to secure its ability to export licensed tape recordings to the West.176 The political 
ramifications of these cultural and economic collaborations with capitalist organisations were 
initially justified by appeals to gaps in the recorded classical repertoire, but the hard currency 
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income generated by these deals rapidly overcame other rationales.177 Deutsche Schallplatten 
became increasingly happy to collaborate on recordings for financial reasons, even if the 
recorded material didn’t fit its own programme requirements:  
 
Unabhängig davon, ob diese Bänder sofort bei uns ausgewertet werden, sind 
Aufnahmen solcher Art notwendig.178 
 
Regardless of whether these tapes are currently valued by us, recordings of this kind 
are necessary.   
 
Licensing deals based on tape exchanges became central to Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
recording and infrastructural investment strategies and the record company’s equipment 
procurement policies began to turn away from GDR-designed equipment during this period as 
it sought to maintain parity with changing international recording standards.179 In 1957 
Költzsch initiated a self-perpetuating technical procurement cycle that became characteristic 
of the company. Seeking approval from the Ministry for Culture to upgrade recording facilities, 
Költzsch argued that the substantial cost of a Telefunken recording installation (245,878 VDM) 
could be paid off in just two years.180 This was based on projections that Deutsche Schallplatten 
could bring in 100,000 VDM annually if given permission to exploit licensing income 
opportunities.181 Improved equipment and expanded recording capacity allowed Deutsche 
Schallplatten to steadily increase the amount of recorded material it could offer for licensing, 
which in turn generated income that maintained technical standards while also financing 
investment across the entire organisation. The regular import of recording gear from the West 
by Deutsche Schallplatten distinguished it from the technological recording paradigm at 
Rundfunk DDR, where a steady policy of internal research and development was maintained. 
Licensing deals were transformative for Deutsche Schallplatten by enhancing the value of its 
assets -primarily the GDR’s world-renowned performance ensembles - while bypassing its 
weaknesses. During the 1950s and early 1960s this was largely its weak vinyl record 
manufacturing base. As the medium of exchange was recording tapes, the deals also enabled 
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Deutsche Schallplatten to deal directly with international partners and evade the complications 
associated with the export of physical records and onerous interactions with the GDR export 
infrastructure.182 In 1959, Deutsche Schallplatten exported just 4,400 physical records to the 
West, but its licensing income that year was in the region of 210,000 VDM.183 The export of 
physical records still retained a greater degree of relevance for the Eastern European market. 
In 1959, Deutsche Schallplatten exported just over half a million records of various formats 
eastward, with 40% of this figure comprised of 78s.184 
 
By the early 1960s, the licensing and collaborative recording deals made by Deutsche 
Schallplatten were numerous and diverse, though almost completely focussed on Eterna 
recordings. An account made by Költzsch of co-operative recordings made in 1960 and 1961 
details the variability of the deals made. A 1960 recording of Elektra was conducted in the 
GDR using the Dresdner Staatskappelle under Karl Böhm and soloists contracted to Deutsche 
Grammophon.185 A 1961 recording in Berlin of Tosca performed by the Berliner Staatskappelle 
under Horst Stein again used Deutsche Grammophon soloists but was carried out and paid for 
by Deutsche Schallplatten.186 By contrast, a recording of La bohème with the Berliner 
Staatskappelle and Staatsoper Chor under Alberto Erede, although carried out in East Berlin, 
was produced and paid for by Deutsche Grammophon.187 Co-productions were also carried out 
with the West German branch of Philips on a series of recording with the Leipzig 
Gewandhausorchester under Franz Konwitschny.188 The recordings included Schumann and 
Beethoven symphonies among other works by those composers, with the recordings costs split 
evenly between the two record companies. The finalisation of this particular exchange also 
entailed Philips purchasing the rights to four Amiga recordings, relatively unusual at the 
time.189 While the degree to which Deutsche Schallplatten was intertwined with the West 
German record industry during a period that includes the erection of the Berlin Wall is in itself 
noteworthy, these interactions were critical to the survival of Deutsche Schallplatten during 
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this period and Költzsch distributed the hard currency earned from each of these cross-border 
exchanges to meet specific infrastructural and material needs.190  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s developing foreign income stream and its impact on the record 
company’s technical infrastructure was assisted by a windfall it experienced in 1959. Plans to 
refurbish and upgrade the studios at Taubenstraße were cancelled due to the repossession of 
the record company’s headquarters by the Ministry for Trade and Supply, which was expanding 
its own offices there. In compensation for the enforced move to new premises at Reichtagsufer, 
Deutsche Scallplatten’s moving costs were covered and they were granted 350,000 DM to 
renovate their new location and build new recording studios.191 The move to Reichstagufer in 
itself marked only a small expansion in recording capacity, but the new technical facilities were 
particularly impactful for the output of Amiga recordings; in 1963 the label nearly doubled its 
recording minutes target for that year by September.192 1963 was also the year that 12” Amiga 
LPs were pressed for the first time.193 By 1964, the Reichstagufer studios were already so 
oversubscribed for Amiga and Litera label (spoken word) recordings that it was causing 
maintenance issues.194 This was addressed in 1967 with the construction of a dedicated Amiga 
facility on Brunnenstraße. Referred to as Studio B or the “Amiga studio”, expenditure on 
outfitting this studio accounted for a considerable proportion of the Deutsche Schallplatten 
technical budget for the following years.195 This studio was an important contributor to the 
increasing success and international profile of Amiga artists and bands during the 1970s, until 
the recording studio landscape in the GDR began to shift again during the 1980s. Eterna 
recordings during the 1960s period continued to rely primarily on hired spaces and converted 
churches, primarily the Lukaskirche in Dresden, but these were also becoming better regulated 
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2.2.1  Vinyl Records in the GDR: Genre Disruption and Production Stabilisation  
 
The introduction of vinyl records in the GDR had unusual interactions with genre, partly due 
to the strong prioritisation of 45s during the early stages of domestic vinyl record production. 
This strategy may have been a result of the leadership of Deutsche Schallplatten identifying a 
broad equivalency between 78s and 45s and consequently prioritising the production of 45s as 
a direct replacement for 78s – thus positioning the development of LP production as 
secondary.197 This institutional viewpoint is further suggested by 1957 plans for the expansion 
of record production through 1959 and 1960, which envisaged a coordinated alignment in the 
reduction and increase in the levels of production of 78s and 45s.198 These plans called for the 
domestic production of 2 million 45s and 2 million 78s, but just 100,000 domestically produced 
LPs, augmented by 400,000 LPs under contract to Artia Prague.199 45s may have also been 
appealing to Deutsche Schallplatten in the context of its material supply problems, due to their 
smaller size and the requirement of less material per unit. While 45s in the GDR did largely 
assume the former role of 78s as a format dominated by popular music titles, the belated 
expansion of LP production resulted in a more volatile genre distribution dynamic for that 
format. 
 
LP production in the GDR only exceeded one million towards the end of the 1960s, but 
this prefigured major increases during the 1970s, depicted in Figure 2.5. LP production jumped 
from four to five million between 1969 and 1970, with the majority of this production increase 
coming from Babelsberg.200 This impressive increase of LP production in 1970 was exceeded 
by an increase in the supply of 45s in 1973, when production at Babelsberg more than 
quadrupled to 3.9 million.201 Increases in the numbers of records produced and sold in the GDR 
during the 1970s could be spectacular. In a 1974 regional breakdown of income from record 
sales - reproduced in Figure 2.6 - the percentage increases from 1970 to 1974 ranged between 
200% to nearly 400% in some areas.202 The overall increase of record production in the GDR  
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Figure 2.5: Vinyl record production figures for Deutsche Schallplatten between 1969 and 1979. The graph  
 illustrates a transition between two phases of vinyl production: the incremental increases of the 1950s and 
1960s and the rapid expansion of the early 1970s. The figures also show the establishment of an LP to 45 
production ratio that would remain stable from the mid-1970s until the end of the GDR-era. 
 
Figure 2.6: A breakdown of total regional Deutsche Schallplatten sales between 1970 – 1974. Broadly, the 
figures depict an expanding market but also demonstrate that the relative proportion of these increases varied 
significantly by region.203 
 































during the 1970s mirrored similar rates of expansion in the UK record industry (while US 
record production remained relatively stable), fuelled by falling prices during this period.204  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten production figures from 1974 also provide an illuminating 
snapshot on how genre was now distributed among the record company’s release formats. In 
1956, the ratio of Amiga to Eterna 78s was more than 10:1 (circa 3,009,000:268,000).205 In 
1974, the ratio of Amiga to Eterna 45s was remarkably similar at 9:1 (2,693,000:296,000).206 
This congruency between the shellac and vinyl eras dissipates in relation to LPs. In 1956, 
Deutsche Schallplatten issued 50,000 Eterna LPs and just 9,000 for all other genres of music, 
as the record company prioritised LPs as a prestige format for classical music.207 Eterna’s 
domination of LP production continued for an indeterminate number of years and this 
imbalance appears to have been recognised within Deutsche Schallplatten. In a 1969 interview, 
Költzsch admitted that while the market for classical music recordings in the GDR had been 
demonstrably expanded, Amiga production was still not matching demand.208 Költzsch pointed 
towards a new practice of compiling Amiga singles onto LPs, the creation of a school for 
songwriters and the inititiation of an annual Schlagerwettbewerb (songwriting competition) as 
examples of his efforts to develop domestic popular music in the GDR.209 
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Figure 2.7: Deutsche Schallplatten 45 production figures for its two main music labels, 1974-1979. The large 
increase in the production of 45s in 1973 was focussed on the Amiga label almost exclusively, in contrast with 
the focus on Eterna during the early period of vinyl record production in the 1950s.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Deutsche Schallplatten LP production figures for its two main music labels, 1974-1979. It was 
during this period that the company reached peak capacity and the relative ratio established between the two 
labels by 1979 remained stable into the 1980s. 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten production figures for the late-1950s and the 1960s are not 
conclusive on genre distribution and thus they do not make it clear when the crossover 
occurred, but by 1974 - at the latest - Amiga LP production had decisively overtaken Eterna. 

























































ratio of a little more than 2:1.210 The production of 45s by Deutsche Schallplatten after 1974 
stabilised at between 3 and 3.5 million for the rest of the decade and did not exceed four million 
until the mid-1980s.211 While the established ratio of Amiga and Eterna 45s within these 
production figures remained relatively stable during the 1970s - depicted in Figure 2.7 - the 
ratio of Amiga to Eterna LP production continued to resolve in favour of Amiga. Total 
production of LPs by Deutsche Schallplatten plateaued at just over 12 million between 1977 
and 1979 and did not exceed this level during the 1980s.212 The relative proportion of Amiga 
to Eterna LPs stabilised around 1979 at close to 3:1 (8,308,000:2,936,000); the establishing 
period of this consistent pattern of LP distribution is depicted in Figure 2.8.213 The maintenance 
of these absolute and relative production levels through the 1980s suggest that Deutsche 
Schallplatten had either reached the practical limits of its production capacity or it had saturated 
the domestic market. This thesis does not wish to suggest that GDR-specific cultural policies 
were the only driver behind the changing genre distributions described above; the widespread 
use of LPs for popular musics was not characteristic of the record industry during the 1950s 
and early 1960s. However, it is clear that cultural-political conditions in the GDR - set against 
the backdrop of the strategies it took in introducing vinyl record production - had a substantial 
impact on the character of record format distribution in Deutsche Schallplatten’s output.  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s production increases of the late-1960s and 1970s also had 
expression in how it promoted and organised its releases. This was particularly impactful for 
Amiga. In 1970, Amiga was still chiefly focussed on EP releases; that year it released fifty new 
titles on 45 with an average run of 11,500 discs.214 During the early 1970s, Deutsche 
Schallplatten continued to enact new approaches for expanding Amiga sales; one of the most 
of these was to collect successful single releases onto compilation LPs.215 One of the first of 
these was Rhythmus ’71, which sold more than 100,000 copies.216 This was a landmark for the 
label and similar compilation records became a cornerstone of Amiga release schedules. Four 
other Amiga releases sold over 100,000 records in 1974, although maintaining the supply of 
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these hit records was sometimes precariously managed.217 These kinds of releases and the 
improved promotional policies that accompanied them were credited with helping significantly 
improve the label’s relationship with Rundfunk DDR, Fernsehen der DDR and the GDR’s live-
music infrastructure and they also helped pave the way for full-album LP releases by GDR 
artists during the later 1970s.218 During the 1970s, Amiga managed to sustain a consistent level 
of success and a widening range of artists achieved similar levels of sales. The successful 
Amiga records of the 1970s were accompanied by a change of engagement and rhetoric within 
the Deutsche Schallplatten administration. Annual reports from the beginning of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s formation regularly feted the achievements of the Eterna label and habitually 
detailed some of the most successful composers, works and soloists recorded in a given year. 
By contrast, Amiga’s annual assessments during the 1950s and 1960s were generally 
conducted in broad generalities, despite consistently making up a greater proportion of overall 
domestic sales. As the 1970s progressed and Amiga acts began to achieve foreign success to 
match their domestic sales, names like Puhdys, Karat, City and Veronika Fischer became 
regular features of Deutsche Schallplatten’s annual reports as the company’s appreciation of 
popular music became more sophisticated. In Deutsche Schallplatten administrative records 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of Amiga recordings were placed under broad pre-
war genre categories such as “Tanzmusik” or “Unterhaltungsmusik” music. From 1972 genre 
terms like “Schlager” (“hit music”/pop music) and “Beatmusik” and descriptors like 
“Hartebeat” (“hard beat”, a Germanic synonym for the rock ‘n’ roll back beat) belatedly 
became more prevalent within the organisation and were increasingly recognised in its strategic 
development plans.  
 
Licensing remained a significant source of income for Deutsche Schallplatten 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1978, 75% of all Eterna recordings were either co-produced 
with or licensed to Western record companies and a large proportion of Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s classical output was available worldwide due to this enduring strategy.219 In 
1979, 90% of Eterna recordings had international distribution deals.220 Amiga recordings began 
to play a more significant role in Deutsche Schallplatten’s foreign licensing activities during 
the late 1970s and the band Puhdys, in particular, was important to this development. The  
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Figure 2.9: Total Deutsche Schallplatten foreign licensing income, 1970-1979. This hard currency stream was 
critical to the development of Deutsche Schallplatten’s recording infrastructure. From 210 kVDM in 1959, this 
income expanded rapidly during the 1960s, but by the 1970s it was comparatively static. 
 
 
Puhdys were the most successful GDR band in both domestic and foreign sales and their career 
usefully expresses recurring tensions and inconsistencies within the GDR’s treatment of 
popular music. In 1977, the Puhdys’ second and third albums sold well across Europe and they 
were awarded “Sonderklasse” (“special status”) within the GDR’s regimented performance 
and recording infrastructure; this granted them a guaranteed income and enabled them to tour 
and record in Western Europe.221 They repaid this treatment with continued success and 
combined sales of nearly 400,000 records in 1979.222 Bands like Karat followed the Puhdys’ 
model and helped solidify Amiga success by selling more than 200,000 LPs in that same 
year.223 However, the aesthetics of both bands were largely based on Western influences and, 
along with many of their peers, they were almost completely reliant on “West-Technik” or 
Western-manufactured musical equipment, largely secured through back-channels established 
with bands in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.224 This transgressive technical equipment was the 
focus of an incident that took place during the band’s early period of major success. In 1974, 
the band were part of a line-up including Klaus Renft Combo, Electra and Prinzip for a concert 
held at the Berliner Friedrichstadtpalast to launch the Rhythmus ’74 compilation LP.225 The 
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concert was used as an opportunity by GDR customs officials to stage a raid with the intention 
of seizing illegally-imported musical equipment.226 The raid led to a stand-off; customs 
officials were faced-down by staff from the Ministry for Culture advocating for the GDR’s top-
performing bands of the period, who faced the effective crippling of their sanctioned activities 
due to conflicting impulses within separate organs of the state.227  
 
The contribution of bands like Puhdys to Deutsche Schallplatten’s foreign licensing 
income never approached the levels attained by Eterna’s long-established commercial 
relationships with foreign record companies, but Amiga’s improved international success was 
nevertheless significant to maintaining the stability of that income. In the late 1950s, Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s foreign licensing income was in the region of 200,000 to 300,000 VDM per 
year.228 Alongside improving vinyl record production, this income expanded rapidly during the 
1960s, but plateaued during the 1970s at around 1,000,000 VDM, as shown in Figure 2.9. 
Amiga’s expanding contribution was critical in that context - and was recognised by Deutsche 
Schallplatten as such - as licensing income continued to finance ongoing infrastructural 
technical upgrades.229 During the 1970s, these upgrades included a brief focus on quadrophonic 
recording at the Lukaskirche.230 Licensing income also contributed to the relative ease with 
which Deutsche Schallplatten introduced its first new consumer format in more than a decade: 
audio cassette tapes.231 First produced in 1970, tape production escalated rapidly during the 
1970s - also shown in Figure 2.10 - and continued to expand during the 1980s, exceeding 3 
million in 1987.232 Despite some quality-control issues, Deutsche Schallplatten had 
considerable success with the format, particularly with Christmas-compilations, comedy 
recordings and fairy-tale tapes aimed at children.233 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten during the 1980s was characterised by the continuation of many 
of its successful long-term policies and stable production trends, but there were some technical 
shortcomings as well as a degree of destabilisation to its Amiga recording model. A focus on 
maintaining technical standards for Eterna recordings continued with the purchase of stereo  
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Figure 2.10: Total Deutsche Schallplatten audio cassette production figures 1970-1979. The record company 
had issues with tape formulations and label printing, but the introduction of audio cassettes was relatively 
unproblematic in comparison with previous formats. 
 
 
digital recorders in 1984.234 Deutsche Schallplatten also invested in Direct Metal Mastering 
(DMM) vinyl record lathes in the same year. 235 The money spent on these two upgrades 
accounted for 64% of Deutsche Schallplatten’s technical expenditure in 1984.236 Although the 
merits of DMM have been debated, it was the technological peak of vinyl mastering technology 
at the time and was seen as a prerequisite for the continued prestige of Eterna recordings. In 
1987, the LP presses at Babelsberg were upgraded to accommodate the new standard and more 
than a million records pressed that year bore the DMM imprimatur.237 Deutsche Schallplattten’s 
cassette production line was improved in 1987; of 3 million total cassettes produced, 500,000 
utilised improved CrO2-formulation tape and 230,000 of these were dubbed from digital 
recordings.238 However, there were areas of recording and record production where Deutsche 
Schallplatten was not on pace with international developments. In 1987, digital multi-track 
recordings relied on the contributions of international collaborators and in 1988 Deutsche 
Schallplatten was only just beginning to investigate processes for creating glass masters for 
CD replication.239  
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Since the mid-1960s, Deutsche Schallplatten made regular provision for the 
construction of a recording infrastructure to serve the Amiga label – largely based on the 
technical model of commercial Western recording studios – alongside its more comprehensive 
expenditure on enhancing Eterna recordings. The results of these tandem policies can be 
discerned from a technical assessment of Deutsche Schallplatten’s recording facilities 
compiled in January 1990. Equipment lists from Deutsche Schallplatten’s Eterna and Amiga 
studios all exhibit a diverse range of industry standard loudspeakers, tape machines, 
microphones – predominantly Western imports with relatively few instances of GDR-
manufactured equipment. A notable exception in this regard are the recording desks used in 
the various recording facilities. Only the two studios at the Amiga facility on Brunnenstraße 
had Western-manufactured desks - a 1967 Telefunken desk and a more modern US-built MCI 
JH 600 with Audio Kinetics automation - all the other studios had recording desks built by 
Deutsche Schallplatten technicians. The most recent of these was the 36-channel desk installed 
at the Lukaskirche in 1988, which featured VCA control.240 Despite these technical provisions, 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s relative monopoly on recording studios was disrupted during the 
1980s as successful Amiga recording artists began to take advantage of opportunities to record 
abroad and a small number of private recording studios also emerged within the GDR. By 
1987, the increasing proportion of Amiga recordings from foreign studios was a noted trend 
and in 1988 more than half of Amiga’s one hundred new releases for the year were produced 
in one of the GDR’s private recording studios.241 Martin Meyer, Deutsche Schallplatten’s new 
general director and the former Deputy Minister of Culture, was not averse to Amiga artists 
making recordings in professional studios in West Berlin, but he was less enthused by the new 
trend of “semi-professional” private studios within the GDR.242 Meyer acknowledged that the 
current technical set-up at the Amiga studio on Brunnenstraße made the achievement of some 
types of contemporary recordings difficult to attain, but he attributed the lack of quality he 
observed in some Amiga recordings of 1988 to external contributors: 
 
Es gab eine ganze Reihe absatzstarker Neuveröffentlichungen, die zu einem Teil 
freilich an der unteren Grenze des zu fordernden inhaltlichen, akustischen und 
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musikalischen Qualitätsstandards lagen. Das betrifft vor allem Übernahmen aus 
Rundfunk, Fernsehen oder Privatstudios. 243 
 
There were a number of high-volume new releases, some of which were at the lower 
end of the demanding content, acoustic and musical quality-standards. This mainly 
applies to acquisitions from radio, television or private studios. 
 
Meyer requested that the Ministry of Culture arrange for the central regulation of access to 
private recording studios as part of a modernising plan to run from 1991 to 1995.244 These plans 
were never enacted as Deutsche Schallplatten largely ceased to be run as an active record 




2.2.2  Conclusion 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s activities as a record company notably bridge the period during which 
vinyl records were the dominant consumer music format and its primary successes and failures 
relate to this medium. Until the mid-1950s the primary challenge for the GDR record industry 
was the restoration of a domestic supply of 78rpm gramophone records. The disruption caused 
by the introduction of vinyl records was devastating for the company and from 1956 until the 
early 1960s, Deutsche Schallplatten faced an existential threat as it found itself in the midst of 
a major technological format-shift for which it was ill-prepared. Deutsche Schallplatten made 
focussed improvements to its recording and production infrastructure during the 1960s, but it 
wasn’t until the 1970s that its production base began to produce records in quantities 
commensurate with domestic demand. Deutsche Schallplatten did not have the legacy 
resources of the major West German record companies, but commercial relationships with 
West German and other international record companies and the foreign licensing income 
derived from these partnerships were key to the large-scale infrastructural improvements that 
Deutsche Schallplatten slowly made over several decades. 
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Material shortages, infrastructural failures and administrative mishandlings were 
central to Deutsche Schallplatten’s challenges with record production, but complex interactions 
between GDR cultural priorities and the pursuit of foreign licensing income also contributed 
to the atypical character of the introduction of vinyl record formats to the GDR. A prolonged 
emphasis on preserving and augmenting the classical music recordings of the Eterna label due 
to their international value influenced unusual dynamics within the genre distribution of 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s vinyl record production output, which require additional investigation 
and analysis beyond that offered in this chapter. Popular music did receive steadily improved 
attention and resources from Deutsche Schallplatten from the 1960s onwards and the 
significant domestic and international success of some Amiga artists during the 1970s and 
1980s was aided by these progressive policies. As the GDR-era came to a close, Deutsche 
Schallplatten had a stable recording and record production infrastructure, regularly augmented 
by steady (though potentially stagnating) foreign licensing income. Impending recording 
technology and consumer format changes would have tested this model again, but the folding 
of the company after the Wende obviated this eventuality. Deutsche Schallplatten recordings 
of diverse types continue to be remastered and reissued and both the quality of its classical 
recordings and the enduring popularity of some of its Amiga artists attest to the contribution it 
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Chapter 3: Stereo Narratives and the GDR, 1947-1970  
 
Audio infrastructures in Europe during the post-war period were initially characterised by the 
restoration of pre-war structures, but new media forms and technologies for music and 
broadcasting began to arrive rapidly during the early 1950s. One of the most interesting 
developments in sound technology in the early years of the Cold War was the final coming-to-
fruition of stereophonic recording. Using two or more sound channels to present a soundscape 
distinctively different than what is possible from a monophonic sound source, stereo was 
consistently portrayed in contemporary academic and commercial spheres as a major 
qualitative advance for sound reproduction. The acoustician Vilhelm Lassen Jordan likened 
monophony to listening with “one ear close to a small hole in one wall of the studio”.1 By 
contrast, stereo’s comparative width and perception of spaciousness supposedly removes this 
wall and invites the listener within the recording space – although attributions of realism or 
verisimilitude to stereo are problematic.2 Stereo remains the default audio format for much of 
contemporary music recording and radio and TV broadcasting. Although conceptually 
relatively straightforward, the development and execution of stereo sound was protracted and 
multi-faceted. Experiments with multi-channel audio are nearly as old as recording itself, but 
until the mid-1950s the overwhelming majority of recorded sound remained monophonic. The 
associated audio technologies and infrastructures of the early twentieth century were all rigidly 
monophonic formats and stereo’s eventual arrival was thus a significant test of the robustness 
of these audio infrastructures in the face of transformative technological change. In the US, 
where stereo was standardised and commercialised, the post-war economic boom fuelled 
expansion in the record industry and enabled an increasing interest in high fidelity; important 
components of the general context that allowed stereo to become a viable mass media format. 
In the GDR, the introduction of stereo was more closely linked to political and cultural 
ideologies, whereby the absence of stereo could be viewed as an implicit criticism of the wider 
GDR project. 
 
Stereo was just one of several technological media forms that flourished in the post-
war period. Although the GDR perceived Western cultural imports as an ideological threat and 
 
1 Vilhelm Lassen Jordan, Acoustical Design of Concert Halls and Theatres: A Personal Account (London: 
Applied Science Publishers, 1980). 
2 Jonathan Sterne, ‘Compression: A Loose History’, in Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures., 
The Geopolitics of Information Ser (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 33. 
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actively attempted to restrict their flow into the GDR, it adopted identical technological forms 
in order to construct parallel cultural infrastructures that could counterbalance the output of the 
West. The compatibility of these domestic infrastructures with those of the West meant the 
GDR actually helped to enable cross-border media exchanges and Western cultural imports 
were never successively excluded. One of the main challenges for the GDR economy was 
matching pace with international technological developments. The handling of the gramophone 
and vinyl record changeover during the mid-1950s discussed in Chapter 2 provides an example 
of a cultural industry in the GDR that was clearly unprepared for a major technological shift. 
In comparison, the introduction of stereo recording and stereo broadcasting in the GDR was 
better coordinated. Although stereo involved a large range of technical developments across a 
wide group of GDR companies and organisations, it was largely self-coordinated with little 
direct control by central government other than broad policy directives. While GDR technical 
narratives are replete with examples of the state trying to catch-up with international 
technological developments, the introduction of stereo to the GDR has particular historical 
undertones due to Germany’s technical contributions to the development of viable stereo media.  
 
 
3.1  Early Stereo, Technological Transfers and the Settling of Stereo Formats  
 
Essential strides were made with stereophonic sound experiments during the 1930s and 1950s, 
but the stereo had a long experimental pre-history. The earliest known stereophonic experiment 
was run during the 1881 Paris Electrical Exhibition. This experiment utilised a dual telephone 
circuit running from the Paris Opera house to the exhibition centre; both circuits fed a signal 
of the live performance taking place at the opera house to the ears of the listener.3 In 1925, the 
Berlin Opera House was the site for a similar experiment.4 Motivated by an envisaged listener 
subscription service, this experiment involved multiple microphones and several phone lines.5 
In 1933, Bell Labs similarly used telephone lines to transmit a performance of the Philadelphia 
Symphony Orchestra on a three-channel system to an audience in Washington DC. 6  A 
commonality between all these early stereo systems was that they were all for live 
 
3 Harold T. Sherman, ‘Binaural Radio Broadcasting’, Audio Engineering, January 1953, 14, 
americanradiohistory.com. 
4 Ludwig Kapeller, ‘Radio Stereophony’, Radio News, October 1925, 545, americanradiohistory.com. 
5 Kapeller, 546. 
6 H. Fletcher, ‘Auditory Perspective - Basic Requirements’, Electrical Engineering 53, no. 1 (January 1934): 9–
11, https://doi.org/10.1109/EE.1934.6540356. 
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performances; the limitations of contemporary recording equipment made it extremely 
difficulty to encode multiple simultaneous recording. Alan Dower Blumlein famously had 
success grappling with several of the many technical and theoretical challenges presented by 
stereo while working for Columbia and EMI Records in England during the early 1930s. This 
included experimenting with several methods of recording multi-channel sound: these methods 
included etching double grooves to disc and recording multiple channels to optical film.7 
Optical film was the solution utilised for the first major exposure of stereophonic sound to a 
broad public: Disney’s Fantasia in 1940.8 While technologically sophisticated, the methods 
used by Fantasia were prohibitively expensive for general use. Stereo was still just a novelty, 
and, after Fantasia, general audiences did not experience stereo sound again to any substantial 
degree until the 1950s. 
 
A key progression towards making stereo a viable format was the maturation of 
magnetic tape recording that took place in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s. However, the 
applicability of magnetic tape towards stereo usage was not the primary motivation for its 
development and its suitability for this role was only realised subsequently. Magnetic recording 
tape offered many important advantages for recording that included recording duration, sound 
quality and the ability to re-record. Germany was at the forefront of magnetic recording 
development from the 1920s through until the 1940s. Magnetised steel wire was the initial 
medium of choice and was used in dictation machines during the 1920s and 1930s. The 
magnetised medium used in Germany rapidly progressed from steel wire to steel tape and then 
to paper tape coated in ferric oxide.9 In the early 1930s two of Germany’s largest manufacturers, 
AEG and IG Farben, collaborated on the development of a new tape recorder utilising a plastic-
based recording tape formulation. The Magnetophon was launched at the Berlin Exhibition in 
1935.10 It was the first tape recorder to use plastic tape, which proved to be a much more reliable 
and robust base than paper for the sound-carrying magnetic layer. The Magnetophon had 
significantly better sound characteristics than wire-based recordings. With a frequency 
response that extended to 10 kHz, the Magnetophon gained about an octave in comparison to 
a contemporary gramophone record. 11  The Magnetophon’s qualitative capabilities were 
 
7 Robert Charles Alexander, The Inventor of Stereo: The Life and Works of Alan Dower Blumlein (Oxford: 
Focal Press, 1999), 75. 
8 E. Garner Louis Jr., ‘Stereo: Then and Now’, Radio Electronics, March 1959, 54. 
9 Mark Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, HI-FI Tape Recording, February 1958, 24, 
americanradiohistory.com. 
10 Mooney Jr., 24. 
11 Mooney Jr., 28. 
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unsurpassed during the Second World War; the BBC and broadcasters in the US continued to 
rely on wire- and steel tape-based magnetic recording devices during this period.12 From about 
1944 the US was beginning to develop paper-tape based recording, but German tape recording 
capabilities had continued to improve during the war with the application of AC bias in 1942.13 
This process involves the use of an inaudible high-frequency signal that improves the 
responsiveness of recording tape to the recording signal. 
 
After the war, the US took over the impetus in the development of magnetic recording 
technology, though largely based on the example provided by German recorders. Richard H. 
Ranger and John T. Mullin, both US Army Signal Corps officers stationed in Germany in 1945, 
were pivotal in bringing the German advances to the US. Ranger was involved in the 
assessment of the AEG factory in Berlin. This factory was the centre of Magnetophon 
production and eighteen Magnetophons were divided among the Western Allies, with five of 
these staying with the US Army.14 On his return to the US, Ranger began to give lectures on 
the devices and distributed the parts among the US audio industry, characterising this as the 
“finest reparations we could get”.15 Mullin came across the Magnetophon in Frankfurt; he 
disassembled two and posted them to the US along with 50 reels of tape. Mullin began to give 
demonstrations of the Magnetophon in 1946 and became a consultant for the electronics 
company Ampex.16 The parallel activities of Ranger and Mullin came to quick fruition. In 1947 
the US manufacturing corporation 3M made significant improvements to the  capabilities of 
Magnetophon-type recorders by improving the tape formulation.17 In the same year Mullin was 
contracted by Bing Crosby to record his live radio show to facilitate repeat broadcasts for US 
radio markets in different time zones. In April 1948, Crosby’s show was recorded for the first 
time using an Ampex 200.18 Magnetic tape recorders quickly became widespread and wire 
recorders were soon defunct in US broadcasting. The Magnetophon also had a direct influence 
on the development of tape recorders in Britain. This began with the design and construction 
by EMI of the British Tape Recorder 1 (BTR1) in 1947, directly based on the German device  
 
 
12 ‘How Broadcasting House Is Run’, BBC Year Book 1934, 1934, 52. 
13 Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, 24; Werner Stankoweit, ‘Studiotechnik Rundfunk: 
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(Rundfunk DDR, 1967), 39, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
14 Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, 28. 
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16 Mooney Jr., 29. 
17 Mooney Jr., 29. 
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Figure 3.1: Sendesaal I at Haus des Rundfunks, Berlin in 1947 during the Hertz stereo experiment. The 
microphones on floor stands labelled 1 and 2 made the stereo recording.19 
 
 
with some additional research.20 An improved design, the BTR2, was built in 1953. This model 
remained in widespread usage for twenty years with hundreds in use by EMI, the BBC, Decca 
and others.21 Blumlein and Fantasia had previously demonstrated the suitability of tape formats 
for encoding multiple audio tracks and once magnetic tape recorders were established in the 
US, their conversion for stereo use was almost immediate. Music recording had been an 
integral component or motivation behind most previous stereo efforts, but the Magnecord 
company first began making stereo recorders at the request of General Motors; the automotive 
company saw application for stereo recordings in its factories as an analytic listening tool.22 
Magnecord’s stereo recorder was demonstrated at the first Audio Engineering Society (AES) 
Audio Fair in 1949. This was the first public demonstration of a stereo format that would go 
on to be developed for wide-spread professional and consumer use.  
 
During the war, the original Magnetophon design was used to create some of the 
earliest-surviving stereo recordings of a live musical performance.23  These were made in 
 
19 W. Lippert, ‘Stereophonische Zweikanalübertragung mit dem Magnetophon’, Funk und Ton, no. 5 (1947): 
243. 
20 Kevin L. Ryan, Recording the Beatles: The Studio Equipment and Techniques Used to Create Their Classic 
Albums (Houston, Texas: Curvebender Publishing, 2009), 198. 
21 Ryan, 200. 
22 Mooney Jr., ‘The History of Magnetic Recording’, 32. 
23 Gerhard Steinke and Wolfgang Hoeg, ‘Mehrkanalübertragung im Rundfunk: Rückblick und Ausblick aus 
Anlaß der Betriebseinführung der Stereofonie im Rundfunk der DDR vor 10 Jahren’, Technische Mitteilungen 
des RFZ 18, no. 3 (1974): 75. 
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Sendesaal I at Haus des Rundfunks by Helmut Krüger in 1943 and 1944.24 These efforts were 
revisited in a well-documented post-war stereo recording session made with a modified 
Magnetophon. This experiment was conducted by Werner Lippert of the Hertz Institute in 
Berlin in 1947, again in Sendesaal I.25 The well-renowned Hertz Institute had been renamed 
during the War due to Hertz’s Jewish roots, but it was reformed in 1945. It was initially funded 
by the Soviet-founded Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften and was based at Haus des 
Rundfunks during the era of the Berliner Rundfunks broadcaster, moving to West Berlin 
shortly later.26 Lippert’s experiment was a parallel mono and stereo orchestra recording session. 
Using a Magnetophon reconfigured to record two tracks to a single tape, the intention of the 
experiment was to examine the feasibility of a range of stereo recording techniques and to test 
the suitability of the customised Magnetophon as a stereo platform. This was still in advance 
of Ampex producing its monophonic tape recorder and Magnecord’s stereo tape recorder. The 
mono recording made at the session was used as a control and carried out using three 
microphones (labelled 3, 4 and 5 in Figure 3.1) following established recording conventions at 
Haus des Rundfunks.27 The stereo recording was influenced by one of Blumlein’s published 
recording techniques. Lippert used a pair of Neumann condenser microphones as a stereo AB 
pair (labelled 1 and 2), one each on either side of the conductor four metres apart. The results 
of the session were largely positive and Lippert was convinced that stereo offered definitive 
advantages over mono recording, while acknowledging that further experimentation was 
required.28  
 
Lippert’s results were achieved despite the acknowledged limitations of the modified 
Magnetophon used; the recording unit and the tape stock used did not benefit from the material 
and technical advances that were being made in the US in the same year. In actuality, the 
engineers at the Hertz Institute had to make serious compromises to the Magnetophon’s 
existing technical specifications to make it capable of stereo recording. For magnetic tape 
recording, two of the main factors that contribute to audio quality are tape running speed and 
tape width. The Magnetophon used 6.5mm tape and standard monophonic recordings assigned 
 
24 Gerhard Steinke and Gisela Herzog, Der Raum ist das Kleid der Musik: Musik-Aufnahmesäle und 
Hörspielstudios im Funkhaus Berlin-Nalepastrasse sowie weitere Aufführungs- und Hörräume (Berlin: Verlag 
Kopie & Druck Adlershof, 2012), 177. 
25 Lippert, ‘Stereophonische Zweikanalübertragung mit dem Magnetophon’, 236. 
26 ‘The Institute’s Reconstruction – Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute’, accessed 22 May 2018, 
https://www.hhi.fraunhofer.de/en/fraunhofer-hhi/about-us/history-of-hhi/90-years-hhi/the-institutes-
reconstruction.html. 
27 Lippert, ‘Stereophonische Zweikanalübertragung mit dem Magnetophon’, 243. 
28 Lippert, 248. 
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the entire bandwidth to a single channel of audio. The Hertz Institute experiment divided this 
available bandwidth into two separate audio tracks of 2.75mm, which directly impinged on the 
dynamic range of the recording. Single channel Magnetophon recordings had a standard 
dynamic range of  about 60dB; the bandwidth reduction for Lippert’s stereo experiment 
reduced the dynamic range to about 42 dB per channel. 29  The bandwidth reduction also 
increased the amount of nonlinear distortion, when compared to a standard mono recording. 
Additionally, although the dual channels are separated physically on the tape strip, due to the 
close proximity of the playback heads a susceptibility for the two channels to bleed in to each 
other remained. The prototype used for this recording gave 29 dB of separation between the 
two channels. 30  An alternate approach that was considered was to synchronise two 
Magnetophons to record in tandem.31 This method would bypass the reduction in dynamic 
range and the other quality compromises that were made. Although a reliable method for 
synchronising the Magnetophons was not found, this concept was revisited by GDR engineers 
in the 1960s, as well as Western tape manufacturers during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the 
technical limitations of the modified Magnetophon, Lippert saw immediate value in the results:  
 
Ausgangsexperimente haben gezeigt, daß es grundsätzlich möglich ist, mit der 
stereophonischen Zweikanalübertragung den räumlich plastischen Eindruck eines 
Klangbildes zu Übertragen und damit etwas grundsätzlich Neues, über die 
Möglichkeiten der Einkanalübertragung Hinausgehendes, von großer Auswirkung für 
ein Hörerlebnis zu schaffen.32  
 
Initial experiments have shown that it is fundamentally possible to transmit the spatial 
plastic impression of a sound image with stereophonic two-channel playback and thus 
to create something fundamentally new, beyond the possibilities of single-channel 
transmission, of great impact to a listening experience. 
 
Lippert saw stereo as a medium with potential for high-value recordings and broadcasts, 
in the same way that prestigious concerts at the time were sometimes recorded optically to 
35mm film. 33  The cited characteristics of Lippert’s experimental recordings compare 
 
29 Lippert, 239. 
30 Lippert, 239. 
31 Lippert, 238. 
32 Lippert, 246. 
33 Lippert, 249. 
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favourably with contemporary gramophone recordings but not with the steady advances tape 
recording was undergoing in the US. Lippert nonetheless considered the Magnetophon’s 
limitations as readily surpassable mechanical constraints and advocated continuing stereo 
research and development.34 Although the GDR’s broadcasting apparatus inherited Haus des 
Rundfunks and its resources after a period of direct Soviet control, Lippert’s modified 
Magnetophon was not a part of stereo developments at Rundfunk DDR. The broadcaster did, 
however, develop its own tape recorders, beginning with the R28 in 1949.35 This was followed 
in 1951 by the portable R26 tape recorder.36 Twenty of these were made and they were used 
extensively by roving reporters for Rundfunk DDR. Although these were both mono recorders, 
when the world’s media descended on the Berlin Conference of 1954, Rundfunk DDR believed 
the R26 still compared well with the best available portable tape recorders.37 Along with the 
Agfa Wolfen Filmfabrik, a manufacturer of photographic film as well as magnetic recording 
tape, the GDR had a magnetic recording capability that was still superior to most countries 
during the early 1950s. This scenario changed as improved recorders and tape were exported 
from the US and the GDR’s domestic tape recorders and tape stock began to suffer in 
comparison.  
 
By 1950 several manufacturers in the US were building tape recorders and players. In 
the mid-50s, magnetic-tape’s impressive audio quality and unique ability to play back a limited 
catalogue of stereo recordings resulted in a miniature stereo boom among hi-fi enthusiasts. In 
1959 the president of the AES was happy to hype the format as “the most fundamental advance 
in sound reproduction since electrical recording came in 1926”.38 In Britain, EMI released its 
first commercial stereo tape recordings in 1955.39 In 1957 there were 650 stereo titles released 
by 39 companies in the US, but even at its peak magnetic tape was not a widespread consumer 
format.40 In 1956, 400,000 tape recordings were sold in the US, not all of which would have 
been in stereo.41 This paled in comparison alongside the still expanding record disc market. 
Comprehensive sales data for records didn’t begin in the US until the 1970s, but in 1956 
 
34 Lippert, 246. 
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Billboard estimated that more than four million record players alone were sold.42 Despite the 
obvious audio capabilities of magnetic tape, there were technical factors that mitigated against 
it becoming a widespread consumer format. Chief among these was its relative expense, 
particularly in comparison with the ready reproducibility of disc formats.43 As the vinyl record 
helped contribute to a continuing US record industry boom, a vinyl stereo disc became the 
desired technological outcome of the US recording industry. However, the format resisted the 
conversion. The spiral groove of a disc record substantially complicates any attempt to encode 
parallel groove tracks, as was achieved relatively straightforwardly in the cases of optical film 
and magnetic tape. Disc formats already had inherent design limitations related to how the 
interaction between the groove and needle changes as the needle travels between the outer and 
inner sections of the disc.44 Experimental stereo disc formats had to deal with the exacerbation 
of these issues. The development of a stereo vinyl disc thus presented a particular technical 
challenge. If different companies came up with proprietary solutions, it also had the potential 
to split the market into rival competing formats again. This had been the case when the LP and 
45 were first released, prompting a costly format war. Although several companies devised 
innovative solutions to these problems, the eventual introduction of a standardised stereo vinyl 
record was made possible by an uncharacteristic level of cooperation within the record industry.  
 
By 1957 two companies had technical solutions for pressing stereo records: British 
Decca and Westrex in the US. Both methods worked along a similar principle of using 
contrasting motions to encode two audio tracks within a single groove. The grooves duplicated 
on conventional mono gramophone and vinyl records are encoded using lateral movements of 
the stylus. Thomas Edison’s phonographic cylinders conversely used vertical movement in the 
stylus. Decca’s solution for stereo combined both approaches: lateral movement was used to 
record one channel of audio and vertical movement was used to record the second. Westrex’s 
method encoded both channels using vertical movement but with each channel offset by 45 
degrees to the other. Both elegant solutions, either could have been brought to market at a time 
when record sales were continuing to expand. Decca, who had their solution earliest, were 
reluctant to precipitate another format war and instead sought the assistance of the Recording 
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Industry Association of America to seek a consensus.45 An industry meeting in Zurich in 
November 1957 was attended by representatives of British Decca, DDG, Electrola, EMI, 
Philips, Teldec and Telefunken. A later meeting in Indianapolis endorsed their consensus that 
the Westrex 45-45 method should be adopted as a unified standard. This was ratified by the 
Electronic Industries Association in January 1958. Although both methods had weaknesses, 
the Westrex method had the advantage of applying its limitations equally to both channels. By 
May of 1958, PYE Records in the UK was releasing stereo records and by June, RCA Victor 
in the US had a catalogue of 55 stereo discs and a line of stereo record players.46  
 
The level of industry agreement that surrounded the introduction of vinyl record stereo 
playback was an unusual example of co-operation across commercial and national lines.47 
Westrex even relinquished its entitlement to be associated with the method, as the RIAA 
announced it would be known exclusively as the 45-45 method.48  Although aided by the 
context of a record industry that was keen to avoid a repeat of the tumultuous introduction of 
vinyl records, the actual decisions surrounding the adoption of a shared standard were taken by 
a relatively small group within the record industry’s engineering community. Of note is that 
this process took place within the commercial and engineering communities of the West. In 
contrast with their West German counterparts, GDR or other Eastern European engineers or 
record companies were not party to the finalisation of the stereo disc format. As with the vinyl 
record and other US-created media formats, stereo in the GDR was a de facto Western standard 
that was imported directly into the GDR audio infrastructure. Stereo vinyl records became the 
first-mass produced stereo format, while magnetic recording tape retained a role as a dedicated 
recording medium. While the origins of vinyl records and stereo vinyl records belonged 
decisively to the West, the retention of a role for recording tape preserved a hint of the German 
technical contribution. The conventional tape speed established among US manufacturers was 
30 inches-per-second (or even fractions of that speed). This speed was not chosen arbitrarily, 
it was directly inherited from the German progenitor. The Magnetophon ran at 77 centimetres-
per-second and 30 inches was the nearest whole integer after the metric to imperial conversion, 
leaving the Magnetophon’s legacy hardcoded into all tape recorders of the era.  
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3.2  FM Broadcasting in the GDR  
 
Stereo recording, records and broadcasting all migrated to Europe during the late 1950s and 
1960s, but this technological conversion was preceded by an earlier technological shift during 
the early 1950s that prompted a similar degree of broad infrastructural reconfiguration. Like 
magnetic tape, the introduction of frequency modulation (FM) radio was not undertaken 
primarily with a view towards enabling stereo. Nevertheless, it was an important technological 
step towards stereo broadcasting and to some extent the FM changeover provided a template 
for the stereo rollout that took place several years later. This was particularly true for the GDR’s 
recovering radio set manufacturers and Rundfunk DDR’s transmission infrastructure. The 
application of FM radio was heavily politicised in early Cold War Germany. At the root of this 
were the impracticalities and resulting tensions surrounding the state of radio spectrum 
management after the War. A problematic feature of the medium wave (MW) radio network 
as it developed in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century was the limited amount 
of usable bandwidth. The proliferation of broadcasters during and after the war lead to a highly 
congested radio spectrum. European radio stations were regularly interfering with each other’s 
broadcasts and the quality and reach of medium wave transmissions was heavily dependant on 
atmospheric conditions.49 During the interwar period there were several attempts to regulate 
international radio airspace, which led to the formation of the International Broadcasting Union 
(IBU). The IBU conference in Copenhagen in 1948 attempted to deal with the huge climb in 
transmitters by delineating the national broadcasting rights for medium-wave transmissions 
across Europe. 50  To dampen fears of “Wellenchaos” (“airwave chaos”), power limits on 
transmitters were proposed to restrict interference over shared frequencies.51 As Germany was 
still being directly administered by the Allied military administrations in 1948, it was not able 
to represent its own interests at the Copenhagen conference.52 The four allies did not pursue a 
joint policy and lobbied separately for frequencies in their own zones.53 Leading up to the 
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conference there were seven MW transmitters and a single longwave (LW) transmitter 
broadcasting from the Eastern Zone.54 The Minister for Post and Telecommunications of the 
GDR, Friedrich Burmeister, interpreted the implications of the Copenhagen agreement to be 
the reduction of broadcasting to just two MW frequencies and the complete loss of LW 
transmissions.55 The potential loss of the LW frequency had particular political significance, 
as it was the GDR’s chief means for reaching a broad West German listenership at the time.  
 
The outcomes of the Copenhagen conference were contentious and adherence to its 
recommendations varied across Europe. FM radio quickly became of interest to European 
broadcasters as it was not regulated by the terms of the Copenhagen conference and thus 
offered broadcasters more potential for expansion.56 FM radio was principally developed in the 
US during the 1930s by Edwin Armstrong, who was chiefly motivated in his research by its 
impressive transmission-distance capability.57 However, FM’s intrinsic rejection of static and 
inter-station interference made it particularly suitable to the broadcasting situation in Europe. 
The fact that it had audio reproduction characteristics as good or better than any current audio 
format was more a welcome side-effect than a primary feature. FM radio’s ability to reject 
crosstalk and its conservation of the radio frequency spectrum hastened its acceptance by the 
Federal Communications Commission in the US, but it was adopted much more rapidly and 
widely in Europe.58 FM consequently became a new component in the escalating conflict 
between the broadcasting networks of East and West Germany. This conflict was manifested 
in physical terms during the late 1940s and early 1950s by the Western Allies’ progressive 
enforcement of Berlin’s political boundaries and the dismantling of broadcasting infrastructure 
that was nominally in the possession of the GDR but located in West Berlin. This contention 
of boundaries extended into the airwaves. Non-targeted MW-interference was a feature of 
European broadcasting, but the GDR made consistent attempts to disrupt West German 
transmissions into its territory, with Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS) a particular 
target.59 The GDR’s jamming policy escalated after June 1952 and there were hundreds of GDR 
jamming towers by the late 1950s.60 FM’s ability to resist jamming thus became an important 
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part of its value to West German broadcasters as it was rolled out during the 1950s.61 Similarly, 
the adoption of FM radio by the GDR was driven in part by the need to match and counter 
West German broadcaster’s new capabilities as the influence wielded over East Germans by 
broadcasters like RIAS was maintained, despite GDR jamming.62  
 
The first FM test transmission in West Germany was in Munich in February 1949, 
followed by Hannover in March.63 By August 1950 West German regional broadcasters were 
beginning to duplicate their MW transmissions on FM wavelengths. 64  The GDR lagged 
roughly a year behind West Germany in introducing its own FM network.65 The first FM radio 
transmission in the GDR was from a 100W transmitter in East Berlin in May 1950. Rundfunk 
DDR followed this with a 250W transmitter that commenced broadcasting in November 
1951.66 A transmitter in the Harz mountains followed and nationwide coverage was achieved 
by 1953 with further transmitters in Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.67  FM was 
unusual in the context of most post-war technological developments in that the US was not the 
primary early-adopter, despite originating the technology. FM’s particular technical 
characteristics enhanced its value to European broadcasters and FM coverage in Europe during 
the 1950s greatly exceeded that in the US. By 1957 FM only 2% of radio advertising in the US 
was broadcast by FM stations and the format didn’t really take off in the US until the 1970s.68 
By contrast, the introduction of stereo recording and records was definitively led by the US.  
 
The introduction of FM radio necessitated that Rundfunk DDR upgrade its transmission 
network, but FM also required the GDR’s electronics manufacturing industry to supply suitable 
receivers. Much of Germany’s pre-war heavy industrial capacity was located in what became 
West Germany, but the GDR inherited a reasonable distribution of electronics and light 
manufacturing companies.69 A radio receiver factory in Dresden was able to recommence 
production as early as 1946, although total annual production of radio receivers in the GDR 
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between 1948 and 1949 was only about 10,000 medium-wave sets of pre-war design.70 The 
introduction of FM-receiver designs proceeded relatively smoothly in the early 1950s, although 
production was vulnerable to supply chain issues.71 In 1953 600,000 radio receivers were 
manufactured, of which nearly half had an FM capability.72 The design of some radio receivers 
was politicised by the ongoing airwave conflict. Stern-Radio Berlin made several attempts to 
build Kolibri-model radio sets that were pre-set to receive a limited selection of approved radio 
stations. 73  This integrated design-limitation had limited success and the Kolibiri was 
discontinued as GDR broadcasting policy trended towards an acceptance that the total 
obstruction of Western broadcasting was unfeasible. By 1955 practically all GDR-
manufactured radio sets were FM capable and this technological conversion was essentially 
complete.  
 
Critical to this transition was the GDR’s domestic production of vacuum tube valves; 
two former Telefunken factories (which became a wholly West German company) in Erfurt 
and Neuhaus am Rennweg were essential contributors to the resurgence of the GDR radio and 
electronics industry.74 The manufacture of new valve designs suitable for portable radios began 
around the same as the FM changeover and GDR valve manufacturers continued to 
independently miniaturise their valve designs, although not at the same pace as in the West.75 
The relative resilience of the the GDR’s electronics industry had wider significance than 
contributing to the roll out of FM broadcasting. Radio and electronics manufacturing became 
a significant export industry for the GDR and it was also a large contributor to the propagation 
of television in Eastern Europe. In the years 1955-1958 the export of radio and TV sets from 
the GDR increased by 300%. 76  VEB Stern-Radio Staßfurt became one of the largest 
manufacturers of TVs in Europe; in its first year of production in 1957 it produced over 9,000 
sets, by 1964 this had increased to 360,000.77 The GDR’s success in maintaining a capacity to 
manufacture and improve vacuum tube valves was of enormous significance to this role as 
electronics supplier. Vacuum tubes were also a foundation that allowed the GDR to transition 
into the transistor age during the 1960s. Although disparities of quantity, quality and capability 
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between GDR- and Western-designed electronics components existed from an early stage, the 
GDR electronics industry was still able to supply a degree of technological independence. This 
allowed audio industry institutions like Rundfunk DDR to run technical development programs 
over several decades and to build a recording and broadcasting infrastructure that was largely 
based on their own designs and GDR-constructed components. It was only during the 1980s, 
as technology digitised, that the GDR electronics industry began to collide with unsurpassable 
limits to its research and development abilities. This trajectory is discussed in more detail in 
the chapter on System 2000, but the roots of that project’s potential and its eventual failure can 
be observed in the GDR’s electronics industry of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
FM was brought to Europe as a continent-wide solution for a more integrated 
broadcasting system. Largely effective in this regard, it nonetheless played a role in the 
continued politicisation of radio broadcasting and the use of radio transmissions as a 
technological front in the Cold War. This was initially characterised by GDR strategies to block 
Western transmissions while attempting to maintain its own broadcasting reach into West 
Germany. These broadcasting goals proved to be incompatible and the GDR’s navigation of 
these conflicting impulses eventually led to a technological liberalising of its broadcasting 
policy; in 1957 the GDR adopted Western European transmission standards.78 Turning away 
from a potential path of mutual incompatibility, the introduction of stereo broadcasting in the 
early 1960s was largely carried out in a more normalised pan-German transmissions context. 
The technological characteristics of FM radio - which allowed it to resist interference and 
jamming - was a contributing factor to the acceptance by the GDR that the broadcasting of East 
and West Germany would exist in parallel. Apart from its broadcasting implications, the 
introduction of FM was a notable proving ground for a reviving East German electronics 
industry. Its ability to absorb FM techniques and supply electronics components was significant 
for the later introduction of stereo and the ability to sustain the technical capabilities of various 
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3.3 Preparing for Stereo: Deutsche Schallplatten and Rundfunk DDR 
 
FM was a fundamental technological alteration of the radio medium and required a large-scale 
transformation of the GDR’s broadcasting and receiving network. Much like the vinyl disc, 
FM was an improved medium for audio but neither FM nor vinyl records directly dictated 
technical upgrades or changes in practice for the recording process. Stereo was arguably a less 
radical technological upgrade in comparison to FM or vinyl records. Although it required some 
technical innovations to make it feasible across various media formats, at root it was simply 
the standardisation of methods for using two channels of audio. However, stereo required much 
more extensive alterations to the recording process in order to take advantage of its additional 
properties. The rationalisations used to justify the large-scale investment required by the stereo 
conversion in the GDR and elsewhere were different in character to those used for the FM 
conversion a few years previous. In comparison to FM, stereo broadcasting offered the GDR 
no additional strategic value for broadcasting in terms of reaching a greater proportion of the 
West German population or eliminating inter-station interference. The introduction of stereo 
in the GDR was thus less factious than that of FM radio and more emblematic of the broad 
technological and cultural arms race between East and West that endured after the 1950s. 
Although both FM and stereo in the GDR were motivated in large part by all-encompassing 
political directives to match the technological achievements of the West, the justification for 
stereo was centred largely on its capacity to enhance the cultural value of a recording. This 
justification was sufficient to prompt the upgrading of the recording infrastructures of the 
GDR’s recording institutions and, subsequently, its broadcasting and record-pressing 
infrastructures. 
 
There was a recognition within the GDR, expressed explicitly by the acoustician 
Herbert Buttenberg in 1958, that there was no impetus or framework within the Soviet Union 
or the wider Eastern Bloc to develop an independent approach to stereo in parallel with 
developments in the West.79 The stereo infrastructure that was assembled in the GDR in the 
early 1960s thus largely emulated internationally-developed standards and had little to do with 
the various experimental recordings made in Haus des Rundfunks during the 1940s. Following 
on from ad hoc collaborations that took place during the FM crossover, there was a degree of 
coordination across the GDR audio industry. However, there was relatively little central 
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government direction or assistance apart from broad consumer-focussed political directives. A 
1959 meeting of a work group focussed on stereo provides a snapshot of the GDR’s 
preparedness for the new format. The meeting included representatives for Rundfunk DDR, 
Deutsche Schallplatten, the RFZ, the Staatliches Rundfunkkomittee (State Radio Committee) 
and several other technical and manufacturing audio companies.80 Two stereo record players 
were in development by the electronics manufacturer Meßgeräte Zwönitz at the time. Deutsche 
Schallplatten never considered releasing stereo tape recordings and was reliant on GDR stereo 
record players coming to market, but the record company considered their cited retail prices 
(800 DM and 1100 DM) to be out of reach for most customers.81 Deutsche Schallplatten had 
an uneasy relationship with GDR manufacturers. In 1958, while embroiled with the fallout 
from the collapse of the gramophone record market and while trying to initiate a sustainable 
vinyl record market in the GDR, it was dismayed when Funkwerk Zittau would only commit 
to producing 2500 vinyl record players that year. 82  The RFZ did not share Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s doubts about GDR manufacturers nor their concerns about price; they 
considered the overall quality of the players to be the long term priority.83 Meßgeräte Zwönitz’s 
representatives were encouraged at the meeting to seek collaborators to continue the 
development of record player motors and stereo pick-ups in an effort to reduce costs, but they 
were also advised that they would need to rely on their own initiative in realising this.84  
 
The overlapping music recording responsibilities of Deutsche Schallplatten and 
Rundfunk DDR led the two organisations towards some important collaborations during the 
introduction of stereo recording. They had an existing, if occasionally fractious, collaborative 
relationship. Perennial tensions tended to be in the area of broadcast royalties and Rundfunk 
DDR’s occasional perceived lack of support for Deutsche Schallplatten recordings; relations 
were more collegial in the area of recording and recording studios.85 The efforts of the two 
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organisations, combined and independent, to secure stereo recording for the GDR warrants 
comparison as they establish the contrasting methods each used to maintain technological 
parity with recording developments in the West. During the late 1950s, both organisations 
prioritised the ability to make stereo recordings in advance of the infrastructures required to 
distribute stereo recordings to the public. This was motivated by the consideration, expressed 
by Gerhard Steinke, that “jede unnötige Verzögerung der Einführung verteuert das Archiv” 
(“each unnecessary delay of the introduction (of stereo) increases the expense of the archive”), 
articulating a developing view that each monophonic-only recording sessions was a missed 
opportunity to contributing to the future-proofing of the broadcasters’ recorded repertoire.86 
The prioritisation of stereo recording over stereo distribution by Deutsche Schallplatten and 
Rundfunk DDR was in line with the strategies of record companies in the West like EMI in the 
UK, although EMI was stockpiling stereo recordings about four to five years before stereo 
recording began in the GDR.87  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten was a regular user of Rundfunk DDR’s studio facilities and at 
times Deutsche Schallplatten was very dependent on this relationship. Rundfunk DDR had a 
greater capacity for capital investment and had a more stable recording infrastructure, best 
represented by Funkhaus Berlin. Deutsche Schallplatten, particularly for its large-scale 
classical recordings, was much more reliant on converted spaces - the Lukaskirche in Dresden 
was an important example. It had a good acoustic and hosted high-profile recordings, but its 
availability for sessions was restricted by its continued use for religious services and it required 
acoustic and technical interventions. Deutsche Schallplatten did have some advantages over 
Rundfunk DDR. As discussed in Chapter 2, Harri Költzsch, the record company’s general 
director, was able to develop a business model that greatly enabled the procurement of foreign 
technical equipment. Foreign licensing deals for the Eterna classical music label generated hard 
currency that allowed it to make direct purchases of western equipment and this quickly 
became a key component of Deutsche Schallplatten’s technical development strategy from 
around 1957. Licensing income subsidised technical expenditure at Deutsche Schallpatten, but 
this model also required that this money was continuously reinvested to maintain parity with 
Western recording standards and to protect the viability of Eterna’s classical recordings in the 
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Western market. Stereo was the first major technological recording upgrade made by Deutsche 
Schallplatten, but Költzsch was just starting to escalate this funding model as the company 
sought to begin stereo upgrading. By collaborating on stereo recordings with Western record 
companies like Deutsche Grammophon, Deutsche Schallplatten was able to earn money from 
stereo recordings internationally before it had established its own stereo recording ability.88 
Költzsch directed this income stream towards d the creation of an independent stereo recording 
capability and the licensing income model continued to fund technical upgrades at Deutsche 
Schallplatten for the next three decades.89 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s first independent stereo recording trials took place in 
November 1959 at the company’s original headquarters on Taubenstraße, while it was 
preparing for a move to new premises on Reichstagsufer.90 It spent more than half a million 
DM on stereo recording and editing equipment in 1959, more than twice what it spent on 
renovating its new headquarters and recording studios the same year.91 Deutsche Schallplatten 
issued a directive in 1957 for all Eterna recordings to be stereo by 1962 and this was readily 
achieved.92 By 1961 most Eterna recordings were already stereo and that year also marked the 
beginning of stereo Amiga recordings.93 Of 146 Tanzmusik (dance music) Amiga recordings 
that year twenty-three were stereo.94 In 1961 Deutsche Schallplatten also made a significant 
outlay on record presses and equipment for cutting and electroplating stereo masters.95 This 
was part of a general strategy to end Deutsche Schallplatten’s continued reliance on the ČSSR-
based Artia Prague for pressing vinyl records. Within the context of Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
ongoing difficulties with vinyl record-pressing during this period, stereo contributed further 
complexities to the vinyl record-pressing narrative explored in more detail in the previous 
chapter. In 1965 both of Deutsche Schallplatten’s most imporatant recording studios, Studio 
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Reichtagsufer and the Lukaskirche in Dresden, were outfitted with additional stereo equipment 
and the conversion of its existing recording facilities was largely complete.96 
 
Deutsche Schallplatten did not purchase all of its studio equipment from the West. It 
used GDR-designed equipment like Rundfunk DDR’s R28 tape recorder during the 1950s and 
a survey of all of its studios in January 1990 indicates a scattering of GDR audio equipment, 
including record players, amplifiers, loudspeakers and goniometers. 97  It also constructed 
several of its own mixing desks during the 1970s and 1980s. 98  However, its overall 
procurement strategy meant Western recording equipment occupied a progressively larger 
proportion of the recording framework at Deutsche Schallplatten than that seen at Rundfunk 
DDR. This was possible due to Deutsche Schallplatten’s foreign licensing income, but also the 
scale of its recording operation. Deutsche Schallplatten slowly expanded from one dedicated 
recording studio to two dedicated recording studios and three converted churches outfitted for 
Eterna recordings.99 The staggered opening of these allowed the record company to spread its 
investment in equipment over several years and large equipment purchases at any point in its 
history immediately impacted a significant proportion of its recorded output. Rundfunk DDR 
had a comparatively broader recording remit and more intense production requirements. While 
it did purchase equipment from the West, hard currency factors and fluctuating import 
complications restricted it from accessing this option to the same degree. Rundfunk DDR’s 
long term strategy was much more reliant on the GDR’s own capacity to develop and 
manufacture audio equipment. The Betriebslaboratoriums für Rundfunk und Fernsehen (Radio 
and Television Laboratory) (BRF) - a technical research group of the Deutsche Post that was 
closely associated with Rundfunk DDR - was an important contributor to the development of 
stereo and other technical developments within the GDR’s media institutions. Led in the 1950s 
by Lothar Keibs, the chief acoustician for Funkhaus Berlin, the BRF changed its name in 1961 
to the Rundfunk- und Fernsehtechnische Zentralamt (Central Radio and Television 
Technical Department) (RFZ) der Deutsche Post and for clarity will be referred to by the latter 
name. 100  In the 1960s the RFZ was heavily involved with the process of converting the 
recording at Funkhaus Berlin’s Block B from mono to stereo. Although the FM conversion had 
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taken place shortly beforehand, this was the largest single technological shift in recording that 
was completed at Block B during its use by Rundfunk DDR.  
 
Despite the descent of the Iron Curtain, Rundfunk DDR and the RFZ were able to 
maintain a consistent engagement with international audio research. One of the earliest 
proactive actions taken by the RFZ in anticipation of developing a stereo mixing desk was the 
organisation of a comprehensive literature review in 1959.101 Members of the RFZ attended 
audio technology conferences throughout the 1950s as stereo was being formalised and 
political differences were not an obstacle to obtaining information on stereo developments.102 
Collaboration with West German radio colleagues was also a positive influence on Rundfunk 
DDR’s adoption of stereo. Steinke and Keibs expressed doubts at some stereo recording 
methods described by the BBC, but their worries were assuaged by research work shared by 
Telefunken.103 A tour in October 1960 by Steinke and other members of the RFZ to several 
regional radio and TV broadcasting centres in West Germany (including Frankfurt/Main, 
Baden-Baden and Freiburg) was also helpful in establishing their neighbours’ progress with 
the new format.104 Although this cross border assistance was helpful to the RFZ, it did not 
compare with the level of audio-technology cooperation that was taking place around the same 
time between EMI in the UK and Electrola in Cologne. A collaboration between Len Page 
(EMI) and Peter Burkowitz (RIAS/Electrola) led to the construction of the REDD.17 console 
in 1958, which was a ground-breaking and influential mixing-desk design.105 The practical 
development of stereo at Rundfunk DDR began in earnest with the decision to set up a 
dedicated stereo laboratory facility in 1959, with the ultimate goal of constructing a stereo 
mixing desk.106 Domestic production of stereo equipment began in the same year with the 
construction of a portable stereo test-device by the RFZ that facilitated playback from multiple 
stereo sources, intended to help integrate new stereo equipment into Rundfunk DDR’s existing 
systems.107  These methodical steps were characteristic of the approach adopted by the RFZ 
 
101 Gerhard Steinke and Lothar Keibs, ‘Laborbericht 345/37: Regieanlage für stereofonische Aufnahmetechnik’ 
(Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk und Fernsehen Labor 345, 25 June 1959), 31/26/1/2 - 31/26/1/7, Deutches 
Rundfunk Archiv. 
102 Lothar Keibs, Gerhard Steinke, and Horst Nutscher, ‘Bericht über die 4. Tonmeistertagung in Detmold vom 
22. - 25.10.1957’ (Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, 2 November 1957), Deutches Rundfunk 
Archiv. 
103 Steinke and Keibs, ‘Laborbericht 345/37: Regieanlage für stereofonische Aufnahmetechnik’. 
104 Gerhard Steinke et al., ‘Informationsbericht über eine Studienreise’ (Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk und 
Fernsehen, 27 December 1960), 3, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
105 Ryan, Recording the Beatles, 66. 
106 Steinke and Keibs, ‘Laborbericht 345/37: Regieanlage für stereofonische Aufnahmetechnik’. 
107 Steinke, ‘Technischer Bericht Nr. 308: Der Stand Der Untersuchungen Zur NF-Stereofonie’, 57. 
 164 
and Rundfunk DDR when faced with technological shifts. Steinke argued that, stereo aside, a 
complete overhaul of the technological basis for handling audio in the GDR was justified by 
broad developments in electronics:  
 
Noch bevor die Stereofonie die Studiotechnik beeinflußte, führte der Wunsch nach 
modernen und vielseitigen, transportablen Regieanlagen zu der in vielen Ländern ziemlich 
einheitlichen Forderung, Mischpulte hoher Kanalzahl mit Transistorverstärkern und einer 
Vielzahl an Möglichkeiten zur Tonsignalbearbeitung zu entwickeln.108 
 
Even before stereophony influenced studio technology, the desire for modern and 
versatile portable mixing desks led to a demand, similar in many countries, for developing 
high-channel mixers with transistorised amplifiers and a variety of audio signal processing 
capabilities. 
 
Steinke advocated that this overhaul be approached holistically as, he argued, the 
piecemeal upgrades he had observed in other countries would inevitably lead to future 
compatibility and reliability issues.109 While this entailed a much greater research burden, the 
scale of Rundfunk DDR’s technical requirements meant it was considered more cost-effective 
and more feasible than importing all the equipment it needed. Importing equipment was a 
feature of the RFZ’s stereo adoption efforts plans and in 1959 it attempted to purchase a 
portable stereo mixing desk from Telefunken in West Berlin, along with five Neumann SM 2 
stereo microphones.110 Although this order resembles Deutsche Schallplatten’s approach to 
technical upgrading, the explicit intention was to use the Telefunken and Neumann equipment 
as a template from which to reverse-engineer components that could then be built in larger 
numbers by the RFZ itself.111 The RFZ’s first attempt to acquire a Telefunken stereo mixing 
desk failed and subsequent attempts to procure western stereo equipment were only partially 
successful. Despite this, 1960 was a year of important stereo firsts for both Rundfunk DDR 
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3.4  Stereo in Saal 1, Funkhaus Berlin 
 
The earliest stereo recording trials at Rundfunk DDR took place in Saal 1 of Funkhaus Berlin 
during April 1960.112 This was an orchestral session, involving the conductor Adolf Fritz Guhl 
and the Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Berlin: recordings were made of symphonic and chamber-
sized ensembles playing a repertoire that included music by Mendelssohn and Handel and also 
included some vocal pieces. The RFZ’s inability to procure a stereo Telefunken mixing desk 
for the session meant Deutsche Schallplatten supplied the stereo recording equipment for the 
experimental session; Deustsche Schallplatten had previously succeeded in obtaining a stereo 
Telefunken mixing desk.113 This first trial was followed by a commercial session in August for 
Deutsche Schallplatten using the same equipment and again recorded in Saal 1. The was a 
recording of Haydn’s Die Schöpfung, but the performance ensemble is not recorded in 
Rundfunk DDR’s evaluative account of the stereo recording.114 Although Rundfunk DDR did 
not secure a desk from Telefunken, this second stereo session at Funkhaus Berlin had technical 
support from a Telefunken engineer who collaborated with the Deutsche Schallplatten and 
Rundfunk DDR engineers. Steinke’s work with the RFZ’s Hörgruppe had led to the 
introduction of listening standards at Rundfunk DDR and the practices of the visiting sound 
engineers came under scrutiny. Steinke considered Deutsche Schallplatten’s engineer’s 
monitoring levels to be excessive. 115  Steinke was also critical of the high-frequency 
characteristics of the Telefunken loudspeakers used on the session, considering them to be 
“hart und schrill” (“harsh and shrill”) when playing back stringed instruments.116 Rundfunk 
DDR had developed its own loudspeaker, the Z 130. Steinke was previously disappointed by 
the reception this had received from West German engineers but continued to advocate the Z 
130 for use at Rundfunk DDR.117 Regarding the outcome of the stereo recording, Steinke 
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Figure 3.2: The Mehrkanalsversuchregie (MKR) desk installed in Mehrkanalregie 1 (Multi-channel Control 
Room 1) at Funkhaus Berlin, formerly Abhörraum 1 (Playback Room 1). The window to the left of the desk 
overlooks Saal 1 but the desk could also record sessions in Saal 2.119 
 
The RFZ continued its attempts to import Rundfunk DDR’s first stereo mixing desk, 
but by September 1960 it had accepted these attempts were “aussichtlos” (“hopeless”).120 The 
RFZ finally sidestepped the difficulties that accompanied importing a complete mixing desk 
from West Germany by instead importing some critical components but largely constructing 
the desk itself. The resulting desk was called the Mehrkanalsversuchregie (Multi-Channel 
Mixing Desk Prototype) (MKR). In March 1963 it was installed - as shown in Figure 3.2 - in 
a control room adjacent to the existing mono recording control rooms for Saal 1 and Saal 2 at 
Funkhaus Berlin.121 The desk itself was valve-based and featured twelve-channels with insert 
points before and after both the microphone preamp and the desk fader. The desk’s 
specification also included two headphone outputs, stereo voltage units and a goniometer for 
measuring stereo phase relationships. For monitoring the desk used three of Rundfunk DDR’s 
Z 130 speakers, two for stereo use and one for mono.122 Steinke’s experience from the stereo 
recording trials with Deutsche Schallplatten’s Telefunken desk, along with his knowledge of 
the prevailing academic stereo discourse, led him to believe that it was not enough to simply 
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construct a multi-channel desk with a basic provision for stereo recording.123 While there was 
a relatively high level of international consensus surrounding stereo transmission and stereo 
record standards, stereo recording was not codified to the same degree. Although many soon-
to-be conventional stereo recording approaches had been devised by Blumlein and others in 
the 1930s, there was still a degree of uncertainty around stereo-recording’s final form and also 
the interaction between heritage mono recordings and the new format. The MKR thus 
emphasised flexibility and was a stereo-research resource as well as an active recording desk. 
These attributes allowed the RFZ to publicise the MKR internally as superior to any 
standardised stereo-mixing desk it might have acquired from Telefunken.124 The additional 
features allowed the RFZ to experiment with both established and more esoteric recording 
techniques, as well as devising inter-compatibility tactics for mono and stereo recordings; a 
serious concern for engineers during the stereo crossover period. The stereo crossover in the 
record industry was greatly eased by the ability of heritage mono record players to play stereo 
vinyl discs without any technical intervention. In the recording world, stereo recording 
techniques that provided an excellent stereo image but which could collapse to a coherent mono 
signal were a comforting tool to a generation of engineers reared in a strictly monophonic world. 
These techniques remained relevant for a significant period of time after stereo became the de 
facto standard.  
 
As well as backward compatibility stereo-to-mono concerns, another feature of 
Rundfunk DDR’s stereophonic research efforts was the serious attention given to converting 
mono records into stereo-simulacra. Sometimes referred to as pseudo-stereophony, 
manipulating monophonic recordings to emulate a stereophonic effect has a history nearly as 
old as “true” stereo. In 1925 the German audio engineer Heinrich Kluth proposed a method for 
creating the impression of “plastic listening” from a single-channel source.125 Kluth’s method 
was just one of a multitude of proposed pseudo-stereophonic methods that varied widely in 
their sophistication and viability. Pseudo-stereophony was an attractive proposition for radio 
broadcasters as, for a time, it seemed to offered the potential of creating stereo broadcasting by 
altering the radio receiver and leaving the existing recording and broadcasting infrastructure 
largely intact. This became less relevant as FM-multiplexing became the progressive medium 
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for radio during the 1950s, but pseudo-stereophony was still considered relevant as a method 
for presenting archival recordings. The RFZ’s Lothar Keibs had some success with a process 
that used filters and delay to produce a pseudo-stereophonic effect; this was still being used to 
prepare archival mono recordings for stereo broadcast as late as 1967.126 The Cologne-based 
record company Electrola developed and marketed a similar process to record labels and there 
were releases by labels like RCA and Deutsche Grammophon that were stereo-enhanced mono 
recordings.127 There were also efforts made in the US to refresh notable mono recordings. RCA 
Victor applied a process called Electronic Stereo Reprocessing to recordings of Arturo 
Toscanini in 1961.128 An independent proprietary method known as the “Magic Dimension” 
technique was of interest to Rundfunk DDR during the early 1960s, but communication 
between Rundfunk DDR and the Hamburg-based record company Teldec on their experiences 
with the format helped to confirm the GDR broadcaster’s doubts.129  
 
While pseudo-stereophony techniques became increasingly peripheral as stereo 
recording stabilised and the repertoire of recorded stereo works expanded, the broad flexibility 
of the MKR helped Rundfunk DDR to weather a period of technological uncertainty.130 A 
willingness to engage with esoteric recording methods remained a characteristic of the GDR’s 
recording institutions, although none of these became as ubiquitous as stereo. In 1971 Deutsche 
Schallplatten equipped the Lukaskirche in Dresden with a full quadrophonic recording set-up, 
during the period when the format was briefly popular for classical recordings.131 Around the 
same time, Rundfunk DDR was an enthusiastic adopter and promoter of binaural recording – 
known as Kopfkunst in German-speaking countries; a recording approach that used stereo’s 
conventional two-tracks to deliver a stereo representation with emphasised spatialisation to 
listeners using headphones.132 Alternative conceptualisations of stereo were also significant in  
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Figure 3.3: Layout and functions of the control spaces shared between Saal 1 and Saal 2 after 1960. The option 
to expand technical control facilities into a playback room eased the transition to stereo and the proximity of the 
new control space to Saal 2 enhanced the value of Block B’s first stereo recording facility. 133 
 
 
the development of a proprietary sound reinforcement by the RFZ in the 1970s, used to outfit 
the Palast der Republik in East Berlin and discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
 
The MKR stereo recording desk had lasting implications for the layout of recording at 
Funkhaus Berlin. The desk’s installation prompted a significant reorganisation of the control 
rooms for Saal 1 and Saal 2, beginning a process of deviation from the architect Franz Ehrlich’s 
original intentions for these spaces, previously alluded to in Chapter 1. The original layout of 
the control rooms for Saal 1 and Saal 2, which are situated in an acoustically isolated void 
between the two recording spaces, allowed each space a dedicated control room alongside a 
playback room for non-technical production staff. The exigencies of stereo led to a 
reprioritisation of the use of these rooms and the new stereo desk was installed in what was 
formerly the playback room - Abhörraum 1 - for Saal 1; this new arrangement is depicted in 
Figure 3.3.134 This left the existing mono control room intact and operational and the MKR 
desk’s location was re-termed the Mehrkanalregie 1 (Multi-Channel Control Room 1). The 
former playback room was originally intended to allow artistic personnel a space to evaluate 
recordings without entering the utility-focussed control room, but the acoustic and physical 
features of the room were very similar to the control room. The playback room had a line-of-
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sight window into Saal 1 and it could also be patched into Saal 2. When the stereo control room 
came into service in 1963, it served in parallel with the existing mono control room, Regieraum 
1. This allowed Rundfunk DDR to methodically develop its stereo recording practice and build 
a stereo repertoire without interrupting or interfering with normal production.135 This practice 
was influenced by communications with West German colleagues that suggested running 
stereo and mono recordings in tandem to ensure the creation of a mono-compatible recording, 
as mono continued as the dominant transmission format during the early 1960s.136 The residual 
supremacy of the older format was further demonstrated by assigning the mono-Tonmeister 
overall responsibility for the recording session during the period when mono and stereo 
recordings were run in parallel at Funkhaus Berlin.137 The renovation of a playback room into 
an additional control room disrupted Franz Ehrlich’s original delineation of space and his 
separation of artistic and technical audio assessment roles. However, the additional space the 
incorporation of playback rooms in his design provided proved invaluable to ongoing 
upgrading processes for Saal 1 and Saal 2. This additional availability of independently-
isolated acoustic spaces allowed Rundfunk DDR to install upgraded control room facilities, 
while allowing the current control room to operate uninterrupted. In 1974, Saal 2 was upgraded 
to Rundfunk DDR’s proprietary transistorised audio equipment and Playback Room 2 became 
the new control room.138 The former control room for Saal 2 then became a supplementary 
recording and editing room for Saal 1. 139  This enhanced flexibility for major upgrades 
prompted Steinke to suggest that all future music studios should be designed with two separate 
control rooms and an additional playback room.140 The unlikelihood of a studio building project 
incorporating this amount of semi-redundant space into its design emphasises the value of the 
additional specialised practical space Rundfunk DDR did have. 
 
 
3.5  Diversifying Stereo in Block B 
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Deutsche Schallplatten’s procurement policies for recording and record pressing equipment 
and how they were applied to different genres of music offer insight into how it interpreted the 
role of different types of music within its cultural and commercial remit, and how this changed 
over time. Classical music and the classical label Eterna were heavily prioritised in technical 
expenditure due to Deutsche Schallplatten’s reliance on the foreign licensing fees Eterna’s 
prestige recordings could attract. This prioritisation overlooked the fact that Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s domestic record sales were heavily dominated by the popular music offerings 
of the Amiga label. This dynamic shifted somewhat during the mid-1960s and into the 1970s 
as the success of several Amiga artists moved Deutsche Schallplatten to recognise the cultural 
value GDR popular music artists had abroad. The application of stereo at Funkhaus Berlin to 
genres other than classical does not offer a similarly systematic analysis of how Rundfunk 
DDR allocated resources by genre, but it does offer a snapshot of how it treated the 
diversification of stereo during a specific technological moment. 
 
As at Deutsche Schallplatten, classical music benefitted in terms of technical resources 
from its position of prestige within the cultural hierarchy of the GDR. Three of the four music 
recording spaces at Funkhaus Berlin were specialised towards different forms of classical 
music and the MKR was positioned to augment two of these. However, during the period before 
Rundfunk DDR was able to secure additional stereo equipment for Funkhaus Berlin, the 
broadcaster sought to use the capabilities of the MKR as broadly as possible. This 
diversification process began in October 1963 with the first non-classical stereo recording at 
Funkhaus Berlin.141 This was a two-day session with the Tanzorchester des Berliner Rundfunks 
in Saal 2 overseen and reported on by Gerhard Steinke and Klaus Wagner. The session also 
marked an early opportunity for Rundfunk DDR engineers to hear a stereo representation of 
Saal 2, as Saal 1 was prioritised in early stereo sessions. The tentative goal of the session was 
to devise an instrumental layout suitable to the space and ensemble within the context of a 
stereo recording.142  This was not an entirely straightforward task for the Rundfunk DDR 
engineers who, unlike the early Saal 1 stereo trials, were working without the assistance of 
personnel experienced with stereo recording. Recording practices for popular music had long 
diverged from classical music approaches and the report from the Saal 2 trial discusses the 
session in this context. Steinke described classical music recording practice as the attempt to  
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Figure 3.4: Three instrumental layouts used for an experimental stereo session in Saal 2, October 1963. The 
session shows the RFZ used similarly rigorous procedures across different genres to assess best practice.143 
 
143 Steinke and Wagner. 
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create an emulation of the acoustic image as it would be experienced by a listener seated in an 
idealised location within the performance space. 144  By contrast, popular music recording 
practice during the mono-era was characterised as having developed into the seeking of a 
bespoke tonal balance that best served the particular arrangement.145 The application of stereo 
technology to recording sessions was thus not just a question of technology and the 
reconciliation of a popular music recording aesthetic with the new format was treated as a task 
independent of the development of classical music stereo recording practice.  
 
Rundfunk DDR’s first attempt at a stereo popular music recording adopted a rigorous 
approach; the session made three separate recordings of two pieces with an ensemble consisting 
of: drums, bass, guitar, piano, saxophone, trombone and trumpet. The recorded pieces were 
Duke Ellington’s Satin Doll and Billy Moore’s Marchmellow Hare.146 Moore was an American 
arranger who lived in Berlin during the early 1960s.147 The choice of pieces is somewhat 
striking given the GDR’s fluctuating official regard for jazz, but jazz-influenced ensembles 
were a significant constituent of popular music in the GDR.148 The main technical concern of 
the session was ensuring separation between the different instrument groupings and a number 
of different ensemble layouts were attempted over the course of the two days, as relayed in 
Figure 3.4.149 Achieving isolation between the various instrument groups proved problematic 
and the various layouts trialled varied quite drastically, with several instruments stationed in 
the hallway outside the recording space (though supplied with a headphone mix) in the final 
permutation.150 The success of each instrumental layout was determined using a methodical 
approach; sound level measurements were taken at each microphone for each layout and a 
separate reading made for the bleed from each instrument.151 While experimental recording 
sessions often incorporate comparisons of various microphone types, the explicit goal of this 
session was to address the issue of separation and the same microphones were used for each 
instrumental layout. These included Neumann U 67s (West German), AKG C 28s (Austrian) 
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and Neumann UM 57s (East German). The notes on the recording session do not indicate 
whether the results of the session were ever broadcast, although Steinke and Wagner were 
satisfied enough with their final recordings to allow them to be submitted to an international 
stereo study group for analysis.152 Regardless, the session’s value was primarily procedural and 
in how it broadened the genre application of stereo within Rundfunk DDR. Although trial 
recordings with new equipment are not exceptional within the context of any broadcaster or 
record company, the analytic procedures applied by Steinke and Wagner to the Saal 2 stereo 
recording exhibit a meticulousness identical to that used by Rundfunk DDR to establish 
procedures for large-scale classical recordings. The recording is also notable for taking place 
within months of the activation of the MKR. By comparison, there were several years between 
the first Eterna stereo recording and the first Amiga stereo recording. 
 
Stereo recordings at Rundfunk DDR further exposed  the recognised technical 
limitations of the broadcaster’s R 29 tape recorders in comparison with Western tape 
recorders. 153  Rundfunk DDR was successful in maintaining a magnetic tape recording 
capability with its own tape recorder models during the 1940s and 1950s and stereo-augmented 
versions of the R 29 tape recorder were the basis for many of its early stereo recordings.154 As 
Deutsche Schallplatten increasingly relied on imported tape recorders, Rundfunk DDR 
continued to update its tape recorders and in 1963 started to convert them to international tape-
speed standards.155 This was a telling example of the increasing technological hegemony of US 
recording standards; these new speed standards were derived from the Magnetophon’s original 
speed conventions after their transfiguration to US Imperial standards in the early 1950s. The 
technical limitations of GDR tape recorders were augmented by problems with the tape stock 
used by both Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche Schallplatten. The pre-war German photographic 
film manufacturer Agfa had post-war remnants on either side of German border: Agfa Wolfen 
in the GDR and Agfa Leverkusen in West Germany, both of which became significant sources 
of magnetic recording tape for international recording companies. Tape made by Agfa Wolfen, 
primarily Agfa Typ-C tape, was commonplace within the GDR audio industry and Eastern 
Bloc recording companies and broadcasters.156 However, by the mid-1950s, the magnetic tape 
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heritage shared between East and West Germany was diverging and there was an expanding 
quality disparity between the tape stocks produced by the two Agfa counterparts.157 Deutsche 
Schallplatten and Rundfunk DDR were almost totally reliant on Agfa Wolfen tape stock during 
the 1950s, but from about 1956 Deutsche Schallplatten, in particular, became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the standard of results using Agfa Wolfen’s Typ-C tape.158 The short-comings 
of the tape stock had implications for the quality of Eterna recordings made without the 
assistance of Western record companies and threatened the licensing potential of these 
recordings. This led to a change of policy regarding tape procurement and Deutsche 
Schallplatten began to investigate the possibility of importing various brands of Western 
recording tape manufacturers including BASF, 3M and Agfa Leverkusen. It wasn’t until 1959 
that the record company was able to secure a supply of Agfa Leverkusen’s PE 22-type tape, 
but it could not obtain enough to cover all its recording needs and the tape was applied 
preferentially to Eterna recordings. 159  One of the definitive analytical outcomes of the 
experimental stereo sessions held in Saal1 for both Deutsche Schallplatten and Rundfunk DDR 
was an enhanced recognition of the contribution of tape quality to the final recording and 
criticism of Agfa Wolfen’s tape was consequently renewed.160 Deutsche Schallplatten could 
secure Western recording tape in high enough quantities to secure its highest priority 
recordings, but Amiga and general Rundfunk DDR production continued to rely on Agfa 
Wolfen tape stock into the 1960s and 1970s.161 Despite the low professional regard Agfa 
Wolfen tape held within Deutsche Schallplatten and Rundfunk DDR, it was crucial to both 
organisations. Given that magnetic tape was never a consumer format in the GDR, it may also 
have retained some aura of technological prestige as a specialised tool of the GDR’s recording 
institutions. This may account for the prominent placement Agfa Wolfen tape reels were 
regularly accorded within promotional photos for Rundfunk DDR during the 1960s, an 
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Figure 3.5: A 1967 promotional photograph from Deutsche Post depicting the transmission of pre-recorded 
programme material from Funkhaus Berlin. The prominent placement of Agfa Wolfen tape (under the Orwo 
export imprint) in the right foreground emphasises a domestically produced and specialised audio format.162 
 
 
The Saal 2 stereo session was a place-holder experiment, as focussed plans to expand 
stereo recording at Funkhaus Berlin were already underway.163 A degree of equity in the 
distribution of resources according to genre is further indicated by the placement of Funkhaus 
Berlin’s second stereo mixing desk in Saal 4, Block B’s primary facility for popular music. 
Saal 4 was renovated during 1963 and by 1964 it was running a new stereo-capable desk based 
on Rundfunk DDR’s own System 700 technology.164 Saal 4 did not have the dual control spaces 
of Saal 1 or Saal 2. Running parallel mono and stereo sessions was thus not seen as appropriate 
for Saal 4 and the upgraded control room was expected to handle both. 165  Deutsche 
Schallplatten contributed to configuring the new desk’s technical specification, which had 24 
channels.166 The control room was equipped with four R 29 tape recorders, a single Telefunken 
four-track recorder and three Z 130s for stereo/mono monitoring powered by V 274 amplifiers. 
The new System 700-based control desk demonstrated Rundfunk DDR’s increasing aptitude 
with designing stereo systems, but also a new proficiency with transistor technology. Unlike 
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the MKR, System 700 was almost entirely self-developed within the GDR and represented 
another major technological departure for Rundfunk DDR. The major limitation with transistor 
technology innovation at Rundfunk DDR was that it was at a workshop scale, so the supply of 
parts was slow, limited in number and expensive, but of a high quality.167   
 
As with the activation of the MKR, as soon as Rundfunk DDR had additional stereo 
capacity, it sought to use it as flexibly as possible. In addition to its four music recording spaces, 
Block B also housed two radio drama complexes. At one point, there was a plan to trial stereo 
drama recording by connecting the radio drama studios to the MKR desk at the other end of 
the building.168 This was amended to running tie-lines and a video feed between one of the 
radio drama studios to Saal 4 and its new stereo mixing desk in November 1964. The first 
stereo drama recording to utilise this arrangement was, Kleine Suite des Wartens by Roger 
Richard. This was broadcast by Berliner Welle on December 26th 1964, but this quick 
turnaround proved unusual as the distribution of stereo broadcasting lagged behind Rundfunk 
DDR’s expanding recording capabilities.169 It was followed by the broadcasting of Wieviel 
Erde braucht der Mensch by Horst Dannenberg in May 1965 and Warschauer Ballade by 
Dieter Noll, in July 1967. The broadcasting of stereo radio drama works only became 
somewhat regular in 1968 with five works broadcast, but the capability had been established 
with the 1964 Christmas recording.170 By the end of 1964 there were a total of five stereo-
enabled spaces available to Rundfunk DDR, three of which were capable of making stereo 
recordings. Four of these were onsite at Funkhaus Berlin: Mehrkanalregie 1, the adjacent 
Abhörraum 2, the control room for Saal 4 and the RFZ’s own playback test-facility. 171 There 
was also a temporary control room set up at the Sporthalle on Karl-Marx-Allee. These 
recording spaces secured Rundfunk DDR’s ability to record music in stereo and prepared its 
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3.6  Stereo for the People  
 
The preparations made by Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche Schallplatten to adopt stereo 
recording were accompanied by the development of the infrastructures to deliver the new 
format to the GDR public: stereo broadcasting and stereo records. Deutsche Schallplatten’s 
struggles with vinyl record production are depicted in Chapter 2; pressing stereo-compatible 
records was an additional complicating component to this but it was not a pivotal constraint to 
the record company’s overall vinyl record production efforts. The production of stereo records 
increased throughout the 1960s and by 1969, 46% of all Deutsche Schallplatten LPs were in 
stereo.172 Introducing stereo broadcasting to the GDR was a more complicated process and took 
longer to reach a mass audience. A consensus on the technical methods for broadcasting in 
stereo was not reached until the late-1950s and until that point stereo broadcasting was defined 
by its non-uniformity. Diverse stereo transmission experiments were made during the inter-
war period in many countries, mostly using dual-transmission methods with each transmission 
carrying a single channel of audio. The Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft made experimental 
medium-wave stereo transmissions along these lines in the mid-1920s.173 These included an 
opera performance in Berlin in 1924 broadcast by two co-operating independent transmission 
towers and a similar effort made in Hamburg in 1925.174 Experiments on similar technological 
foundations were continued after the Second World War. Broadcasters including Rundfunk 
DDR and the BBC continued to make experimental dual-transmission medium-wave stereo 
broadcasts during the 1950s.175 Dual-transmission methods were also the basis for some regular 
stereo broadcasting in the US from the mid-1950s and the Newport Jazz Festival in 1958 was 
broadcast in stereo using a qualitatively mismatched AM-FM dual transmission method.176 As 
FM multiplexing - where a single radio transmission contains both stereo audio channels - 
looked increasingly to become the consensus format for stereo broadcasting, both the BBC and 
Rundfunk DDR ceased their own experiments during the late 1950s and awaited the 
international codification of stereo broadcast standards before resuming stereo broadcast 
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trials.177 Stereo test transmissions on FM frequencies began in East Berlin in June 1961, by 
December 1962 test transmissions were using the US-derived pulse amplitude modulation FM 
multiplexing method.178 Rundfunk DDR largely relied on GDR-created stereo resources for 
providing the content for these test transmissions. This content ranged from test tones to 
recordings from the 1960 stereo recording session in Saal I, as well as additional Deutsche 
Schallplatten recordings not made at Funkhaus Berlin.179  The experimental basis of these 
transmissions is confirmed by the degree to which the GDR public could engage with them; 
Steinke estimated that there were as few as thirty to fifty FM stereo receivers in the GDR during 
the 1960 to 1961 period.180  
 
While their ability to receive stereo was severely restricted during the early 1960s, 
stereo test transmissions were one of the most visible parts of a technological process that was 
mostly opaque to GDR citizens. 181  As stereo trials advanced, the new technology was 
increasingly valorised as a symbolic advancement by GDR media institutions. In 1963 the 
GDR celebrated the fortieth anniversary of radio broadcasting in Berlin and these 
commemorations were used as the impetus to broaden stereo broadcast trials that year. Stereo’s 
engagement with the public was formalised with industry demonstrations and press 
conferences in August and October 1963.182 The stereo roll-out continued with the first stereo 
programme transmission on 2 August 1963.183 The following year another milestone for stereo 
in the GDR was reached with the commencement of the first regular scheduled stereo test-
broadcast on 15 September.184 Transmitting on the Berliner Welle FM frequency, it ran initially 
for four weeks for thirty minutes on Tuesday and Thursday evenings.185 The press conference 
announcement for the new broadcasts was made at an associated exhibition for stereo, “Seht, 
Hier ist Deutschland”. For two months following the start of broadcasting, additional stereo 
demonstrations were available to the public as part of the exhibition, reminiscent of the large-
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scale radio fairs that announced Germany’s strides in radio during the 1920s and 1930s.186 A 
press conference was also given at Funkhaus Berlin by Wolfgang Kleinert from the State Radio 
Committee, promising that stereo content was being prepared and would soon be made 
available to radio listeners.187 Part of these preparations entailed Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche 
Schallplatten cataloguing and collecting all their existing stereo recordings to create a shared 
resource. 188  The escalation of stereo transmissions was linked with the GDR’s fifteenth 
anniversary celebrations and characterised in the press as a birthday gift from the GDR to its 
citizens.189 This was established rhetoric by GDR media to underline technical achievements 
of GDR industry, previously applied to a new transistor radio set model released on the GDR’s 
tenth birthday in 1959.190 Regional stereo broadcasting in the GDR began in Leipzig in 1965. 
Regular transmissions from Leipzig commenced in 1966 and Dresden followed the following 
year.191 By 1968 four million East German households could receive at least one stereo GDR 
programme (offering 30 hours per week) and a majority of the population could receive two 
out of the four active programmes.192 Listeners in Berlin in 1966 had the choice of three stations, 
giving a total of 90 hours of stereophonic transmission a week, up from a single hour in 1964.193 
In 1968 “Stereo Week” saw Rundfunk DDR collaborate with the state television broadcaster 
to bring stereo to television. This was achieved with a simulcast of the regular GDR 
documentary Aus Wissenschaft und Technik; those willing to line up a stereo radio set with 
their television were given a glimpse of a stereo-televisual future.194  However, Rundfunk 
DDR’s extending stereo broadcast network may not have been initially accompanied by a 
comparative increase in listeners. In 1968, Steinke estimated that were not much more than 
10,000 stereo receivers across the GDR.195 Radio listenership had been impacted by the uptake 
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in television ownership during the 1960s, but stereo and improved GDR transistor radios did 
combine to promote a resurgence of radio set production during 1969 and 1970.196  
 
The RFZ and Rundfunk DDR also played a role at the consumer end of the introduction 
of stereo in the GDR. Gerhard Steinke and other members of Rundfunk DDR and the RFZ 
were portrayed as important figures of counsel in the media and were used to help address 
issues of concern for listeners intimidated by the new technology.197 Steinke was described as 
“Pionier der Stereofonie in der DDR” (“pioneer of stereo in the GDR”) and the RFZ’s research 
work was cited as one of the GDR’s main hopes for keeping up with consumer technology 
developments.198 In 1963 Steinke published an article geared towards home stereo users in the 
Radio und Fernsehen magazine.199 Steinke went into considerable detail describing the ideal 
spacing and layout to experience stereo; every home was different and Steinke encouraged 
experimentation to reveal the best positioning for an optimal stereophonic sound. He also 
weighed in on the then-contentious international hi-fi debate by defining hi-fi as studio quality 
equipment designed for smaller domestic rooms.200 A definite advocate of stereo in the home, 
which he described as “ein entscheidener Schritt zur Verbesserung der Wiedergabequalität in 
Heim” (“a decisive step in the improvement of home playback”), Steinke was not puritanical 
in his advocacy of the pursuit of good sound in the home, delineating three sufficient levels of 
quality of varying degrees of affordability.201 Each of these levels was adequate for enhancing 
the listener’s appreciation of the musicians and composers work, as well as that of the 
Tonmeister and Toningenieur. Stereo sound became steadily more popular in the GDR and 
both the regular and specialist printed media covered its roll-out and progress in minute detail. 
Stereo was firmly established in the GDR by the 1970s and, in line with their reception 
elsewhere, enthusiasm for the possibilities offered by quadrophony and binaural radio 
broadcasting among the recording institutions of the GDR did not succeed in displacing stereo 
from its newly secured position as the high quality audio medium of choice.  
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3.7  Conclusion 
 
After many fits and starts, mono records and broadcasting were steadily supplanted globally 
by stereo iterations from the 1960s onwards. In both the record industry and broadcasting 
settings, stereo had been preceded by important enabling technologies: magnetic recording tape, 
vinyl records and FM broadcasting. The GDR had a distinguished technical heritage in the area 
of magnetic tape recording, but had to scramble to adopt the other enabling technologies. The 
GDR responded to these technological developments in turn and on a large scale. In each case, 
GDR manufacturers, publishers and broadcasters became a dominant or highly significant 
supplier of these new media forms to its citizens. The initiation of stereo recording and 
broadcasting by the media institutions of the GDR highlights how they were closely engaged 
with international technical developments and the extent to which they were able to cope with 
a rapidly-changing technological landscape. Maintaining a demonstrable technological parity 
with the West remained a consistent political goal of the GDR and the introduction of stereo 
was a conspicuous way of signalling technological success to its citizenry during the 1960s. 
Stereo also added momentum to the adoption of transistor technology in GDR consumer 
electronics and the export of stereo radio sets, stereo recordings and other associated consumer 
items became important sections of GDR industry. 
 
While the introduction of stereo in the GDR was not exactly aligned with its roll-out in 
West Germany, stereo was a complicated crossover that entailed a broad range of cross-
industry alterations that were not enacted uniformly by any national market or industry. 
Generally, interactions with West Germany on the topic of stereo, within the confines of travel 
and import restrictions, were fruitful and there were consistent instances of collegiality between 
GDR audio engineers and various West German broadcast and record company engineers. 
Although the airwaves over East and West Germany were particularly contentious during the 
1950s prior to the introduction of FM broadcasting, by the time of the stereo broadcasting 
conversion, this situation was comparatively regularised. Although the stereo paradigm that 
was delivered to GDR citizens was essentially a derivation of the West’s technological example, 
it was still delivered to a large extent by the GDR’s own industriousness. In 1960 Rundfunk 
DDR was about five years behind the stereo recording capabilities of some Western record 
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labels, but it laid a methodical groundwork that came to fruition as the international stereo 
landscape stabilised and GDR manufacturers started to supply suitable record players and radio 
sets. The RFZ and Rundfunk DDR’s systematic approach to the stereo as a technical problem 
was typical of the two closely-linked organisations. Rundfunk DDR’s MKR stereo mixing desk 
required imported components and depended on dated valve technology, but it was a key 
marker in the broadcaster’s departure from the technological heritage of the RRG that it shared 
with West German broadcasters. The GDR’s increasing transistor production enabled the RFZ 
to develop its transistor-based System 700 range of audio equipment during the mid- to late-
1960s and Rundfunk DDR self-developed most of its critical audio infrastructure for the rest 
of its lifetime.  
 
Aspects of stereo’s introduction the GDR establish illustrative patterns later repeated 
during subsequent technical developments. Deutsche Schallplatten continued to rely upon its 
foreign currency income stream to navigate all the recording technology transitions it 
encountered via direct purchases of relevant equipment. The contrast between Rundfunk 
DDR’s infrastructural development model and Deutsche Schallplatten’s direct procurement 
was maintained into the 1980s, long after most Western broadcasters and record companies 
had ceased to develop equipment systems in-house. The success of the MKR and System 700 
were important precedents that allowed the RFZ and Rundfunk DDR to believe they could self-
develop equipment to bridge the next major audio technology step: digital automation and 
control. The implementation of this technology in the GDR became part of a project called 
System 2000 during the 1980s. The RFZ’s openness towards diverse methodologies was also 
carried forward. A wariness towards only semi-established international orthodoxy in the field 
of stereo recording and a willingness to explore esoteric methods had some helpful applications 
during the 1960s, but it also helped create the circumstances for innovation in later years. In 
the late 1970s, engineers at the RFZ built on forgotten and anomalous early post-war German 
stereo research to create a sound reinforcement system for the unique design of the Palast der 
Republik in East Berlin. Known as Delta Stereo System (DSS), the original concept 
approached dual-channel stereo using principles distinct from the left-right stereo paradigm 
that became the orthodoxy. Although the GDR largely accepted and applied Western stereo 
standards for broadcasting and consumer purposes, it was able to utilise a pre-standardisation 
concept of stereo as a basis to solve contemporary sound reinforcement problems and to market 
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Delta Stereo and the Great Hall of the Palast der Republik 
 
Dieser Palast der Republik soll ein Haus des Volkes sein, eine Stätte 
verantwortungsbewußter Beratungen der höchsten Volksvertretung unseres Arbeiter-
und-Bauern-Staates, ein Ort wichtiger Kongresse und internationaler Beratungen. 
Unsere sozialistische Kultur wird hier ebenso eine Heimstatt finden wie Frohsinn und 
Geselligkeit der werktätigen Menschen.  
 
This Palace of the Republic shall be a home of the people, a place of responsible 
deliberations of the supreme representative body of our workers- and labourers-state, a 
place of important congresses and international discussions. Our socialist culture will 
find a home here, as well as the cheerfulness and conviviality of the working people. 
 
Erich Honecker at the ground-laying of the Palast der Republik,  2 November 1973.1 
 
 
Die Akustik wird gut sein, und es wird ein angenehmes Klima herrschen, wofür etwa 
200 technische Anlagen das ganze Jahr über sorgen. Die Lautsprecheranlagen in den 
Sälen entsprechen der Studioqualität des Randfunks.2 
 
The acoustics will be good and there will be a pleasant climate, with around 200 
technical facilities to maintain year-round. The loudspeaker systems of the venues 
match the quality of broadcast studios. 
 
 
In the early 1970s, GDR acousticians and sound technicians were presented with the 
challenge of designing the acoustics for a large next-generation public auditorium. The Großes 
Saal (Great Hall) was part of a larger superstructure that was constructed as a major civic 
centrepiece for East Berlin: the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic). The Palast der 
Republik’s ostensible primary function was to host the GDR’s national parliament, but its 
 
1 Alfred Wagner, ‘Am Berliner Marx-Engels-Platz entsteht ein Haus des Volkes - ein Palast für uns alle’, 




cultural functions would arguably be of greater consequence to East Berlin and GDR citizens. 
Aside from the Great Hall and the Volkskammer (People’s Parliament) plenary hall, the Palast 
also housed a diverse range of public amenities, from restaurants and bars to bowling alleys 
and discotheques. These amenities and the Great Hall, completed in 1976, combined to create 
a vibrant new social and cultural centre in the centre of East Berlin.  
 
The Palast der Republik emerged as a feature of a broad regeneration scheme for East 
Berlin. The Palast der Republik itself was intended to simultaneously address civic and cultural 
infrastructural deficits in the city. Its location carried forward resonances from Berlin’s pre-
war civic administration, but also specific performative aspects of the GDR’s political genesis; 
it was the former site of the Lustgarden public space and the Berliner Stadtschloss (Berlin City 
Palace) and became a rallying location for Soviet-style parades in the immediate post-war 
period.3 These associations became integral to GDR commemorative performance in East 
Berlin. After the Stadtschloss was demolished in 1950, the location was renamed Marx-Engels-
Platz and a stone tribune erected there continued to be a focal-point for May Day Parades until 
the 1970s.4 Intended to continue the site’s significance in the GDR’s political genesis, the 
construction of the Palast der Republik was given the go-ahead by the SED’s central committee 
in March 1973.5 The Palast der Republik helped to fill a civic vacuum and, like many other 
high-profile infrastructural projects in the GDR, it was also able to serve as an indicator for 
general economic progress across the GDR. Although the imagined redevelopment of central 
Berlin - of which the Palast der Republik was only a component - did not come to full fruition, 
Erich Honecker linked its completion to progress with broader infrastructural projects in the 
GDR, like East Berlin’s continuing home-building program.6 It also showcased the GDR’s 
technical and construction capabilities. Work on the Palast der Republik progressed relatively 
smoothly; the ground-laying ceremony took place on 4 November 1973 and the targeted 
completion for the first quarter of 1976 was achieved.7  
 
 
3 Ines Weizman, ‘Palast Der Republik (Palace of the Republic): Designed by HEINZ GRAFFUNDER. Berlin, 
Germany, 1973–2008’, Journal of Architectural Education 67, no. 1 (2013): 135–137, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10464883.2013.767147. 
4 Weizman. 
5 Wagner, ‘Am Berliner Marx-Engels-Platz entsteht ein Haus des Volkes - ein Palast für uns alle’. 
6 Karl-Heinz Arnold, ‘Am Marx-Engels-Platz wurde das Haus des Volkes eröffnet’, Berliner Zeitung, 24 April 
1976, http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP26120215-19760424-0-1-7-
0, ZEFYS. 
7 Wagner, ‘Am Berliner Marx-Engels-Platz entsteht ein Haus des Volkes - ein Palast für uns alle’. 
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In addition to its political utility the Palast der Republik was a bold reinterpretation of 
what a parliament house could be with its distinctive emphasis on social and cultural spaces. 
The Great Hall was of notable significance to the city; there was a dearth of large performance 
venues in East Berlin, further exacerbated by the erection of the Berlin Wall. Block B at 
Funkhaus Berlin was a major infrastructural investment in music and drama during the 1950s 
but, unlike Sendesaal I at Haus des Rundfunks, its contribution to the GDR’s cultural landscape 
never included public performances. There were few new venues of scale in East Berlin until 
the opening of the Great Hall and nothing to compare with the bold contribution made to 
cultural life in West Berlin by the Berlin Philharmonie in 1963. The Great Hall was not a direct 
response to the Berlin Philharmonie; East Berlin did not receive a dedicated symphony concert 
hall until 1984 with the renovation of the Konzerthaus Berlin. However, while the Great Hall 
was not conceived primarily as a concert hall, its broad cultural remit required that it could be 
used as such. That it could fulfil this role to any degree was only possible due to innovative 
technological interventions by the GDR’s audio community, collectively developed under the 
title Delta Stereophony System. While the lifetime of the Great Hall itself was curtailed, the 
extended lifetime of this sound reinforcement system problematises residual suspicions of the 
GDR’s inability to innovate in technological areas. The Great Hall’s use as a concert hall also 
draws it into dialogue with design developments in post-war concert halls and venues and how 
similar organising design principles were enacted in very different ways. Furthermore, the 
Great Hall’s dependence on sound technology for its acoustic design raises questions about the 
interaction between classical music performance and technology, sometimes elided in 
discussions of venues and concert acoustics. The manner in which the Great Hall performed 
the role of concert hall role also offers insights into how the GDR conceptualised a possible 
future for classical musical performance and classical music audiences.  
 
 
4.1  Acoustic Design in Post-War Performance Venues 
 
Until the twentieth century, the development of theatre and concert hall design was slow and 
fitful and an integrated appreciation for the role of the acoustic design, in particular, has been 
intermittent. 8  Occupying an uneasy space between science and art, methodical acoustic 
 
8 Victoria Newhouse, Site and Sound : The Architecture and Acoustics of New Opera Houses and Concert Halls 
(New York: Monacelli, 2012), 10. 
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research lagged behind other areas of physics until approached by Wallace Clement Sabine at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Sabine defined a single quantitative variable for acoustics: 
reverberation time (RT). This single variable was sufficient to assist him in designing the 
Boston Symphony Hall, widely assessed as one of the best concert halls in the world. 9  
Although an emulation of historical shoebox-type concert halls and also drawing on 
contemporary general knowledge, Sabine’s mathematical models incorporating RT were 
instrumental in allowing him to increase the scale of the hall without adversely impacting the 
acoustic result.10 However, Sabine’s acoustic legacy was mixed. Due in part to the success of 
the Boston Symphony Hall, acousticians took Sabine’s single variable to be a determining 
factor in acoustic design and its significance was overemphasised for decades.11 Acousticians 
eventually began to define further quantitative variables for assessing acoustics and these were 
increasingly applied in the decades after the Second World War. However, the unification of 
empirical method and a positive subjective result remained elusive and there were several high-
profile failures of acoustic design, particularly of symphony concert halls, in the 1950s and 
1960s. These failures can be attributed to continuing flaws in acoustic understanding but also 
tensions between contemporary acoustic design limitations and post-war cultural policy 
pressures to maximise access to concert halls. The infrequency of large concert hall 
commissions, the under-development of acoustic design and the heightened political stakes 
associated with high-culture infrastructure combine to create interesting points of comparison 
between cultural projects under different political systems during the post-war period. These 
comparisons can help determine how similar cultural priorities were embodied in different 
designs under different ideological regimes, as well as the extent to which technological 
approaches were allowed to offer new acoustic potentialities. 
 
One of the important implications of Sabine’s equation is the flexibility it allows – it 
doesn’t prescribe a particular design in regards to layout, thus offering opportunity to detach 
from habitual designs of the past. 12  One of the most noteworthy acoustic designs of the 
twentieth century was also one of the most novel - the Berlin Philharmonie, designed by the 
architect Hans Scharoun and completed in 1963. The Berlin Philharmonie took a radical 
 
9 Leo L. Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses: Music, Acoustics, and Architecture, Second edition.. (New 
York, N.Y.: Springer, 2004), 47. 
10 Vilhelm Lassen Jordan, Acoustical Design of Concert Halls and Theatres: A Personal Account (London: 
Applied Science Publishers, 1980), 34; Emily Ann Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural 
Acoustics and the Culture of Listening in America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge; London: MIT Press, 2002), 44. 
11 Jordan, Acoustical Design of Concert Halls and Theatres, 181. 
12 Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity, 44. 
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approach by discarding many concert hall conventions by adopting a “vineyard” style that 
envelops the performance area with an audience seated on all sides.13 Scharoun’s vineyard 
design was influential on the design of concert halls around the world and in the GDR; the 
Kulturpalast Dresden (1969) and the Gewandhaus Leipzig (1981) both adopted similar features. 
Although the auditorium of the Berlin Philharmonie holds 2,218 seats, the design approach 
was successful in achieving a sense of intimacy unequalled by historical venues of similar 
capacity. The encirclement of the performance area with seating required the acoustic design 
to compensate for the absorptive effect of seated audience members. This was done by 
incorporating reflective surfaces into the design of the audience spaces. Reflective panels 
suspended above the orchestra help provide early reflections and the concert hall achieved its 
desired reverberation time of 1.9 seconds.14 The acoustic could also be manipulated by altering 
the arrangement of physical components of the space, to subtly enhance its suitability for 
different types of classical performance. The architectural historian Victoria Newhouse writes 
that the Berlin Philharmonie “achieved an unprecedented feeling of egalitarianism and 
intimacy, with no listener more than one hundred feet from the stage”.15 This was not a passive 
intimacy, but an invitation to active participation that paralleled the role of citizens within a 
functioning democracy. 16  Scharoun’s design was highly political and motivated by what 
Newhouse describes as a broad “democratising intention”.17 Scharoun’s Berlin Philharmonie 
successfully united a politically-influenced design with effective acoustics, but his concert hall 
design was not the first to be influenced by democratising intentions prevalent after the Second 
World War.  
 
The Royal Festival Hall in London is an early example. Designed within the context of 
the relatively progressive British post-war consensus, which sought to improve social provision 
as recompense for the British public’s war-time contribution, the Royal Festival Hall was built 
in 1951 as part of the future-facing Festival of Britain. The Royal Festival Hall’s involvement 
with this progressive democratising spirit was represented in part by its large seating capacity. 
 
13 Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses, 297. 
14 Beranek, 297. 
15 Newhouse, Site and Sound, 46. 
16 Hugh Campbell, ‘“The Bright Edifice of Community”: Politics and Performance in Hans Scharoun’s Berlin 
Philharmonie’, Arq : Architectural Research Quarterly; Cambridge 11, no. 2 (June 2007): 160, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/10.1017/S1359135507000632. 
17 Newhouse, Site and Sound, 46. 
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It opened with 2,901 seats but early plans indicate a planned capacity of 3,500.18 The lower 
figure still exceeded the capacity of Sabine’s Boston Symphony Hall, which was a direct 
influence. As a young man the Royal Festival Hall’s lead acoustician, Hope Bagenal, had a 
formative written correspondence with Sabine.19 Seeking to match or eclipse the achievement 
of Sabine’s inclusive acoustic was a bold move for Bagenal but had the potential to introduce 
a new era of concert acoustics in Britain. Bagenal was emboldened by the apparent progress 
made in acoustic science since Sabine’s time. The Royal Festival Hall was used to trial new 
acoustic design methodologies and was one of the earliest concert halls to incorporate 
predictive computer modelling in the formulation of its acoustic design. 20  However, the 
effectiveness of the computer modelling was negated because a key value used in the models 
- the sound absorption of a seated audience member - was inaccurate.21  This resulted in the 
concert hall exhibiting a reverb time of 1.5 seconds at 500 Hz, instead of the planned 2.2 
seconds.22 Today, concert hall acoustics continue to elicit disparities between their subjective 
and objective assessments, but the degree to which the Royal Festival Hall diverged from its 
own models was drastic. A BBC Research Department report on the concert hall’s acoustic 
from September 1951, suggested that the Royal Festival Hall acoustic design was caught 
between competing design trends towards “directed sound” and “diffuse sound”.23 The same 
report indicates that the designers were becoming aware of new qualitative acoustic concepts 
and analytical tools (e.g. “liveness”, pulse technique) that would become standard over the 
coming decades, but these were still insufficiently developed to contribute at the design stage 
of the Royal Festival Hall. 24  Although the concert hall’s truncated reverb time primarily 
impacted the Royal Festival Hall’s acoustic effectiveness for large-scale romantic works, the 
design failure was a lingering embarrassment and coloured the venue’s reputation from an early 
stage.25 London already had a cautionary history of large capacity performance venues seeking 
to enhance public engagement with culture. The Royal Albert Hall was constructed with similar 
intentions to the Royal Festival Hall, but the scale of its ambitions were extremely destructive 
 
18 C.L.S. Gilford and T. Somerville, ‘Acoustics of the Royal Festival Hall’ (BBC Research Department, 
September 1951), 2, https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/rdreport_1951_15. 
19 Fiona Smyth, ‘Hope Bagenal and Wallace Clement Sabine: A Legacy in Letters’, Acoustics Bulletin 40, no. 2 
(2015): 26–30. 
20 ‘Acoustic Treatment of the Royal Festival Hall’, Proceedings of the Institution of Electronic and Radio 
Engineers 2, no. 3 (May 1964): 64–65. 
21 Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses, 245. 
22 Beranek, 245. 
23 Gilford and Somerville, ‘Acoustics of the Royal Festival Hall’, 7. 
24 Gilford and Somerville, 1. 
25 ‘Acoustic Treatment of the Royal Festival Hall’, 64. 
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to its acoustic efficacy. Designed to hold more than 5,000 people, numerous serious acoustic 
deficiencies were immediately apparent upon its inauguration and it took close to a hundred 
years of remedial action until they were conclusively resolved.26 The Royal Festival Hall 
entered a similarly drawn-out process and several attempts at remedial action were made from 
an early stage. By 1962 the venue was judged to have reached the limit of what was possible 
through physical alteration but the acoustic was still critiqued as sub-optimal.27 The next phase 
of alterations undertaken at the Royal Festival Hall during the early 1960s mark a pivotal 
moment in the merging of passive and active acoustics for classical performance venues and 
will be discussed later in this context. The Royal Festival Hall’s original acoustic was a 
reminder that acoustic design remained capricious, but the concert hall’s prominent 
shortcomings did not prevent further high-profile acoustic failures. 
 
Similar problems to those experienced at the Royal Festival Hall, albeit with different 
causes, impacted the reputation of the New York Philharmonic Hall (known as Avery Fisher 
Hall 1973-2015, now known as David Geffen Hall), opened in 1962. The Philharmonic Hall 
was the first component of the landmark Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts. Conceived as 
a solution to the logistical and practical limitations of venerable venues such as the old 
Metropolitan Opera House and Carnegie Hall, the placement of several of New York’s most 
prestigious performance groups in deliberate proximity with each other was a radical way of 
organising urban cultural bodies.28 Collectively, the Lincoln Center represents probably the 
most prestigious example of post-war venue design in the US, but it has also been criticised for 
its destructive approach to urban renewal and its perceived isolation.29 The designs of the 
individual venues themselves were less radical than their grouping. The Philharmonic Hall’s 
auditorium was influenced by traditional shoe-box designs and the Boston Symphony Hall and 
Royal Festival Hall were both used as specific examples by the New York Philharmonic  
Society as to what the new auditorium should and should not be.30 However, a flawed design 
process led to a deficient acoustic. The Philharmonic Hall’s original design called for a capacity 
of 2,400 and the acoustician Leo Beranek conducted a comprehensive survey of venues across 
 
26 Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses, 236. 
27 ‘Acoustic Treatment of the Royal Festival Hall’. 
28 Edgar B. Young, Lincoln Center, the Building of an Institution (New York: New York University Press, 
1980), 25. 
29 Newhouse, Site and Sound, 65. 
30 Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity, 319. 
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the world to inform his design.31 A combination of public and media pressure sought to increase 
the seating capacity to maintain the level of public access offered by Carnegie Hall.32 The 
seating capacity was consequently increased to nearly 2,700 and this was a significant 
contributing factor to the problems with the final acoustic.33 The perceived shortcomings of the 
Philharmonic Hall’s became publicly apparent during the concert hall’s opening gala and were 
the subject of scandal within the New York music community.34 Like the Royal Festival Hall, 
the Philharmonic Hall underwent several attempts to positively improve its acoustic before 
undergoing a major renovation in 1976.35 This renovation was successful at improving the 
acoustic and in maintaining the auditorium’s large seating capacity at 2,742 seats. 36  The 
Philharmonic Hall was eventually able to confirm that large-capacity concert halls could be 
made to work acoustically, but also confirmed the continuing unpredictability of outcome 
regarding concert acoustics.  
 
The Great Hall of Palast der Republik was built a decade after the Berlin Philharmonie, 
but democratic principles were similarly integral to its design, although these emerge in very 
different forms. The architect of the Great Hall, Manfred Prasser, believed it had practically no 
precedent: “hier wurde etwas völlig Neues gemacht" (“here something completely new was 
made”).37 Prasser was motivated in his design by a desire to create a communicative space that 
could host a large number of people, without the confrontational aspect of a traditional 
proscenium theatre.38 Prasser’s auditorium referenced Greek and Roman amphitheatres in its 
wide sweep although it also included a balcony level. The Great Hall had 5,000 seats over two 
levels: about 3,550 in the stalls and 1,450 in the balcony. Although situated within an unusual 
hexagonal groundplan, the seating layout of the Great Hall’s larger configurations resembles 
the spatula-shaped “modern auditorium” template that Emily Thompson identifies as a 
response to electroacoustic sound reinforcement in the US from the 1920s onward.39  
 
31 Michael Barron, Auditorium Acoustics and Architectural Design, Second edition. (London ; New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2010), 91. 
32 Christopher Blair, ‘Orchestral Acoustics 101: Avery Fisher Hall’, Adaptistration, 5 August 2009, 
http://adaptistration.com/2009/08/05/orchestral-acoustics-101-avery-fisher-hall. 
33 Newhouse, Site and Sound, 90. 
34 Harold C. Schonberg, ‘The Curse Of Fisher Hall’s Acoustics’, The New York Times, 13 October 1974, sec. 
Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/13/archives/the-curse-of-fisher-halls-acoustics.html. 
35 Barron, Auditorium Acoustics and Architectural Design, 95. 
36 Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses. 
37 Alfred Wagner, ‘Gespräch mit Manfred Prasser, Architekt im Bau- und Montagekombinat Ingenieurhochbau 
Berlin’, Berliner Zeitung, 7 October 1975, http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-
presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP26120215-19751007-0-9-148-0, ZEFYS. 
38 Wagner. 
39 Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity, 248. 
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Figure 4.1: Provisional floor plans, cross sections and estimated capacities for three of the Great Hall’s seating 
configurations. The plans give a sense of the Great Hall’s non-traditional layout and the scale of its flexibility.40 
 
 
40 ‘Kurze Zusamenfassung des Beschallungsplans der Palast der Republik’ (Rundfunk und Fernsehtechnisches 
Zentralamt, 1974), 31/26/2/5, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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Electroacoustics were integral to the design and the Great Hall notably adopted a highly 
technological approach to enable its accommodation of a programme remit that covered almost 
every configuration of live and recorded performance. This approach deconstructed traditional 
divisions between different forms of performance by making similar levels of technical 
provision for acoustic and electrically amplified performances and the auditorium could also 
be configured in scale to reflect the needs of productions. This aspect of the Great Hall was 
influenced by another design trend in post-war performance venues; the inclusion of features 
to enhance their suitability for several types of cultural production. Multi-purposes venues 
became common in the US as venues were constructed in greater numbers outside of the main 
urban centres that could sustain single-purpose venues.41  Multi-purpose venues were also 
constructed in Europe. In 1952 the Aalborghallen in Denmark included several technical 
features that allowed it to have several flexible configurations for theatre, concert performance 
and assembly with a capacity ranging from 1,400 to 3,200.42  
 
The efficacy of multi-purpose designs could vary but they were influential on theatre 
construction in the latter-twentieth century. Several multi-purposes venues with capacities 
ranging between 1,000 and 3,000 were built in West Germany between 1963 and 1970.43 The 
Great Hall was a conspicuous enlargement of the multi-purpose concept and the degree to 
which it could be transformed was extreme, as suggested by sample layout configurations 
shown in Figure 4.1. The Great Hall could be reduced to just 10% of its maximum seated 
capacity for small-scale theatrical performances.44 Nearly every part of the auditorium had 
elements that could be reconfigured. Similar to other multi-purpose venues, the front seating 
rows could be wheeled away in large sections and stored in the sub-stage. The rear seating 
rows folded into the walls, so the entire floor space could be cleared for banqueting or dance 
events. Other features were less typical. While the seats in the balcony were fixed, the ceiling 
itself could be lowered by up to five metres to effectively separate the balcony from the space 
entirely. The ceiling lowered in sections to facilitate lighting and sound installations and the 
triangular plafonds of the ceiling could be angled to facilitate acoustic adjustments. In addition, 
the Great Hall had temporary dividing walls that could reduce the width of the auditorium. The 
 
41 Robin Mackenzie, Auditorium Acoustics (London: Applied Science Publishers, 1975), 43, 131–34. 
42 Jordan, Acoustical Design of Concert Halls and Theatres, 35. 
43 Mackenzie, Auditorium Acoustics, 131–34. 
44 Wagner, ‘Gespräch mit Manfred Prasser, Architekt im Bau- und Montagekombinat Ingenieurhochbau Berlin’. 
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design aim was for each configuration to be fully integrated in terms of lighting, sound and 
other facilities, with each distinct configuration intended to feel complete and autonomous.  
 
The flexibility of the Great Hall was not just to accommodate cultural functions. In a 
design consideration emblematic of a broader conflation of culture and politics that was 
characteristic of both the GDR and the Palast der Republik itself, the Great Hall could also 
serve as a congress hall for the GDR’s ruling party, the SED. There were several features 
specifically geared towards this. These included folding writing tables integrated into the 
seating, as well as live television projection and translation facilities. Each chair also 
incorporated a small loudspeaker for speech transmission during conferences or speech-
focussed uses. This was among the simplest elements of the Great Hall’s acoustic design. The 
Hall was designed to accommodate all aspects of performance culture, high and low, small and 
large scale. While the consequent complexity of the Great Hall due to this extreme remit was 
significant, it aligned well with the GDR’s capacity to produce results for high-profile projects. 
The GDR had a well-established and robust audio-engineering community that had been 
instrumental in introducing several technological advances during the previous two decades 
and which approached the Palast der Republik project with noticeable energy. The acousticians 
and architects of the Royal Festival Hall and the New York Philharmonic Hall utilised the best 
available technology and acoustic practice to create relatively conservative concert halls, yet 
in both cases were thwarted in fully executing their design intentions. The Great Hall had far 
fewer precedents to follow for its combination of scale, configurability and broad cultural 
programme. Nonetheless, the multiple uses of the Great Hall and, by extension, the multiple 




4.2  Active Acoustics  
 
Every feature of the Great Hall had direct implications for its acoustic design. Its large size 
meant it would be heavily dependent on the integration of a sound reinforcement system. 
However, specific features of the Great Hall complicated conventional sound reinforcement 
solutions. The height of the ceiling and absence of a proscenium made the placement of 
loudspeakers to create a coherent sound field from the stage difficult using standard  
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Figure 4.2: A diagram of Herbert Buttenberg’s original 1950s conception of delta stereo. Originally conceived 
as a variant form of stereophonic recording and playback, Buttenberg’s idea was upscaled in the 1970s to serve 
as the conceptual basis for a large-scale distributed sound reinforcement system.45 
 
 
contemporary techniques. Interrelated to the question of sound reinforcement was the Great 
Hall’s acoustic design, heavily constrained by the venue’s multi-purpose intentions. The Great 
Hall’s remit included symphony concert performances. An acoustic tailored for symphony 
orchestra typically requires a reverberation time of close to two seconds in the mid-range 
frequencies, but an acoustic of this type is problematic for most other musical or speech-
dependent uses. Although multi-purpose venues had experimented with mechanical means for 
creating adjustable passive acoustics, the scale and degree of flexibility required by the Great 
Hall led the RFZ’s workgroup to determine that an active acoustic system would be a better 
solution.46 In principle, an active acoustic uses a variety of sound reinforcement and audio 
equipment to augment the passive, physical acoustic of a venue. An active acoustic system 
offered the potential to create an electronically malleable acoustic that could be altered to match 
 
45 ‘Informationen der Studiotechnik Rundfunk’ (Studiotechnik Rundfunk, January 1989), 6, 363/33/4/2/5, 
Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
46 Heinz Graffunder, ‘Protokoll der Beratung mit dem Expertengremium “Akustik” am 11. 11. 1973 in der 
Aufbauleitung Sondervorhaben Berlin zum Objekt Palast der Republik’ (Generalprojektant Palast der Republik, 
10 November 1974), Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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the various uses of the Great Hall. The decision to take this approach required the innovative 
application of acoustic theory integrated with an array of sound reinforcement and audio 
distribution techniques, culminating in the Delta Stereophony System (DSS).  
 
The RFZ had a tradition of embracing new concepts and was happy to engage with the 
esoteric. During the introduction of stereo it pursued several pseudo-stereophonic methods to 
allow it to enhance heritage recordings, with some success.47 During the 1970s, it was an 
enthusiastic adopter of Kopfkunst recording methods (“head art” – usually referred to as 
binaural recording outside of Germany) – a stereo technique that offers an enhanced sense of 
localisation when listened to on headphones – while the format enjoyed a brief period of 
popularity within some audio engineering circles. 48  This willingness to experiment with 
formats at the edges of convention also features in the provenance of DSS. The genesis of the 
format was research undertaken by the engineer Herbert Buttenberg at Haus des Rundfunks in 
the early 1950s. 49  Influential within the East German audio community, Buttenberg was 
intrigued by the potential of stereophonic recording and devised an alternative approach to 
stereo playback. Standard two-channel stereophony uses volume differences between the two 
channels to impart directional information, most effectively in the horizontal plane. More 
interested in imparting an impression of the room rather than a directional sense of left and 
right, Buttenberg experimented with separating the two channels into the transmission of a 
direct signal and a spatial signal. Buttenberg’s original concept is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Calling this delta stereo, the idea was patented but found little application until the RFZ was 
searching for a methodology with which to approach the problematic acoustic of the Great Hall. 
Buttenberg’s work offered a conceptual framework that originated within the GDR’s own 
audio development history. However, Buttenberg’s delta stereo was intended for recording and 
playback, not for live sound. It required substantial elaboration to become a holistic sound 
system suitable for application to the Great Hall. Its creation relied on the expertise of the 
GDR’s audio community and audio equipment manufacturers, but it was also heavily reliant 
on acoustic research developments and new audio technologies from abroad. 
 
 
47 Klaus Wagner, ‘Bericht der Arbeitsgemeinschaft “Pseudostereofone Bearbeitungsverfahren”’ (Rundfunk und 
Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt, 1967), 31/26/2/4, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
48 Gerhard Steinke, ‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der kopfbezogenen Stereofonie - im Vergleich zur 
raumbezogenen Stereofonie’, RFZ Fachberichte, January 1979, 17. 
49 ‘Informationen der Studiotechnik Rundfunk’, 5. 
 202 
While the classical music record market was an important driver of technical 
improvements in the world of recording and high-fidelity reproduction, popular music was 
much more significant in driving the application of technology to live music performance. As 
guitar amplifiers became more powerful during the 1960s, successful bands, such as the 
Grateful Dead and Pink Floyd, gave pioneering sound engineers the opportunity to apply these 
technical developments into new sound reinforcement systems and audio handling 
techniques. 50  By the time the Palast der Republik was being conceptualised, sound 
reinforcement capabilities were much improved. However, sound reinforcement was rarely 
applied to conventional classical music performances, which continued to rely primarily on the 
passive acoustics of an established circuit of appropriate venues. As the power, transparency 
and distribution possibilities of sound reinforcement technology continued to improve, 
technology originally intended for direct sound reinforcement began to be applied to altering 
room acoustics in subtler ways. Entrenched subjective acoustic parameters for classical 
performance, an aversion towards technological interventions and the cultural stakes associated 
with established classical music venues were obstacles to experimentation in this area. Early 
experiments were also constrained by continued deficiencies in the understanding of acoustics 
and sound perception. During the 1950s and 1960s improving theoretical understanding and 
advancing technological capabilities contributed to several important practical advances for 
enhancing passive acoustics by electronic means.  
 
Underpinning the technological development of active acoustics were the important 
contributions made during the late 1940s and early 1950s to the understanding of how humans 
perceive sound. The work of sensory perception researchers like Hans Wallach and Helmut 
Haas had important implications for many aspects of sound reinforcement.51 Their work on 
psychoacoustics, allied with the technical development of audio delay, led to the development 
of distributed sound systems by taking advantage of particular characteristics of human hearing 
to bypass the technical and practical limitations of sound reinforcement technology and create 
coherent sound fields on a large scale. Distributed sound systems have application for sound 
reinforcement approaches to both classical and popular music performance, but they were 
foundational to the beginning of effective active acoustic systems. Several early active acoustic 
 
50 Robert Greenfield, ‘The King of LSD’, Rolling Stone, 12 July 2007. 
51 Hans Wallach, E. B. Newman, and M. R. Rosenzweig, ‘A Precedence Effect in Sound Localization’, The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 21, no. 4 (1 July 1949): 468–468, 
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installations are discussed below. These examples demonstrate that there was not a linear 
progression in the development of active acoustics in advance of the iteration that was used as 
a component of DSS. Each example used different technical methods under different 
circumstances and the intentions behind these experiments also varied substantially. Some of 
these systems were dedicated to enhancing a venue’s acoustic (sometimes referred to as 
ambiophony), whereas others were focussed on speech distribution. However, the principles 
driving these different applications are similar and what the experiments do all share is the 
systematic integration of an improved understanding of psychoacoustic effects. 
 
There is some evidence to show that sound reinforcement systems were historically 
used as an ad-hoc tool for enhancing the ambience of performance spaces during recordings. 
In 1947, a stereo recording experiment at Haus des Rundfunks sent a live microphone feed to 
Sendesaal I’s sound system in an effort to improve a dry-sounding string section.52 In the mid-
1950s the Philips Research Laboratory in the Netherlands made one of the first methodical 
attempts to augment a venue using active means. Research by the engineer Roelof Vermeulen 
led him to develop an approach for enhancing the acoustics of a performance space considered 
sub-optimal for orchestral performance. Vermeulen believed that lateral sound reflections in 
music venues were an important and under-valued factor for good acoustics.53 He regarded 
reverberation as an “inevitable subsidiary effect” of an acoustic suited to music, but regarded 
the diffuseness of the sound in the space as more significant.54 As part of his research he 
designed a distributed loudspeaker system that could create an artificial reverberation field 
derived from the original sound source by applying intensity variations and audio delay. 
Vermeulen called his approach “stereo reverberation” and demonstrated it at the Gravesano 
and Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk sound engineering conferences in 1955.55 The RFZ was 
aware of Vermeulen’s work from his regular attendances at Gravesano and his published 
work.56 Vermeulen’s system was later installed in venues in the Netherlands including the 
Philips Theatre in Eindhoven. The system used a line microphone consisting of ten condenser 
microphones mounted above the orchestra on a floating boom a metre long. Each microphone 
 
52 W. Lippert, ‘Stereophonische Zweikanalübertragung mit dem Magnetophon’, Funk und Ton, no. 5 (1947): 
244. 
53 R. Vermeulen, ‘Stereo Reverberation’, IRE Transactions on Audio AU-4, no. 4 (July 1956): 98–105, 
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54 Vermeulen, 99. 
55 Roelof Vermeulen, ‘Stereophonie und Stereonachhall’, Gravesaner Blätter, July 1955, 132–41. 
56 Lothar Keibs and Gerhard Steinke, ‘Laborbericht 345/40 (Tagungsbericht): “5 Jahre Gravesano” durchgeführt 
vom Elektroakustischen Experimentalstudio Gravesano am 8./9.August 1959’ (Betriebslaboratorium für 
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picked up minute differentials of intensity and phase in comparison to its neighbours and this 
gave the system a fairly wide range of stereophonic information to feed into the stereo 
reverberation system. These distinct signals were delayed by different values and then fed to 
loudspeakers positioned throughout the auditorium to enhance the reverberation field within 
the venue.57 The delayed signals were distributed to the speakers on a random basis to increase 
the degree of diffusion. Psychoacoustic principles guided Vermeulen’s design. The system was 
calibrated so that no audience member would hear the sound system more than 50 milliseconds 
after the direct sound from the stage.58 This ensured that audience members perceived the sound 
emanating from the system as a seamless extension of the original sound, rather than as a 
distinct echo and destroying the effect.  
 
In 1959 the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) used methods similar to Vermeulen’s 
towards a different purpose when they designed and built a 300-seat “acoustoelectronic” 
auditorium at their labs in New Jersey.59 This auditorium had one of the earliest distributed 
sound system for sound reinforcement and came about as the RCA believed that new venues 
were not integrating sound systems into their acoustic designs. The primary design remit of 
this innovative system was to transmit the speech of a speaker on stage at an appropriate level 
to all seats without the use of a conventional personal microphone or sound operator. 60 The 
physical fabric of the entire space was tailored to facilitate the goals of the sound system. The 
walls and floors of the venue were heavily sound absorbent and the stage was also carpeted. 
These room features created an extremely short reverberation time of 0.6 seconds in the mid-
range in an effort to improve the ratio between the direct and electrically-reproduced sound. 
The sound system comprised of six overhead microphones covering the stage and the signal 
from these was distributed to 20 loudspeakers arranged in five rows in the ceiling above the 
auditorium seating. The most innovative feature of the RCA auditorium was how it handled 
and distributed the audio signal to these loudspeakers. Audio delay was used to synchronise 
each row of speakers with the direct sound emitted from the stage. This alignment of direct 
sound with reinforced sound maintained the impression of a speaker on stage speaking 
naturally without amplification, but improved intelligibility throughout the auditorium and 
maintained an even volume to all rows. Locating the loudspeakers in the ceiling also 
 
57 Vermeulen, ‘Stereo Reverberation’, 99. 
58 Vermeulen, 103. 
59 Harry F. Olson, ‘Acoustoelectronic Auditorium’, The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 31, no. 7 
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60 Olson, 873. 
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contributed to the system’s goals of being visually and acoustically imperceptible. Worth 
noting is that the RCA system focussed exclusively on preserving localisation across the depth 
of the auditorium and not its width.61 The six overhead stage microphones combined to create 
a single monophonic signal and the system did make any differentiation to the signal based on 
the speaker’s location on the stage. The RCA system showed audio delay and distributed 
loudspeakers could be used to reinforce a stage sound source, but did not address issues of 
localisation. This was not problematic for a sound system in a space for a few hundred people; 
the scale and aesthetic demands of the Great Hall made this a much more pertinent issue in its 
design.  
 
The introduction of active acoustics to established venues was not smooth. Vermeulen 
reported a good reception to his experiments from audience and orchestra members and his 
system was offered commercially, although it met with limited success.62 Installed at the Teatro 
alla Scala in Milan in 1955, it initially received a positive reception there from conductors 
including Herbert von Karajan.63 Nevertheless, it was deactivated permanently within three 
years due to dissatisfaction with feedback and colouration issues.64 Vermeulen subsequently 
advocated that the use of active acoustics should not be disclosed to audiences saying, 
 
under no circumstances must the public become aware of the use of loudspeakers, for 
their reputation has become so bad by misuse that the mere suggestion that they are 
present can spoil appreciation of the performance, even when they are not in use.65 
 
Vermeulen’s comment re-emphasises the uneasy relationship between classical music 
audiences and technology, but his system undoubtedly had limitations. This contentious aspect 
of Vermeulen’s experience was very influential on how one of the most high-profile early 
applications of active acoustics was undertaken.  
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During the early 1960s, the Royal Festival Hall - still dealing with lingering criticisms 
over its failed acoustic and after exhausting traditional remedial options - returned to the 
vanguard of acoustic science in an attempt to re-shape its acoustic. The management of the 
Royal Festival Hall approached the installation with a strong degree of trepidation. This 
contributed to the length of time the project took as the installation was not allowed to interfere 
with the venue’s program. A staggered development, installation and assessment process, 
undertaken in two main stages, was not fully completed until 1969.66 Overseen by the Building 
Research Station -Bagenal’s acoustic consultancy responsible for the Royal Festival Hall’s 
original acoustic design - the system that was eventually installed took more inspiration from 
ancient Greek auditoria than the experiments of Vermeulen or the RCA. 67  Some ancient 
auditoria incorporated Helmholtz resonators; simple hollow vessels with narrow mouths that 
vibrate at specific frequencies. Most often used in contemporary acoustic designs as acoustic 
absorbers, the Building Research Station’s “assisted resonance” system instead used the 
acoustic properties of the resonators to bolster the auditorium’s resonance across a specific 
range of frequencies.68 This was done by installing 172 resonators across the ceiling of the 
auditorium and augmenting each resonator with a dynamic microphone, a 12-inch loudspeaker 
and a 3 Watt amplifier. Each resonator activated in sympathy with the programme material at 
a specific frequency and the electronic elements amplified the enhanced resonance back into 
the auditorium. The large number of resonators was required as each one only enhanced a very 
narrow frequency range. The initial installation stage focussed on enhancing the auditorium’s 
resonance between 70 – 340 Hz, as this was identified as the area where the auditorium was 
particularly deficient.69  
 
After the system’s initial trial had a cautiously positive response, the installation was 
expanded to cover the frequency range from 58 - 700 Hz.70 Although the assisted resonance 
system was highly distributed, it was essentially modular; each resonator acted independently 
and there was no centralised control. The modular aspect of the system also meant that the 
system was highly integrated into the auditorium’s passive acoustic and the location of the 
sound source or the listener were not critical factors to the effectiveness of the system. 
 
66 P. H. Parkin and K. Morgan, ‘“Assisted Resonance” in The Royal Festival Hall, London: 1965–1969’, The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 48, no. 5A (1 November 1970): 1025–35, 
https://doi.org/10.1121/1.1912240. 
67 Parkin and Morgan. 
68 Barron, Auditorium Acoustics and Architectural Design, 209. 
69 Parkin and Morgan, ‘“Assisted Resonance” in The Royal Festival Hall, London’, 1025. 
70 Parkin and Morgan, 1025. 
 207 
Musicians and conductors associated with the Royal Festival Hall were largely kept in the dark 
about the project and audiences were not informed at all until after several concerts had been 
performed with the system in place.71 The acousticians themselves were also very restricted in 
their opportunities to assess the system. In the run-up to its inauguration, they were permitted 
only one full rehearsal where they were able to make comparative judgements based on 
switching the system on and off.72 The system was a success and it was used without incident 
for more than twenty years, until it became increasingly unreliable and prone to disruptive 
outbursts of noise during the 1990s. Although it was integral to the Royal Festival Hall’s 
acoustic for many years, active acoustic enhancement was not a component of a major 
renovation in 2007. However, the prestige of the Royal Festival Hall and the relative success 
of the assisted resonance system meant it was influential on active acoustic designs, including 
later iterations of DSS.  
 
 
4.3  Kulturpalast Dresden and the RFZ as Venue Consultants  
 
The RFZ had a broad technical expertise in audio applications but did not have a particular 
background in the application of technical solutions to live performance. Its involvement with 
the acoustic assessment of the Kulturpalast Dresden in 1969 was the beginning of a more direct 
involvement with GDR venue acoustics. The Kulturpalast’s acoustic consultant was Walter 
Reichardt. Reichardt was director of the Technical Acoustics Institute in Dresden and he was 
well-renowned internationally for his involvement with efforts during the 1960s to improve the 
correlation between objective acoustic measurements and the subjective assessment of large 
halls.73 An indicator of these efforts across acoustic communities was the proliferation of new 
qualitative and quantitative acoustic terms during this period, coined by acousticians like 
Reichardt, Lothar Cremer and Leo Beranek, among others. Beranek’s role as the lead 
acoustician for the original New York Philharmonic Hall was damaging to his reputation, but 
he went on to publish influential work and pioneered subjective acoustic evaluation 
approaches. 74  Cremer made his name for his contribution to the Berliner Philharmonie’s 
acoustic design and collaborated with Reichardt on standardisation work. Cremer credited him 
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with helping to maintain a convergence between Eastern and Western measurement methods 
and acoustic quality evaluations.75 Reichardt was particularly involved in quantifying the ratio 
of energy components contributing to “spatial sound” versus direct sound and how this ratio 
contributed to the subjective acoustic experience.76 Reichardt invited the RFZ’s Hörgruppe 
(Listening Group) to assist the Technische Universität Dresden (TU Dresden) with the final 
stages of the Kulturpalast’s acoustic preparation.77 The Hörgruppe was a specialised team of 
evaluative listeners initially founded during the early days of Funkhaus Berlin to help maintain 
standards and evaluate new methods. Gerhard Steinke and Walter Hoeg were among thirteen 
RFZ and TU Dresden engineers that worked on evaluating the venue’s acoustic over several 
days in September and October 1969.78  
 
The Kulturpalast tests used repertoire excerpts performed by the Dresdner 
Philharmonie and a children’s choir to examine a number of different orchestral layouts and 
their influence on the acoustic in the auditorium and on stage. The RFZ and TU Dresden groups 
both made systematic but subjective assessments using eleven evaluative terms including 
reverb, balance, transparency and Klangfarbe (sound-colour), which were particular to the RFZ 
but representative of contemporary trends in acoustic evaluation.79 A copy of one of test forms 
is reproduced in Figure 4.3 and the RFZ  later shared its acoustic evaluation tables with other 
organisations.80 The results of the Kulturpalast assessment were mostly positive. Although the 
musicians found the sound on stage to err on the side of dryness, they were also generally 
satisfied with the overall acoustic. This had been previously been a contentious area in the 
RFZ’s experience when making early assessments of Saal 1 at Funkhaus Berlin.81 Part of the 
formal assessment involved tabulating and comparing the evaluations by organisation, but no 
great variance between the RFZ and TU Dresden assessments was found.82 Further tests in  
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Figure 4.3: A rubric with eleven categories used to assess the acoustic of the Kulturpalast Dresden in 1969. The 
RFZ’s Hörgruppe had long been developing practical methods and terms for assessing recordings and acoustics, 
alongside wider developments in the understanding of psycho-acoustics.83 
 
83 Steinke and Hoeg, ‘Subjecktiv-akustische Beurteilung des Großen Saales im Kulturpalast Dresden’. 
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December 1969 with the Staatskappelle Dresden led to the determination that the “best” seat 
in the house was seat 23 in row 17.84 
 
The RFZ also contributed to other areas of the Kulturpalast’s finalisation. Although the 
Kulturpalast was optimised for use as a concert hall, there were some design concessions for 
multi-purpose use. Jazz was envisaged as part of the performance program and the venue also 
had an orchestra pit to allow for operatic and ballet productions. The RFZ’s involvement with 
the calibration of the venue’s sound reinforcement system prefigure its work on DSS and the 
Great Hall and it was a more marked departure from its typical work than its contribution to 
assessing the venue’s passive acoustic. During a series of tests conducted before the orchestral 
layout assessment, Steinke and Klaus Wagner (an RFZ Tonmeister who also contributed to the 
auditorium tests) made several small but constructive alterations to the installed sound system. 
This included re-angling the speakers to improve coverage and inserting an equaliser into the 
signal chain.85 The equaliser was an RFZ-designed W 732 and Steinke and Wagner reported 
that it made a significant improvement to the delivery of speech in the middle axis of the 
auditorium, critical to the auditorium’s supplementary roles.86 Although the Kulturpalast’s 
monophonic sound system bore little comparison to the complexity of the DSS sound 
reinforcement system developed a few years later, it nonetheless marked a pivoting of the 
RFZ’s remit towards large live sound systems. Steinke and Wagner were also part of an 
advocative process that saw the Kulturpalast adopt several sound reinforcement practices that 
were increasingly becoming standard internationally. The Kulturpalast sound system initially 
made no provision for stage monitors, but tests indicated these would be essential for jazz 
musicians and they were subsequently included in the venue specification.87 Additionally, 
sound mixing was initially conducted from an enclosed control room. This restricted the sound 
engineer’s ability to make an accurate assessment of conditions in the auditorium, but the 
importance of this role was quickly realised and the sound desk was brought into the auditorium 
and allocated space beneath the balcony.88 At the time of the Kulturpalast’s completion Steinke 
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and Hoeg were positive in their assessment of the new venue’s primary attributes as a concert 
hall while reserving their optimism towards its multi-purpose aspects: 
 
In diesen Zusammenhang kann erstmalig für einen Kulturbau in der DDR die 
Bezeichnung "Konzertsaal" mit gutem Recht angewendet werden, auch wenn man noch 
nicht von einem optimalen Konzertsaal sprechen kann, was bei einem Mehrzweckbau 
nie möglich sein wird.89 
 
In this case, the term "concert hall" can justifiably be used for the first time to describe 
a cultural building in the GDR, even if we cannot yet speak of an excellent concert hall, 
which would never be possible with a multipurpose building. 
 
Steinke, Hoeg and the RFZ were soon much more directly involved with a venue 
design-project with far more ambitious goals for multipurpose use. The RFZ’s involvement 
with the Kulturpalast prompted it to engage further with sound reinforcement questions and it 
began to articulate its own aesthetic priorities in this area. Broadly, it saw the shared technical 
and aesthetic goal of sound reinforcement as being an integrated component of performance of 
which a typical audience member should be unaware.90 Preceding their involvement with the 
Palast der Republik, Walter Hoeg and Klaus Wagner had already observed that sound 
reinforcement was occupying a growing role in the control of venue acoustics and they believed 
that the RFZ should engage with this. Their requests for the founding of a centralised GDR 
research centre in this area were not met and the cooperation between the RFZ and TU Dresden 
on the Kulturpalast provided the template for the DSS development process.91  
 
 
4.4  Preparing DSS  
 
The RFZ’s involvement with sound reinforcement escalated in 1973 when they were asked to 
contribute to the electro-acoustic design of the Palast der Republik by Wolfgang Fasold, the 
lead acoustician of the project for the Bauakademie der DDR (GDR Academy of 
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Architecture).92 Steinke responded proactively by setting up a special RFZ workgroup under 
his leadership - the Arbeitsgruppe Beschallungstechnik (Sound Reinforcement Workgroup) - 
as a sub-section of the Abteilung Tonstudiotechnologie (Department of Recording Studio 
Technology). 93  This RFZ workgroup project-managed a diverse team of engineers and 
acousticians from a range of GDR institutions; including Reichardt and some prominent 
contributors seconded from several departments of TU Dresden. The RFZ-led workgroup 
designed and oversaw the installation of a sophisticated conferencing and public address 
system in the Volkskammer plenary hall using predominantly GDR-manufactured technical 
equipment and it also designed bespoke solutions for the numerous ancillary public facilities 
of the Palast der Republik, including a bowling alley, casino, and nightclub.94 However, the 
most innovative aspect of the project by a considerable degree was the multi-tiered electro-
acoustic DSS-design devised for the Great Hall. The initial production remit that the RFZ 
workgroup was given to inform their design estimated that the Great Hall would hold 118 
events a year.95 The most challenging aspect of this was that the acoustic needed to work for at 
least fifteen diverse forms of production. Based on these requirements, the RFZ workgroup 
submitted its first general design in August 1973 and an initial sound reinforcement scheme 
followed a month later.96 The first scale model of the auditorium was made in November of 
that year.97 Steinke was enthused by the prospect and invited Fasold to contribute members of 
his architectural acoustics team to the RFZ’s Hörgruppe so that there would be a balance of 
expertise across both passive and active acoustics.98 Although Steinke admitted to Reichardt in 
a 1975 letter that the RFZ was venturing outside its traditional expertise by directing the design 
of the Great Hall’s sound reinforcement system, he also stated that he saw it as a 
complementary field to his own studio- and broadcast-focussed work.99  
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The DSS-design process incorporated extensive research of international active 
acoustics practices, but also a notable research trip. The Kremlin Palace of Congresses 
auditorium in Moscow was the most important source of practical experience with active 
acoustics available to the RFZ. Chiefly intended for large political meetings but also used for 
concerts, this large auditorium was already more than a decade old but had an electro-acoustic 
installation that was advanced for its time. Steinke and other members of the RFZ workgroup 
made a trip to see the 6,000 seat Soviet auditorium in November 1973.100  First completed in 
1961, the Kremlin Palace was large in volume (54,000 m3) and capacity but relatively 
traditional in its layout with a proscenium, stalls and balcony. The timing of the trip was 
fortuitous as the venue had undergone some technical upgrades to transistorised systems in the 
previous months and further technical upgrades were being planned for the following year.101 
The auditorium had a relatively short reverberation time for its size of 1.5 seconds between 
125 Hz and 4 kHz, suitable for its primary usage for mass meetings and conventions.102 
Reliance on sound reinforcement for speech transmission was integrated into the acoustic 
design and accommodation for musical performance was made using ambience-enhancing 
loudspeakers installed along the ceiling and side and rear walls.103 The Kremlin Palace’s main 
sound reinforcement system consisted of five loudspeaker arrays installed above the stage 
proscenium, without any distributed elements. The stage was divided into five areas and the 
audio signal from these areas was distributed to the corresponding loudspeaker array. Based 
on the principle of intensity stereophony that allows volume differences between stereo 
loudspeakers to be interpreted as directional information, the system was designed to radiate a 
sound field that maintained coherence and accurate localisation of the speakers on stage as it 
propagated across the audience area.104 The use of this approach as the organising principle of 
the Kremlin Palace sound system contrasts with the emphasis on audio delay to preserve 
coherence that characterised the development of experimental sound reinforcement systems in 
the West. While innovative in its scale and approach, the Kremlin Palace system’s ability to 
maintain source localisation and even sound levels across the whole auditorium was not 
consistent.105 Steinke found the visit to the Kremlin Palace helpful on several fronts, but its  
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Figure 4.4: A loudspeaker distribution plan for the Great Hall. GDR theoretical and manufacturing expertise 
created a multi-tiered technical solution to address the scale and flexibility of the venue, but internationally 
sourced components were also key.106 
 
 
relatively traditional layout in comparison to the Great Hall’s unconventional plan and its far 
more limited range of uses meant that the RFZ still needed to implement a lot of its own 
solutions. 107  The principles underlying the Kremlin Palace sound system also had clear 
limitations and did not align with the methodologies driving the RFZ’s DSS research or 
international sound reinforcement trends. The Soviets were accommodating in the analysis of 
their systems and were encouraging of the RFZ’s efforts to surpass its limitations.108 Reichardt 
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in particular was bullish about the potential to surpass every aspect of the acoustic design of 
the Kremlin Palace.109 Steinke was more reserved, particularly in regard to the limits of the 
Great Hall’s multipurpose intentions. He was adamant that the Great Hall would only be 
capable of providing a good acoustic for the recording of symphony hall and not for concert 
performance.110 
 
The DSS design coalesced steadily around principles that were different to those 
utilised by the Kremlin Palace and which are still commonly used by large distributed systems 
today. Instead of using intensity variations to transmit locational cues, DSS relied on audio 
delay to stagger the system’s sound emissions to align with the original sound source on stage. 
This allowed the RFZ workgroup enough flexibility to distribute the system’s loudspeakers 
quite widely within the Great Hall’s auditorium. A sense of the scale of the DSS installation 
and its wide distribution through the auditorium is given by the loudspeaker distribution plan 
reproduced in Figure 4.4. The manipulation of a variety of psychoacoustic effects gave 
designers enough leeway to maintain an artificial alignment between the visual and audio 
image experienced by the audience.111 As well as developing an overarching methodology 
based on consistent acoustic principles, the RFZ workgroup also had to develop a technological 
framework for DSS that could manifest their theoretical plans. TU Dresden took on major 
aspects of the technical research and sourcing of equipment associated with this.112 GDR-
manufactured audio equipment was emphasised in the original DSS design and the 
procurement of loudspeakers and amplifiers was relatively straight-forward due to a number 
of well-established GDR audio manufacturers. In June 1974 a provisional DSS layout for the 
Great Hall specified 278 individual loudspeakers to meet the projected requirements for 
coverage and sound level.113 The eventual number of speakers that were eventually installed 
exceeded 400, excluding the small loudspeakers incorporated into the seating. The large 
number of loudspeakers required by Great Hall led the RFZ workgroup to take the decision of 
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proceeding with a high-impedance system design. In contemporary usage high-impedance 
systems are more often used for distributed paging systems, rather than high quality broad-
band music systems, but this choice allowed all of the venues loudspeakers to be supplied by 
long cable runs from centrally located amplifiers.114 The RFZ workgroup collaborated with 
VEB Musikelectronic Geithain on the development of the V 736 100 V amplifier for this 
purpose.115 Musikelectronic Geithain is an audio company founded in the GDR in 1960 that 
developed increasingly high-end loudspeakers and audio equipment during the 1970s and 
1980s and which later successfully navigated the commercially tumultuous reunification of 
East and West Germany.116 The loudspeakers used in the Great Hall were of various types 
depending on their location and purpose, but they were all GDR-designed and manufactured. 
The primary loudspeakers used were Z 133s and Z 128s, variations of the Z 130 studio monitor 
developed by the RFZ.117 Some of the smaller supplementary loudspeakers came from VEB 
Gerätebau Limbach, known for its Heliradio brand of radio sets.118  
 
The ability to delay audio signals was just as critical to the technological framework of 
DSS as good quality loudspeakers, but it was considerably more difficult for the RFZ to procure. 
The technological development of methods for producing audio delay is important to 
understanding how distributed sound systems became possible, but also to how DSS ties into 
larger narratives of technological successes and failures in the GDR. During the 1950s and 
1960s, as the utility of audio delay for sound reinforcement purposes was starting to be 
understood, generating delayed audio signals reliably was technically difficult and many 
different methods were trialled. The experimental active acoustic venues cited earlier are again 
instructive here. Vermeulen used bespoke audio delay equipment to create the artificial 
ambience he needed for his stereo reverberation system.119  Vermeulen’s signal delay was 
achieved with a solid metal “delay wheel”; the rim of the wheel acted as a magnetic recording 
surface similar in practice to a magnetic tape loop. A recording head and multiple playback 
heads around the circumference of the wheel were aligned to create several discrete delay times 
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of the original signal. The delay wheel could generate between four and six separate lines of 
differentially delayed signals to produce the diffuse sound field within the auditorium. The 
RCA acoustoelectronic auditorium used two very different techniques - tape delay and acoustic 
delay - to offset the signals it distributed to the rows of loudspeakers it used.120 Acoustic delay 
in this instance entailed a speaker coupled to a length of pipe with microphones set to pick up 
the delayed sound at positions calibrated to correspond to the amount of delay required. 
Although tape delay quickly became a superior and more commonplace method, in 1959 the 
RCA’s acoustic delay method could achieve a better signal-to-noise ratio than its tape 
system.121 By the time DSS was being developed in the mid-1970s, digital delay units were just 
beginning to become commercially available. However, audio peripherals and effects was an 
area where the GDR audio industry was relatively weak. In the late 1960s VEB Gerätebau 
Limbach was producing a spring reverb unit called the 0 750, but this was relatively unusual 
and the GDR was not producing any analogue or digital delay units during the mid-1970s.122 
This was not a problem that was particular to the GDR; the Kremlin Palace also relied on 
Western delay units.123 The RFZ’s short-term solution was to import the delay units it required 
and Danish Lyrec 7202s were initially considered.124 These were eventually passed over and 
by the end of 1974 TU Dresden specified the West German-made EMT 440 instead, after also 
considering Austrian AKG units.125 It was not a damning indictment of GDR industry that it 
could not produce a digital delay unit in 1974 – at that time digital delay was cutting-edge and 
its use was highly specialised. As the 1980s progressed and delay units used for subsequent 
DSS installations were consistently sourced from the West, this did become more indicative of 
terminal trends within the broader GDR electronics industry. Even then, as discussed below, 
the RFZ was agile enough to develop advantageous relationships with Western manufacturers 
that helped to considerably extend the reach of DSS. 
 
 
4.5  Installation and Reception of DSS  
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Steinke and Reichardt largely maintained their relative opinions of the capabilities of DSS in 
the run-up to its installation. Reichardt wrote: 
 
Sie ist neuartig. Auch deshalb kann ihre Bedeutung nicht aus ähnlich gelagerten 
Projeckten abgeleitet warden. Die Gefahr der Unterbewertung liegt selbst für einen Teil 
der Fachleute auf der Hand. 126 
 
It is novel. That is why its significance cannot be inferred from similar completed 
projects. The risk of underestimation is clear even to some of the professionals. 
 
Steinke remained more reserved and was particularly adamant that the Great Hall could not be 
considered to be the equivalent of a dedicated “Konzerthaus Berlin”. Nonetheless he affirmed 
that DSS “den maximalen Kompromiß verwirklichen zu helfen” (“would help realise the best 
compromise”).127 Steinke communicated his wariness regarding the Great Hall’s multi-purpose 
role to Reichardt directly, writing:  
 
Allerdings wird die konfiguration im Saal ohnehin zu manchem Kompromiß zwingen. 
Die Praxis wird zeigen, was mehr geschätzt wird.128 
 
In any case, the configuration of the hall will force many compromises. Practice will 
show what is more esteemed. 
 
RFZ research was confidential by default, but the excitement surrounding the project and its 
innovative nature was enough to compel Steinke to issue a memo reminding staff of its 
sensitivity. 129  Staff were permitted to allude to DSS in general terms at conferences and 
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The run up to the opening of the Palast der Republik received substantial coverage in 
the GDR media. From its initiation the project was emphasised as the “Palace of the People” 
and the valorisation of its construction teams was a big feature of media coverage during its 
construction with portraits of labourers displayed in the street during its construction.130 During 
the construction period the builders and contractors were featured in newspaper articles that 
emphasised the speed and efficiency of the process and the dedication of the workers to the 
socialist values the Palast der Republik emblematised.131  VEB Sächsischer Brücken- und 
Stahlhochbau Dresden (SBS) was the firm responsible for the installation of lifts and escalators 
and other general services, but it also handled the installation of the stage machinery and 
seating for the Great Hall itself.132 SBS had previously made theatrical installations at the 
Maxim-Gorki Theatre in Moscow. SBS was able to claim that “die gesamte Technik für den 
Großen Saal liefern ausnahmslos Betriebe unserer Republik” (“all the equipment for the Great 
Hall was supplied without exception by companies of our republic”).133 The RFZ came close 
to being able to make a similar claim for DSS, with the EMT audio delay units being the most 
significant exception. Despite the major acoustic challenges posed by the Great Hall’s 
substantial configurability and the GDR’s general eagerness to fixate on technological 
solutions, DSS was not a feature of general coverage of the Palast der Republik. While good 
acoustics were often cited as an important goal in general terms, this was often in the same 
breath as comments about the building’s advanced air-conditioning facilities.134 The link made 
by the media between the Palast der Republik’s cultural function and its construction teams 
remained prominent after its completion. The expansion of a pre-existing concert series for 
building labourers became a conspicuous part of the Great Hall’s programme and was a useful 
way to demonstrate the ability of the new venue to serve multiple cultural constituencies. These 
concerts also expand the terms of evaluation for the suitability of the Great Hall as a venue for 
classical music performance. 
 
DSS was installed in the Great Hall during the early months of 1976 and testing began 
in March. By 27 March the full system was used for a number of technical rehearsal shows,  
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Figure 4.5: View of the Great Hall in one of its larger configurations preparing for a musical performance 
during the early 1980s. The primary loudspeaker hangs are visible across the top of the picture, interspersed 
among the venue’s adjustable triangular plafonds. The venue’s mixing desk is also visible at bottom centre.135 
 
 
the project’s building and contracting staff in attendance by way of reward. 136  These 
preparatory shows were rehearsed in the venue from 21-25 March and included a children’s 
choir, a Schlager band and a ballet performance with a pre-recorded musical backing.137 These 
shows were presented in the 3,800 seater “panorama” seating configuration and helped inform 
final technical decisions, such as the installation of additional speakers along the front stage 
edge to reach some back-row seats considered to be in the shadow of the main loudspeaker 
groups.138 TU Dresden also made impulse recordings to assess the final characteristics of the 
auditorium. 139  Assessments of the system continued in the run-up to the venue’s official 
opening shows at the end of April.140 The venue’s official opening productions were of a larger 
scale to the March shows and were preceded by another period of intensive rehearsal and 
technical calibration. The opening gala program included several of Rundfunk DDR’s string 
ensembles and its choir, along with several ballet companies, theatre groups and a Soviet blues 
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orchestra. The official opening production was held on 23 April and was also used as the first 
opportunity to trial the venue’s facilities for radio and TV outside broadcasting.141 Figure 4.5 
gives a good sense of the venue in its heyday. 
 
The first prestige classical music event at the Great Hall was the launching in May 1976 
of a new concert series specific to the Palast der Republik, “Orchester der Welt”. The large 
audience capacity of the Great Hall allowed this series to be framed as a new departure in 
audience outreach.142 The series was opened by the Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra under Kurt 
Masur playing a programme of Strauss’ Don Juan, Prokofiev’s Piano Concerto No. 3 and 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 7, with the overture from Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von 
Nürnberg as an encore. The concert was also the first rigorous test of DSS’s claims to acoustic 
flexibility. DSS was able to extend the reverberation time of the Great Hall to up to two seconds, 
in theory making it suitable for symphony orchestra performance.143 Initial critical reactions to 
the Great Hall’s concert acoustic made allowances for the unusual surroundings. The critic in 
the Neue Zeit, Eckart Schwinger, credited Masur for wrestling with the unfamiliar sound.144 In 
the Berliner Zeitung, Hans-Peter Müller gave a balanced appraisal, praising the audibility and 
clarity of the venue, but lamenting how a sense of distance detracted from the experience of 
the performance:  
   
Die Akustik deckte den Orchesterklang nicht zu, vermittelte von ihm ein recht 
anschauliches Bild, nicht zuletzt in den Instrumentalsoli, wenn auch der Hörer bei 
solchen Entfernungen zu den Ausführenden sich nicht direkt einbezogen und 
angesprochen fühlt, mehr Betrachter als Beteiligter ist. 145 
 
The acoustic did not obscure the orchestral sound, conveying a very vivid picture, not 
least for the instrumental solos, even if the listener is at such a distance from the 
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performers that they don't feel directly involved and addressed, and are more of a 
beholder than a participant. 
 
The Orchester der Welt series was designed to bring major symphony orchestras to East Berlin. 
It continued in November 1976 with the visit of the Leningrad Philharmonic under Yevgeny 
Mravinski with a Shostakovich programme consisting of his fifth and sixth symphonies. 
Schwinger was admiring of Mravinski and the orchestra but began to share Müller’s sense of 
alienation, while also directly identifying the Great Hall’s technical acoustic system as 
problematic: 
 
Wenn einiges zu verhalten, klanglich zu kühl wirkte, man sich nicht immer unmittelbar 
hineingenommen fühlte in das musikalische Geschehen, ist das auf die Akustik, die 
noch nicht befriedigende Übertragungstechnik des Saales zurückzuführen.146 
 
If a lot were to improve, the sound was too cool, one did not always feel directly 
involved in the musical occurrences, due to the acoustic, the still not yet satisfactory 
transmission technology of the hall. 
 
 
Müller and Schwinger continued to expand their critiques of the Great Hall’s concert 
acoustic in 1977. At the Berlin Music-Biennale in 1977 with the Rundfunk Sinfonie Orchester 
Berlin, Müller reported: 
 
Man sah zwar mit dem Auge den intensiven Einsatz des Orchesters, hörte aber über 
Verstärkeranlage eine verschwommene und undifferenzierte Klangwiedergabe… 
Jedenfalls beeinträchtigten hallige Lautsprechereffekte sehr stark die klanggewaltige 
und abschließend dargebotene Prokofiew-Sinfonie.147  
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One could indeed see with the eye the intensive commitment of the orchestra, but heard 
over the amplifier system a blurred and undifferentiated sound reproduction… In any 
case, echoing loudspeaker effects severely impacted the sonorous and concluding 
Prokofiev Symphony. 
 
At a subsequent Biennale concert by the Rundfunk Sinfonie Orchester and Rundfunk Chor, 
Schwinger stepped-up his criticism of DSS:  
 
Daß dabei viel von der einkomponierten dynamischen Differenziertheit und 
Klangfarbenfeinheit verloren ging, ist auf die stark übersteuerte elektro-akustische 
Saalbeschallung zurückzuführen, bei der zum Beispiel die hohen Streicher wie 
elektrische Geigen klangen.148  
 
Here much of the intended dynamic differentiation and fineness of sound-colour was 
lost due to the strongly overdriven electro-acoustic sound system, in which, for example, 
the high strings sounded like electric violins. 
 
 
Schwinger and Müller’s direct references to the sound reinforcement system suggest 
that the degree to which DSS was contributing to the Great Hall’s concert acoustic was 
increasing, perhaps to address the critiques of the concert acoustic as dry, but with a detrimental 
result. The progression in their critiques from a recognition of the auditorium’s clarity, but with 
an associated sense of distance that was perhaps unavoidable given the venue’s large scale, to 
a situation where DSS was negatively impinging on orchestral performances, allows a number 
of inferences. Steinke’s views on the limitations on the system were confirmed, but the 
problematic experiences Schwinger and Müller described in 1977 are suggestive of operating 
problems as much as systematic ones. It was never likely that the Great Hall and DSS could 
together create a sense of inclusivity similar to that attained by a venue like the Berliner 
Philharmonie. The Berliner Philharmonie was exclusively directed towards that purpose and 
even features like its warm colour scheme have been identified as contributing factors – in 
tandem with its acoustic design and seating layout – in the creation of a powerfully positive 
 




psycho-acoustic experience.149 The Great Hall was created to generate a different sense of 
inclusivity through continually re-shaping itself to host diverse forms of performance and by 
accommodating as large an audience as possible. For classical music concert performances – 
the performance form that required the most drastic acoustic divergence from its default 
passive acoustic – it succeeded in creating a functional acoustic, with psycho-acoustic 
limitations similar to those experienced at some of the most prestigious new dedicated concert 
halls of the previous twenty-five years. The malleability of DSS, however, also allowed for 
misuse.  
 
While East Berlin still required a Konzerthaus to serve the traditional requirements of 
its dedicated classical performance audience, the Great Hall found a role as a venue for staging 
classical performances for new audiences. The Great Hall began to be used to continue an 
outreach concert series that was begun in 1968 and which involved the Rundfunk Sinfonie 
Orchester Berlin and a number of East Berlin building collectives. The initiative involved pre-
concert talks and performances at venues like the Kongresshalle am Alexanderplatz and the 
Volksbühne. 150  The programmes for these concerts initially prioritised repertoire with 
entertainment value but positive experiences encouraged the programming of more “serious” 
works. Reporting on the expansion of the series, the Neues Deutschland commented:  
   
“Vorsichtig” wurden die ersten Programme disponiert. Sogenannte unterhaltende 
Musik (die bekanntlich dennoch nützlich und anregend sein kann, wenn sie gut ist) 
stand am Beginn. Doch bald konnten die Berliner Sinfoniker ihr neues Publikum auch 
durchaus mitten in ihr eigentliches Arbeitsfeld führen.151 
 
The early scheduled programs were "cautious". So-called light music (which, as we 
know, can still be useful and stimulating, when it is good) was the starting point. But 
soon the Berliner Sinfoniker were able to lead their new audiences right into the middle 
of their actual field of work. 
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From 1974 contemporary compositions were included in the programme and this was 
interpreted as a positive indicator of the degree to which the builders were engaging with the 
series. The transferring of the concert series to the Great Hall with its increased capacity was 
viewed as essential to the expansion of what was already a successful outreach initiative.152 
The Great Hall found other concert roles to which it was well suited. The GDR consistently 
sought to make a special claim on the music of Beethoven and characterised him as a proto-
social realist.153 Beethoven’s Ninth became part of a developing tradition of New Year’s Eve 
concerts at the Great Hall. The music director of the Rundfunk Sinfonie Orchester, Heinz 
Rögner, was taken with the Great Hall’s ability to house this celebratory moment, saying:  
 
Der Große Saal des Palastes mit seiner riesigen Platzkapazität… bewährt sich gerade 
bei der Neunten glänzend.154  
 
The Great Hall of the Palace with its huge capacity… is proving to be brilliant for the 
Ninth. 
 
The Great Hall’s shortcomings for dedicated classical music performance remained a sore point, 
but they could occasionally be overcome. A Berliner Sinfonieorchester performance under 
Günther Herbig in 1978 prompted Müller to report: 
 
Nach diesem konzertanten Leckerbissen folgte eine orchestrale Spitzenleistung: 
Brahms 4. Sinfonie in einer spannungsvollen und konzentrierten Wiedergabe, einer 
klugen und künstlerisch inspirierten Interpretation, bei der man selbst die akustischen 
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A top orchestral performance followed the concert appetisers: Brahms Symphony No. 
4 in a suspenseful and concentrated performance, a clever and artistically inspired 
interpretation, in which even the acoustic pitfalls of the hall could almost be forgotten, 
because the spark ignited the audience. 
 
There is some precedent for large novel auditorium forms with multi-use intentions requiring 
time to ascertain what they are and are not suited to – the Auditorium Theatre in Chicago and 
the Radio City Music Hall in New York both needed to reconfigure their usage to match their 
capabilities after problems with their original programmes long before the construction of the 
Great Hall.156 The Palast der Republik and its facilities were important contributors to the 
cultural fabric of East Berlin, but whether the reception of the Great Hall’s acoustic for classical 
music performance improved over the course of its usage requires further investigation. 
 
 
4.6  DSS beyond the Palast der Republik 
 
Despite the negative reception towards the Great Hall’s capacities as a concert hall, the RFZ 
considered DSS to be a technological and procedural success and began to publicise DSS in 
academic acoustics and sound engineering publications. They presented two papers on DSS at 
an acoustic conference in Bucharest in 1976 and DSS presentations were a regular occurrence 
at AES conferences in the US during the 1980s. Distributed sound systems were becoming 
more common during this period, and the opening of the Internationales Congress Centrum 
(ICC) in West Berlin in 1979 invites a comparison between what were the two largest indoor 
venues in East and West Berlin. The ICC and the Palast der Republik each had multiple 
functions, but both had 5,000 seat venues as their centrepieces with auditoriums that relied on 
sophisticated sound reinforcement systems. However, the motivations behind the ICC’s 
construction contrasted with those of the Palast der Republick; it was primarily a commercial 
exhibition and conference centre. The ICC auditorium’s design was also distinct. Unlike the 
Great Hall, the ICC auditorium had a linear boundary between the stage and the audience with 
a defined proscenium.157 The ICC auditorium was less pliable than the Great Hall in terms of 
seating and layout and its sound reinforcement system heavily prioritised conference and 
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discussion uses. One of the most distinctive elements of the sound system was a collection of 
spherical loudspeaker clusters suspended above the audience; a sophisticated switching system 
allowed the entire system to be time-aligned to a microphone positioned anywhere on the stage 
or in the audience.158 This aspect of the ICC had more in common with the conferencing system 
the RFZ installed in the Volkskammer plenary hall than the DSS configuration in the Great 
Hall. The ICC auditorium did steadily develop a cultural function as a concert venue and it did 
have technical features specific to this. A proprietary ambiophony system designed by Philips 
known as the Multi-Channel Amplification of Reverberation System was installed to enhance 
the reverberation of the venue. The venues share an interesting historical alignment. Opened 
within three years of each other, both buildings made significant use of asbestos in their 
construction. This contributed to the Palast der Republik’s eventual demolition and the ICC’s 
continued dereliction, although the fate of the Palast der Republik was also entangled with the 
politicking and infrastructural redevelopment of post-unification Berlin.159 The Great Hall was 
possibly more audacious than the ICC auditorium in its attempt to technologically address 
versatile acoustics, albeit with a varied degree of success, and the RFZ used DSS as a means 
to proselytise new acoustic possibilities and its own research capability. Despite the Palast der 
Republik and DSS preceding the ISS by several years, the West German venue was the RFZ’s 
most frequent point of reference as it publicised DSS as a commercial product and attempted 
to become a significant supplier of distributed sound systems for diverse uses.160 
 
DSS underwent continued development and refinement during the 1970s and 1980s as 
the RFZ sought to capitalise on its proprietary innovation.161 One of the greatest successes of 
this policy was the installation of a DSS system at the Palace of Culture in Prague in 1981. The 
Palace of Culture is smaller than the Great Hall, with about 3,000 seats over two levels. Its 
layout was more conventional, but it had similar multi-purpose intentions. Popular music 
events were planned to make up 40% of the annual programme, with orchestral concerts taking 
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up a much smaller proportion of the production calendar.162 The ambiophonic system installed 
at the Palace of Culture is noteworthy for being an assisted resonance system, similar to what 
was installed in the Royal Festival Hall during the 1960s.163 This departure from the approach 
used at the Great Hall was viewed as the safest solution for enhancing reverberation without 
colouring the sound. 164  After the system had been in place in Prague for several years, 
representatives of the Palace of Culture and the Radio and TV Research Institute, Prague, 
presented a paper to the 1985 AES conference on their experiences running the system.165 They 
admitted that there had been some reticence among the venue’s technical staff towards the 
system’s level of sophistication.166 This was the motivation behind a provision that allowed 
technical staff to switch the system to monophonic use, bypassing the DSS processing. The 
venue and its technical staff overcame their doubts and endorsed the system and its contribution 
to good sound localisation in the auditorium.167  Visiting sound engineers continued to be 
occasionally alienated by the system’s complexity. In particular, visiting rock bands touring 
their own stereo tower systems often hooked into the DSS in its mono configuration for the 
sake of simplicity.168 The Prague installation included the facility to use one of DSS’s most 
sophisticated capabilities: the active panoramic regulator. Regularly highlighted by the RFZ in 
DSS literature, the panoramic regulator referred to a facility whereby a sound engineer could 
actively track a moving sound source across the stage, with the system then distributing the 
signal to reproduce the physical movement in the sound field.169 The feature was infrequently 
used in Prague but continued to be promoted by the RFZ and was utilised for site specific 
theatre productions.170 
 
During the 1980s, DSS was used across Europe as the sound reinforcement system for 
a wide variety of theatre and television productions and several permanent installations. 
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Projects in Western Europe included an open-air theatre production at the Festspielhaus 
Bregenz in Austria and another open-air production at the Freilichtbühne Trachselwald in 
Switzerland.171 Prominent Eastern Bloc projects included the upgrading of the Kremlin Palace 
and the Semperoper Dresden.172 Given the continuing political alienation between East and 
West Germany during this period, uses of DSS in West Germany are particularly noteworthy. 
DSS demonstrated a startling circularity when it was trialled during January 1988 for Sender 
Freies Berlin in Sendesaal I at Haus des Rundfunks; where Hans Buttenberg had developed the 
original concept of delta stereophony during the early 1950s and the former home of Rundfunk 
DDR’s and the RFZ’s predecessor organisations.173 This trial was facilitated by a formal export 
arrangement between the RFZ and the West German Firma Dudda.174 Although Sender Freies 
Berlin did not pick up the system, it was installed in a new regional venue in West Germany in 
1989. This was the STADEUM Cultural and Conference Centre in Stade, 60 km from 
Hamburg.175 The Stade installation demonstrates DSS’s continued application to venues with 
diverse cultural programmes, but also a trend that defined DSS technologically during the 
1980s. As early as the Prague installation in 1981, DSS hardware was increasingly sourced 
from non-GDR manufacturers. The original DSS installation in the Great Hall was upgraded 
in 1986 and the main system was replaced with US-made Meyer Sound Lab UPA 1A 
loudspeakers powered by low-impedance Meyer amplifiers, supplied through Firma Dudda.176  
 
The RFZ’s role with DSS installations increasingly took the form of consultant. The 
Stade acoustic design was led by Elmar Maronn from Hamburg and the technical installation 
was overseen by Siemens with support from the RFZ DSS team.177 The technical hardware 
used at Stade had diverse national origins and included Siemens amplifiers, ElectroVoice DML 
1122 loudspeakers and a Harrison mixing desk. 178  However, the RFZ was continuing to 
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develop new hardware to improve DSS. The Prague installation utilised AKG delay units and 
this relationship developed into a close collaborative one. The Austrian company became a 
partner in the commercialisation of DSS and led the development of a hardware controller, the 
DSP 610.179 This hardware unit was designed to improve the flexibility of DSS by handling the 
audio delay and distribution centrally and make it independent of standalone audio delay 
units.180 The DSP 610 was the last major feature added to DSS, but production problems limited 
its distribution.181 While the progressive absence of GDR-manufactured technical equipment 
in DSS installations during the 1980s was indicative of shortcomings in the GDR audio 
industry, it also speaks towards the validity of the underlying system and the RFZ’s ability to 
form international technical relationships to maintain its viability. DSS was a proprietary 
design approach to sound reinforcement, which the RFZ could offer as the basis for developing 
bespoke solutions for managing sound in large or unusual venues and performance contexts. 
The centralised character of the design and construction of the Great Hall and DSS was typical 
of project management in the GDR, but it was unusual in the context of commercial sound 
reinforcement in the West. However, the RFZ was able to adapt to the Western commercial 
model by finding key partners to supply system components that it could not and to act as 
Western European representatives for DSS. This approach was sufficient to establish a 
commercial presence for DSS across Europe during the 1980s. 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall augured the dissolution and assimilation of East German 
broadcasting institutions into a pan-German service modelled on the West German federal 
system. In March 1990 the RFZ presented a paper on the Stade DSS installation at the AES 
conference in Montreux, before Rundfunk DDR was folded into the West German broadcasting 
apparatus and the RFZ was disbanded.182 In 1996 a paper written by Peter Fels – a contributor 
to the later development of DSS - published by the AES commemorated twenty years of DSS 
and updated the status of the system and its continued availability.183 Recent installations 
included a system at the Adler Planetarium in Chicago.184 Fels’ paper indicates that the rights 
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to the DSS license were by then held by the telecommunications company Deutsche Telekom. 
The rights were inherited by the company when it was formed in 1995 by the privatisation of 
the formerly state-owned West German Deutsche Bundespost, which had previously absorbed 
the East German Deutsche Post in 1990. Interest in DSS dwindled as new trends in sound 
reinforcement, such as line source arrays, began to dominate.185 However, DSS continued to 
be influential, notably through the work of one of its contributors, Wolfgang Ahnert. In 1990, 
Ahnert founded a private consultancy, Acoustic Design Ahnert, and applied his experience 
with DSS to new projects.186 Ahnert’s consultancy was successful and he was involved with 
the 1992 redesign of the Berliner Philharmonie’s mono loudspeaker cluster, where he used a 
DSS-type mixing matrix in the system design.187 In this way, the lifetime of DSS extended 
somewhat beyond that of its original home. 
 
 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
The socialist-inspired design principles that resulted in the unusual pairing of a parliamentary 
house and a publically accessible civic “palace” at Palast der Republik also found expression 
through the design of the Great Hall. This emerges most clearly in the venue’s combination of 
scale and flexibility, which was unprecedented in Germany. Many elements of the Great Hall 
broke with traditional venue design conventions and the solutions this required in terms of the 
creation of its acoustic were bespoke and highly technical. The operating principles and 
technical execution of DSS married internationally developed theories with a natively 
developed methodology and integrated the best-available GDR sound technology with key 
components from abroad. The conceptual work of the RFZ on DSS confirmed the ability of 
that organisation to envisage new potentialities and to deliver practical solutions. The 
improvement of DSS during the 1980s using Western audio equipment does place it alongside 
common narratives of technical decline in the GDR, but also problematises them. The RFZ 
was able to navigate a viable commercial path for DSS by developing relationships with 
Western audio hardware companies, promoting DSS in academic discourse and by delivering 
on installation contracts. DSS methods continued to have relevance in specialised acoustic 
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applications for some years after the end of the GDR and the demolition of the Palast der 
Republik and the Great Hall. 
 
DSS and the Great Hall also offer a perspective on the interplay between performance 
acoustics, politics and technology. The Great Hall’s scale, accommodation for diverse use and 
extreme dependence on new technologies position it as an outlier within the context of other 
post-war venue designs, but alignments persist. Post-war venues in London, New York, 
Moscow and West Berlin display similarly tumultuous and incomplete interchanges between 
politicised attempts to make additional cultural provision for broader publics, historical 
performance venue conventions and the limits of technology’s ability to enhance the design 
and flexibility of cultural spaces. The GDR had a generalised faith in the transformational 
power of technology and DSS and the Great Hall pushed at the limits of the capabilities of 
contemporary sound reinforcement technology in order to broaden the reach of classical music 
performance.188 However, this acoustic ambition was best applied to the Great Hall’s outreach 
purposes and did not signal a permanent departure from conventional classical music 
performance contexts in the GDR. Following on from the Kulturpalast Dresden, the fixed 
passive acoustic of the 1,900 seat Leipzig Gewandhaus concert hall, built in 1981, was well 
received. Perhaps of greater note, the lengthy process of securing a “Konzerthaus Berlin” 
culminated in the restoration of the Preußisches Staatstheater, renamed as the Berliner 
Sinfonie-Orchester (and known as the Konzerthaus Berlin since 1994) when it was reopened 
in 1984. The Berliner Sinfonie-Orchester notably shared its lead acoustician with the Great 
Hall, but Manfred Prasser’s vision for the reconfiguration of the war-damaged Preußisches 
Staatstheater as a dedicated concert hall stands in sharp contrast with his modernist hexagonal 
Great Hall. Prasser enforced a historicised restoration of Karl Friedrich Schinkel’s celebrated 
1821 auditorium, a move that suggested that the design of both historically proven and cutting-
edge settings for performance could coexist in the GDR’s cultural conceptions.189 Prasser’s 
throwback re-design has been consistently celebrated. 190  Internationally, the uneasy 
relationship between classical music, opera performance and technological enhancement 
remains unresolved and under-discussed.191  
 
188 Thomas A. Baylis, ‘Explaining the GDR’s Economic Strategy’, International Organization 40, no. 2 (1986): 
385, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027181. 
189 Susan Doubilet, ‘Rebuilt from the Ashes’, Progressive Architecture, no. 67 (November 1986): 96. 
190 Beranek, Concert Halls and Opera Houses. 
191 Anthony Tommasini, ‘Microphones Gone, Natural Sound Returns to City Opera’, The New York Times, 4 
November 2009, sec. Music, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/arts/music/05sound.html; Thompson, The 
Soundscape of Modernity, 324. 
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Chapter 5:  
System 2000 and Digital Audio Technology in the GDR, 1975-1990 
 
Das System 2000 ist ein modular gegliedertes System aus Funktionseinheiten und  
Mikrorechnerbaugruppen auf der Basis höher integrierter Schaltkreise zum Aufbau von 
tonstudiotechnischen Einrichtungen unterschiedlichen Automatisierungsgrades für die 
verschiedenen Prozesse (Produktions-, Abmisch- und Abwicklungsprozesse) in 
Rundfunk und Fernsehen.1 
 
System 2000 is a modular system consisting of independent units and integrated circuit-
driven microprocessor modules for the construction of audio engineering equipment of 
varying degrees of automation for the various technical processes (production-, mixing- 
and mastering-processes) of radio and television. 
 
The restoration of broadcasting in East and West Germany during the late-1940s and 
early-1950s was largely based on a shared technological foundation of 1930s-era Reichs 
Rundfunk Gesellschaft (RRG) designs. Surviving pre-war electronics manufacturers, and 
particularly their ability to manufacture electronic valves, were critical to the recovery of 
independent consumer and professional audio equipment-making in East Germany. The shared 
technical heritage between East and West Germany steadily diverged as each nation’s 
broadcasters followed broad technological developments under different circumstances and 
using different methods.2 The GDR was relatively unusual - particularly in an Eastern Bloc 
context - for the degree of technological independence it was able to maintain during the 
transition from valve- to transistor-based electronics and this facilitated it becoming a 
significant exporter of consumer electronics. 3  The 1960s saw the Rundfunk und 
Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt (RFZ) working synergistically with the GDR’s then-expanding 
electronics industry to develop a transistorised line of audio equipment - System 700 - that 
provided much of the technical infrastructure for recording and broadcasting in the GDR for 
 
1 Günther, ‘Einfuehrungskonzeption zur Entwicklung und Produktion des Systems 2000’ (Rundfunk und 
Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt, 18 January 1982), 4, 31/26/2/7, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
2 Gerhard Steinke and Gisela Herzog, Der Raum ist das Kleid der Musik: Musik-Aufnahmesäle und 
Hörspielstudios im Funkhaus Berlin-Nalepastrasse sowie weitere Aufführungs- und Hörräume (Berlin: Verlag 
Kopie & Druck Adlershof, 2012), 28. 
3 Bernhard Hein, Die Geschichte der Rundfunkindustrie der DDR, vol. 1 (Dessau: Funk Verlag Bernhard Hein, 
2002), 115. 
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almost thirty years.4 The System 700 line of equipment was successful and reliable, but by the 
early 1970s, the RFZ was already beginning to conceptualise the GDR’s next generation of 
audio equipment.5 Recording technology and practice progressed rapidly during the 1970s; 
recording sessions became more complicated as the number of tracks that could be 
simultaneously recorded to tape steadily increased. Towards the end of the 1970s, private audio 
companies in the US began to make innovative use of industrial automation principles to 
manage large recording desks and complicated sessions.6 As digitally-controlled automation in 
the US rapidly improved, its application to analogue recording processes quickly became an 
accepted part of high-end audio recording. From around 1975 the RFZ began to actively seek 
a path towards adopting automation and digitised approaches for managing audio.7 In the early 
1980s, this led to the commencement of the System 2000 project.  
 
The inclusion of digital technology elements in the System 2000 schema made it a 
historically significant technological progression for the RFZ, at least equal in magnitude to 
the valve/transistor crossover it had previously navigated and substantially more research-
intensive. System 2000’s digital elements set it against the backdrop of large-scale efforts to 
develop GDR information technologies during the 1970s and 1980s. From as early as the 1960s, 
one of the enduring characteristics of the IT industry in the GDR was a degree of disconnect 
between politically-directed technological goals and the impact the resulting technologies 
actually had on reforming conditions within the GDR itself. 8  Most of the high-end IT 
equipment manufactured in the GDR was set aside for export and contributed little appreciable 
benefit to GDR industry or bureaucratic rationalisation.9 The RFZ’s efforts to create digital 
audio technologies did coincide with increased efforts to disseminate GDR-manufactured 
microprocessors and other electronics components among domestically, with the intention of 
enabling GDR manufacturers and technical organisations to independently self-develop new 
 
4 Steinke and Herzog, Der Raum ist das Kleid der Musik, 29; Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: 
Technology and Change in East Germany 1945-1990, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology 
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 95. 
5 ‘Zur Konzeption einer neuen Tonstudiotechnik’ (Rundfunk und Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt, 1971), 
31/26/2/3, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
6 Dave Harrison, ‘Automation “Dither”’, Recording Engineer/Producer, April 1977. 
7 Gerhard Steinke, ‘Neue Tontechnik Grundinformation: Zur Entwicklungskonzeption einer 3. Generation 
Tonstudiotechnik’ (Rundfunk und Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt, 6 June 1975), 31/26/2/4, Deutches Rundfunk 
Archiv. 
8 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus : Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 265. 
9 Gary Geipel, ‘Politics and Technology in the German Democratic Republic, 1977-1990’ (ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing, 1993), 223, http://search.proquest.com/docview/304029441/?pq-origsite=primo. 
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equipment and systems to rationalise processes in their respective industries.10 As major GDR 
IT organisations like Zeiss and Robotron produced derivative emulations of IBM-type 
computers that were mostly exported to Eastern Europe, System 2000 is an example of a high-
end digital technology that originally had no plans for distribution beyond the GDR. System 
2000’s primary impetus was to modernise the GDR’s own broadcasting, recording and sound 
reinforcement apparatus in line with international technological developments. System 2000 
also contrasts with concurrent development work conducted by the RFZ, due to the degree to 
which it was dependent on domestic GDR electronics. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the RFZ 
was able to augment international installations of its DSS sound reinforcement solution using 
Western audio technology and co-developed a digital processor with AKG. The GDR’s leading 
politician during the 1970s and 1980s, Erich Honecker, actively discouraged joint IT ventures 
with Western firms, a policy not shared by other Eastern European nations.11 Additionally, 
technology export restrictions from the West to the Eastern European Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) meant the System 2000 design was almost completely 
locked-in to the electronics components output of the native GDR IT industry. The RFZ had 
little recourse when specific components were consistently unavailable other than to rely on its 
own ability to develop workarounds. General deficiencies with the development and supply of 
GDR electronics contributed to difficulties with the completion of System 2000 during the late 
1980s and were indicative of an impending development ceiling in the GDR IT industry. 
Similar to other areas of high-tech development, System 2000 hardware did not survive the 
dissolution of the GDR and the flooding of the Eastern Bloc with cheap and superior-quality 
electronics components and equipment. However, personnel involved with the System 2000 
programme were able to apply their expertise to commercially viable digital audio projects 
applications in reunified Germany, shortly after the demise of the GDR and the RFZ. 
 
 
5.1  Valves, Transistors and Automation 
 
By the time the System 2000 project was being first envisaged, the GDR’s broadcasting and 
audio industries had already weathered several major technical challenges and technological 
transitions. During the immediate post-war period, the first broad challenge they faced was the 
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reestablishment of the pre-war technological paradigm. Surviving Reichs Rundfunk 
Gesellschaft valve-based equipment dating from the 1930s and 1940s was an important 
contributor to restoration efforts and newly constructed professional and consumer audio 
equipment in the early post-war years largely followed these designs. The survival of two small 
former-Telefunken valve factories in Erfurt and Neuhaus am Rennweg is an important example 
of infrastructural remnants that helped enable the restoration of an independent electronics 
industry in East Germany.12 Post-war electronics innovations worldwide initially focussed on 
improving and miniaturising existing valve designs. While the GDR was not in lock-step with 
the progress of valve miniaturisation in the West, by 1952 it was producing new series of 
smaller valves using its own designs. 13  This helped the forerunner of the RFZ, the 
Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk und Fernsehen to design updated valve-based audio 
equipment during the 1950s, collectively known as System 200.14 System 200 was an interim 
design, largely based on RRG heritage-designs, but it had improved components and its smaller 
dimensions allowed System 200 units to be directly installed into desks - rather than rack-
mounted. 15  As Rundfunk DDR consolidated its medium-wave broadcasting network and 
introduced FM-broadcasting during the 1950s and early 1960s, this was largely enabled by 
GDR technology and equipment. Rundfunk DDR’s first stereo recording desk, as previously 
detailed in Chapter 3, was a notable exception, with the RFZ relying on the import of some 
Western components to allow it construct the Mehrkanalregie stereo desk. However, recording 
desks subsequently installed at Funkhaus Berlin were generally RFZ-designed and constructed 
with predominantly GDR-sourced components, as Western electronics became increasingly 
difficult and expensive to procure. The Mehrkanalregie stereo desk was also the last valve-
based recording desk installed at Funkhaus Berlin, as transistor technology became ubiquitous 
during the 1960s. 
 
Transistors – first developed by Bell Labs in the US in 1947 - rapidly eclipsed valves 
for most electronics applications. They were smaller, more powerful and lent themselves better 
to mass-scale reproduction. The transformative potential of transistors for organising industry 
and bureaucracy was tantalising to GDR economic planners and the development of transistor 
manufacturing in the GDR was prioritised. 16  The US remained for decades the leading 
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innovator and producer of transistors, but close post-war ties aided Western Europe in keeping 
pace with developments.17 The introduction of transistors to the GDR began in 1952 at the VEB 
Werk für Bauelement der Nachrichtentechnik in Teltow, but production did not begin until the 
mid-50s.18 It was not until 1963 that the GDR produced more than a million transistors in a 
year, by which time the US was producing hundreds of millions annually.19 Production rates 
of transistors in the GDR did improve during the 1960s and the GDR political apparatus made 
regular attempts to harness the symbolic value of the increasing availability of the 
domestically-produced consumer electronics that followed. For the GDR’s 20th anniversary in 
1969, a commemorative transistor radio with an integrated model of the Berlin Fernsehturm 
(Berlin TV Tower) on top was issued.20 Its GDR-specific design belied its dependence on Tesla 
circuit boards from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) due to a lack of domestic 
components that severely restricted its production run.21 Nevertheless, successive economic 
plans did lead to large increases in the production of transistors and this domestic production 
capability was crucial to the development of consumer and industrial electronics in the GDR.22 
Trade embargos on Comecon countries consistently restricted the export of high-end 
microprocessors and other electronics components into the Eastern Bloc, stymieing research to 
an extent, but also enhancing the value of the GDR’s efforts to its Eastern Bloc neighbours.23 
The later reversal of this situation following the opening of Eastern European markets to 
Western imports was impactful to the viability of System 2000 during its latter stages.  
 
Political directions by the SED during the early 1960s helped coordinate and develop 
the GDR’s electronics industry and the resulting improvement in domestic supplies of 
transistors and other electronics components facilitated the RFZ’s development and 
construction of a conceptually integrated system of transistor-based modular audio 
equipment.24 Known as System 700 and launched at the 1964 Leipzig Messe, System 700 was 
first installed in Saal 4 at Funkhaus Berlin the same year. 25  System 700 units initially 
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incorporated germanium transistors, before transitioning between 1968 and 1970 to silicon-
based components.26 System 700 became the dominant format for recording and broadcasting 
technology at Rundfunk DDR throughout the 1970s and 80s and was also used in GDR theatres 
and concert halls.27 The benefits of transistorised technologies were applied unevenly across 
GDR industry and society: a focussed effort to develop a highly-integrated circuit for 
producing one-chip transistor radios resulted in a high-tech gift for delegates of the tenth SED 
Parteitag in 1981, but public distribution was limited to a few hundred sets in Berlin’s hard-
currency Intershops. 28  Transistors were a key post-war technology and the independent 
research activities and technical expertise of the RFZ was central to their steady integration by 
Rundfunk DDR. While the GDR was not at the forefront in the development of 
microelectronics, the components it did produce were essential to the RFZ’s ability to enable 
this. System 700 represented a decisive technological break from a shared pre-war German 
audio technology heritage and confirmed the RFZ’s ability to apply new technologies to the 
requirements of GDR broadcasting and recording. As it approached the integration of digital 
control technologies to audio, it did so with a track record that was largely successful in 
executing effective designs that negotiated the inconsistencies of GDR electronics production.  
 
System 700 could be credited with the securing of the technical operability of Rundfunk 
DDR during the 1960s and 1970s, but, by 1971, the RFZ had already noted audio automation 
as a rising development trend.29 Initially, this trend was characterised more by preparatory 
theoretical work than practical application, but by the mid-1970s US audio companies were 
starting to integrate digital technologies into sound desks in innovative ways. Music Center 
Incorporated (MCI) was one of the pioneers in this area. In 1976 MCI released its JH-500 
studio recording desk. In 1977 MCI followed this with the JH-50 automation system, which 
combined with the JH-500 desk to provide a suite of automatable functions that could be used 
to recall session settings and drastically improve time-efficiency on complicated sessions.30 A 
rivalry between MCI and Harrison Consoles amid a generally competitive audio market led to 
rapid technological leaps in audio automation and the concept was soon standardised in high-
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end settings.31 Each company’s methods and digital processes were proprietary but they were 
emulated with increasing frequency and some general characteristics became common. MCI’s 
JH-50 trendsetting automation system could encode a variety of changes and edits made to a 
mix in real time by logging them alongside a digital timecode recorded to a dedicated channel 
on the session’s analogue tape reel, effectively synchronising the changes to the music.32 The 
recall of audio level changes was made possible by replacing conventional analogue resistive 
channel faders with voltage-controlled amplifiers (VCAs), which can have their relative values 
digitally encoded. VCAs were later augmented by moving fader automation, which allow 
channel faders to physically move autonomously to reflect previous automation passes. Audio 
automation approaches were diverse, but collectively they introduced a new degree of 
flexibility in controlling large numbers of audio channels. Audio manufacturers in Western 
Europe were close behind developments in the US: in 1977 Neve in the UK had its own 
automation system and Lawo in West Germany had commercial success with its PTR 
programmable sound desk during the 1980s.33 Although the RFZ articulated plans for its next 
generation of audio technology in 1975, it was outpaced by international developments and 
initially made little material process.34 An RFZ report from 1982 referred to System 700 and 
Rundfunk DDR’s current technological standing by saying “die Technik nun moralisch 
verschlissen ist” (“the technology is now morally worn out”).35 Resources began to be assigned 
towards addressing this situation and a generalised research project tasked with replacing 
System 700 steadily gained focus and coalesced under the title of System 2000.  
 
 
5.2  Preparing System 2000 
 
Following on from the pattern established by the RFZ’s successful approach towards designing 
System 700, System 2000 was envisaged as a modular system of audio units constructed using 
the best available domestic components. In line with a period of audio technology that was 
characterised by the hybridisation of analogue and digital elements, the audio signal path of 
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System 2000 remained completely analogue. However, the main advances and most notable 
features of System 2000 were the automatable aspects of the system powered by GDR-
designed micro-processors.36 Nonetheless, even the analogue sections of System 2000 were 
based on completely new designs and achieved marked improvements over System 700-era 
designs in terms of compactness and energy usage due to the upgraded components. While a 
project of this type fit the ideological GDR archetype of progression through technology, the 
RFZ and Rundfunk DDR were more preoccupied with practical concerns. The RFZ believed 
that the mixing of 16- to 24-track sessions under the time constraints common at Rundfunk 
DDR had become both physically and mentally unmanageable. In 1982 a bottleneck of 160 un-
mixed musical recordings was attributed to this cause.37 Automation had clear potential to offer 
substantial long-term benefits, but the RFZ was restricted in its ability to access Western 
examples. As related in Chapter 2, Deutsche Schallplatten was able to maintain pace with 
technical recording developments by importing Western audio equipment directly. This policy 
was effective as Deutsche Schallplatten could allocate hard currency from its international 
licensing agreements and its technical infrastructure, at its peak, consisted of just five recording 
studios. Technical upgrades were often applied initially to the Eterna recording studio at the 
Lukaskirche in Dresden and a single item of upgraded equipment was sometimes enough to 
ensure that Deutsche Schallplatten’s prestige recordings were not superseded by technical 
recording standards in the West. The scale of Rundfunk DDR’s technical infrastructure made 
enacting a similar policy unfeasible. Rundfunk DDR also did not have an independent supply 
of hard currency and import restrictions largely ruled out combining GDR components with 
imported Western components, as was done with the Mehrkanalregie stereo desk in the early 
1960s. Although System 700 provided a proven template for the RFZ to develop up-to-date 
audio technologies, the System 2000 development plan recognised that the research burden of 
the project was significantly more demanding than previous developments due to its digital 
and software requirements.38 The large research commitment demanded by the project could 
only be justified in the context of long-term development plans for the GDR’s audio technology 
infrastructure; the project’s title was not a mere serial number, System 2000 was designed to 
secure the technological basis for music recording and audio production in the GDR into the 
next century. An early projection anticipated the production of about thirty full-feature desks 
between 1995 and 2000, for use across Rundfunk DDR, Fernsehen der DDR, Deutsche 
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Schallplatten, DEFA, as well as GDR venues.39 System 2000 was also conceived as providing 
an important research basis for the generation of audio technology that would follow it, which 
the RFZ explicitly recognised would be wholly digital.40 
 
The scale of System 2000 as a research project and its reliance on GDR 
microelectronics in unproven capacities meant that collaboration with Eastern European 
partners was initially seen as a pre-requisite of the project during early planning stages.41 The 
ČSSR national electronics producer TESLA was touted as a collaborative partner in both the 
research and manufacturing aspects of the project and negotiations were initiated, but by 1980 
these plans were abandoned. 42  This was attributed to unspecified differences of opinion 
between the two organisations, but the issue of a shared design for System 2000’s chassis and 
rack mounting system may have been a contributor. The GDR had previously adopted the 
internationally widespread 19” rack-mount system and was continuing to develop a domestic 
version of this with its own name and standards: the Einheitliche Gefäßsystem (EGS). TESLA 
was developing its own ALMES system along similar lines. Although the rack-mount system 
was one of the more mundane elements of the System 2000 development, issues with the EGS 
development process impacted the RFZ’s preparations. In 1980 an EGS order never 
materialised and in 1982 it was only through unofficial channels that the RFZ discovered that 
development of the latest version of EGS had stalled.43 As a contingency the RFZ designed 
System 2000 to conform to older EGS standards and similar issues persisted throughout the 
development period.44 International collaboration on the System 2000 project was not seriously 
considered again and the application of System 2000 in settings beyond the GDR was not 
originally considered integral to the successful execution of the project. The decision not to 
prepare System 2000 for export had some subsidiary legal implications. Part of the RFZ’s 
standard operations was to monitor international developments and to identify relevant patents 
so that their own developments wouldn’t infringe on international copyright protections.45 
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Retaining System 2000 for domestic-usage only had a positive impact on the RFZ’s ability to 
clear international patents for use on System 2000.46 Even more integral to System 2000 than 
a consistent chassis standard were the capabilities of the GDR IT and electronics industries; 
the entire project was predicated on the domestic availability of high-end components and 
cooperation and assistance from expertise within the GDR.47 An increasing political focus on 
the GDR microelectronics industry from the late 1970s and the continuing expansion of the 
production of transistors and other components during the early 1980s were important factors 
in making the project appear feasible.48 Since the 1970s the two largest employers of research 
personnel in the GDR, Zeiss and Robotron, were both involved with microelectronics.49 Within 
cooperative frameworks such as Comecon, GDR information technology significantly 
narrowed existing technology gaps during this period and was developing computers and 
servers for commercial use as the System 2000 project was commencing.50  
 
The System 2000 research project was fully initiated in September 1981 with the 
commencement of preparatory training and the design and building of initial hardware 
components began around the same time.51 The nature of the technology demanded by the 
program, heavily reliant on microprocessor technology and computer programming 
capabilities, was a significant advance on the existing capabilities and experience of the RFZ. 
Despite the advanced character and broad scope of the project, the RFZ considered itself 
prepared but under-resourced, describing its existing research capacity as “optimierte, aber 
weiterhin eingeschränkte” (“optimised, but still limited”).52 The impending demands of System 
2000 required significant reprioritisation within the RFZ, particularly after 1982 when it 
stepped up its own research efforts in the absence of any major collaborative partners. The 
scope of the proposed research plan and limits on resources led several inter-connected projects 
to be run in parallel. Peripheral research projects were wound down and the ongoing production 
of System 700 equipment was curtailed as resources were pivoted towards the new project.53  
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Figure 5.1: The APA RBI radio production system in use during the mid-1980s. The system served as a test case 
for the viability of the development of a sophisticated family of music production equipment.54 
 
 
Computer programming research was prioritised but resource shortages were most apparent in 
this area.55 As the project became fully established, initial projections targeted the completion 
of a full-scale fully-featured production desk for 1988/1989.56 
 
System 2000 also had interim targets, largely focussed on radio production.57 During 
the mid-1960s Rundfunk DDR went through an expansion period with the opening of a new 
production block at the Funkhaus Berlin campus and by 1967 the broadcaster had 599 technical 
employees in Berlin alone. 58  This period was accompanied by generalised rationalisation 
efforts and the introduction in 1967 of Einmannbetrieb (One-man operation) for the technical 
production of all national radio programs broadcast from Berlin.59 System 2000 technology 
saw its first operational use in radio production as a continuation of these efforts in the early 
1980s. Radio production was seen from an early stage as an ideal location for trialling audio 
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equipment with digital automation elements. Automating radio production was seen as a 
modest goal that could be reached by the end of 1984 in a context that was less technically 
complicated or procedurally risky than Rundfunk DDR’s intensive music recording 
department.60 There was also the prospect of immediate returns on research investment as the 
RFZ foresaw large economising potential in applying System 2000 to radio production, 
predicting a saving of 8000 work hours per year across three national programmes due to 
enhanced procedural efficiency along with lower maintenance and power costs.61 The new 
system also incorporated a move to tape machines that ran at a slower speed - which offered 
further cost savings by using less tape - and had the potential to be applied to TV production 
with minor alterations.62 
 
The technical equipment developed for radio production work was initially known as 
the Automatisierte Produktionanlage - Rundfunk Berlin International (APA RBI) and its 
development was fully integrated with System 2000 research. In 1982 preparatory work on the 
APA RBI was used as the first opportunity to trial timecode protocols in the GDR.63 While the 
GDR had occasionally been slow in developing multi-track tape recorders, the tape machine 
used for the timecode trials was a domestic design: the R 722/1. The R 722/1 was an important 
component of System 2000 and it used international SMPTE protocols to interface between 
itself and the production desk.64 These early timecode experiments were important preparations 
for the larger System 2000 desk, which made far more extensive use of automation features. 
APA RBI equipment - shown in use in Figure 5.1 - had production trials in 1983 and was rolled 
out across radio production at Funkhaus Berlin over the following years according to a schedule 
reproduced in Figure 5.2.65 APA RBI equipment was the first major practical use of System 
2000 units and components and it also prompted the first instances of several problems that 
became characteristic of the larger research project. Supply problems with GDR-made 
components were frequent. Video monitors and Robotron K 1520 computer components were 
not delivered. 66  8-bit digital-analogue switchers required for VCAs were not available 
domestically; these were imported from Western suppliers at unsustainable expense.67 Very  
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Figure 5.2: A schedule for the roll-out of the APA RBI production system. This schedule was largely adhered to 
- despite production problems - vindicating the RFZ’s internal development model.68 
 
 
significant for the production of APA RBI, and to the basic electronic architecture of System 
2000 generally, was the persistent unavailability of operational amplifier components (op-
amps).69 Shortages of this particular component had direct implications for later System 2000 
designs. 
 
A distinctive feature of high-end GDR IT research and development during the period 
of System 2000’s development was a reliance on industrial espionage and black market 
procurement.70 High-tech GDR IT projects became increasingly reliant on these options to help 
circumvent shortcomings with its research and development programmes. Such avenues were 
not available to the RFZ and, apart from occasional opportunistic imports of Western 
components, it was left to rely on its own ingenuity to bypass the unavailability of fundamental 
components. Operational amplifiers, or opamps, were required by System 2000 to handle 
analogue switching in the desk.71 By the 1980s, due to automated processes, opamps were 
manufactured in the US in huge quantities at low cost, but those available to the RFZ 
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domestically were rejected due to low reliability.72 The RFZ took the approach of hybridising 
other available components to function as opamps. At one time, hybrid integrated circuits were 
seen internationally as a promising avenue in the further development of integrated circuits and 
they continue to be used for some specific applications. 73  However, they were generally 
considered obsolete for the purposes to which they were applied in the construction of System 
2000. Although the RFZ’s hybrid circuits were functionally identical to the opamps they stood 
in for, by necessity they were larger and heavier than the corresponding monolithic integrated 
circuit. This contributed to completed System 2000 units being larger and heavier than 
equivalent Western equipment. However, despite these disadvantages, hybrid circuits were 
critical to the continuation of System 2000’s development.  
 
The APA RBI roll-out across nine radio programmes was conducted between 1985-
88.74 Its development required a large expansion in the RFZ’s software development capacity 
that led to a broad collaboration with TU Dresden that remained important to the System 2000 
project.75 The RFZ was persistent in asking for more in-house research capacity, but out-
sourcing collaborations of this type remained the only available form of assistance. The 
completion of APA RBI desk was seen as the end of the first phase of System 2000 and a 
vindication of its basic technical and technological concepts.76 The RFZ was confident about 
its progress at this point and Gerhard Steinke, one of the most prominent figures within the 
RFZ, presented a paper on its introduction at the Audio Engineering Society’s 1986 conference 
in Switzerland.77  
 
 
5.3  Tonproduktionanlage System 2000 (TPA S2000) 
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General progress on the development of a large System 2000 system during the APA RBI phase 
was steady but slow. At the end of 1982, three out of eleven audio hardware projects were 
nearing completion.78 The remaining eight were expected to be completed by October 1983.79 
By 1986 the System 2000 project incorporated 75 device types in seven groups.80 In April 1985 
the RFZ’s progress was validated by the Staatliches Rundfunkkomitee (State Broadcasting 
Committee), which directed the RFZ to form a special work group to ensure the completion of 
System 2000.81 Most importantly, the committee committed itself as a customer of the project. 
Further conceptual work was completed by the start of 1986 and the project’s focus now tilted 
towards it primary goal, the design and delivery of a large prototype sound desk for multi-track 
music recording: the Tonproduktionanlage System 2000 (TPA S2000).82  The TPA S2000 
began to manifest physically in early 1986 with the construction of a prototype multi-fader unit 
for testing the mixing and group control automation functions.83 Examples of System 2000 
hardware modules are shown in Figure 5.3. While the broad conception and electronic 
architecture of the TPA S2000 remained relatively stable throughout its development, the exact 
specification of the intended prototype changed quite frequently. In February 1986 the first 
prototype was planned as a 24-channel desk, by August this had expanded to 32-channels.84 A 
48-channel “Typ B” configuration was also considered.85 In addition to 32 input-channels, the 
desk’s design at this point incorporated sixteen outputs to tape and eight control groups. The 
design was also the first in the GDR to incorporate in-line mixing, a feature for convenient 
monitoring from tape that became prevalent in music recording during the 1970s.  
 
The TPA S2000 prototype was the pinnacle of the System 2000 research plans and was 
designed to handle the demands of contemporary music recording sessions with extensive 
automation features in line with best international practice. Integrating the automation aspects 
of the desk was one of the most fraught elements of desk’s design. The TPA S2000 had several 
levels to its operational architecture. The most basic of these was the analogue circuitry that  
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Figure 5.3: A selection of individual System 2000 modules. In line with international approaches, the modules 




handled the audio signal path in a conventional fashion. The next two levels relate to the 
automatable functions of the TPA S2000, which were split into two categories: static 
automation and active automation. These were each handled by separate microprocessors. The 
desk’s second level was the integrated Desk Controller powered by an 8-bit micro-processor 
that handled the desk’s static automation.87 Static automation referred to the desk’s ability to 
recall certain settings - rotating encoders and non-latching switches could have their positions 
recalled automatically - and routing options.88 Fader positions could also be reset manually 
using LED indicators. This offered potential time-savings in the preparation or restoration of 
recording sessions. The desk’s top level was the Mix-computer, based on communication 
between a 16-bit microprocessor and tape-based timecode to control the desk’s active 
automation functions.89 Active automation could ease the burden on the engineer during the 
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88 Sisolefski and Förster, ‘Das automatisierte Abmischen mit S2000-Programmproduktionsanlagen’ (Rundfunk 
und Fernsehtechnisches Zentralamt, 19 September 1986), 5, 31/26/2/7, Deutches Rundfunk Archiv. 
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mixing stage by recalling operations made in real-time.90 The design and construction of the 
System 2000 digital hardware that powered its static and active automation was largely 
conducted in-house by the RFZ, but relied on generic GDR micro-processors. 91  The 
microprocessors were not specialised for the RFZ’s purposes and relied on creative 
programming to make them suitable to their tasks. The availability of these microprocessors 
was problematic. In 1986 Robotron ceased supplying its K 1520 8-bit chip, but without 
commencing supply of the succeeding MMS16 16-bit chip.92 The MMS16 chip was a major 
milestone for microprocessor development in the GDR and it was particularly important to the 
System 2000 architecture as the K 1520 8-bit chip used for the TPA S2000’s static automation 
was considered too slow to run the desk’s auto-mixing capabilities.93 The MMS16 also made 
better provision for future expansion of the desk’s automation capabilities, including the 
possibility of upgrading to automated moving faders.94  The MMS16 chip was planned to 
become available to GDR companies in the mid-1980s, but by the end of 1986 the RFZ was 
still unable to procure it.95 Delays in securing microprocessors also impacted the RFZ’s in-
house software development.96 
 
As a concession to reliability in the broadcasting arena and to dissuade any distrust of 
the new digital paradigm, the TPA S2000 could maintain full manual operability if there was 
a computer failure, but its enhanced utility and the justification for its research and 
development costs was predicated on the efficiencies derived from its automation capabilities. 
An estimate from 1985 predicted that System 2000 equipment would cost three time the 
equivalent System 700 device, but that the added functionality would make it doubly as 
efficient.97  Although the TPA S2000’s automation features were considered critical to its 
viability, its independent analogue components were also seen as important for its  
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Figure 5.4: A 1985 plan for Rundfunk DDR’s migration from System 700 to the various analogue and digital 
System 2000 configurations. The plan demonstrates the range of uses the new equipment was intended for.98 
 
 
dissemination in the GDR beyond Funkhaus Berlin. System 2000 was intended to guarantee 
operational security across the GDR’s audio industry by providing coverage for all usage areas 
of sound technology; from recording and broadcast to live sound. 99  The RFZ was also 
optimistic that System 2000 would appeal to the private music recording studios that were 
beginning to emerge in the GDR during the 1980s.100 A universal standard for audio equipment 
in the GDR had long been advocated by the RFZ and partly achieved during the 1960s and 
1970s with System 700.101  This could be maintained and enhanced by the flexibility and 
interoperability of System 2000 audio units. This flexibility was also important from an 
economic point of view; the broad applicability of the system across the various GDR sound 
industries would validate the large research effort and costs and secure an audio production 
process for the GDR independent of expensive Western equipment. To enable this wide 
dissemination, from around 1986 it was proposed that two lines of development would follow 
on from the first large System 2000 prototype: System 2000 Digital and System 2000 
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Compact.102 System 2000 Digital would be the full-featured larger-scale product line utilising 
both digital and analogue units. System 2000 Compact was essentially a more basic line of 
analogue-only equipment that could directly replace System 700 for purposes that did not 
require automation – a plan for the staged crossing over of these systems is reproduced in 
Figure 5.4. These plans for a subsidiary System 2000 line were prone to change year on year, 
but became of much greater significance to the integrity of the whole project in its latter stages 
due to external circumstances.  
 
 
5.4  Rethinking System 2000 
 
While there was optimism within the RFZ during the mid-1980s regarding its progress with 
System 2000, there were also accompanying reservations. In 1986, Wolfgang Hoeg, an 
important contributor to System 2000, observed steady improvements in the audio hardware 
available in West Germany, with the TPA S2000 still several years from completion.103 Hoeg’s 
observations also led him to a fatalistic observation of the RFZ’s ability to surpass System 2000 
and to oversee a technological transition to a “fourth generation” digital audio paradigm: 
 
Der Vergleich des internationalen Entwicklungstandes mit der in der DDR gegebenen 
materiell-technischen Basis führt auch zu diesem Zeitpunkt zu der Feststellung, daß für 
das RFZ die Entwicklung einer 4. Generation noch nicht möglich ist, sowie daß der 
Schritt zur 4. Generation über eine 3. Generation unvermeidbar und notwendig ist.104  
 
Comparison of the international state of development with the material-technical base 
in the GDR leads to the conclusion that at this time the development of a fourth 
generation is not yet possible for the RFZ, although the step to the fourth generation 
from the third generation is inevitable and necessary.   
 
There were mixed indicators elsewhere in GDR electronics that year. The GDR radio 
industry reached a meaningful milestone with the arrival of a dependable integrated circuit, the 
A 283 D, which allowed the production of large numbers of the GDR’s first radio/alarm- 
 
102 Sisolefsky and Klaus, ‘Qualitätsparameter des Tonkanals in Programmproduktionsanlagen des System 2000’. 
103 Schöneberg and Hoeg, ‘Parameter Produktionsanalagen S 2000 (Kurzfassung)’, 8. 
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Figure 5.5: A 1982 research and production schedule for the System 2000 project. This schedule envisaged 
finalisation of the TPA S2000 in 1988/1989. The RFZ’s research and development processes were outpaced 
internationally, but despite major setbacks it was only a year or two behind its own early schedules.105 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The prototype TPA S2000 with missing modules undergoing preliminary trials c. 1989. The desk 
was approaching completion as political circumstances profoundly altered the context within which it was 




105 Günther, ‘Einfuehrungskonzeption zur Entwicklung und Produktion des Systems 2000’, Anlage 1. 
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clock.107 Hoeg was confident that the TPA S2000 would meet its functional requirements and 
match the audio standards of the RFZ, but he also acknowledged that it was not likely to match 
international standards on secondary parameters such as power consumption, weight or size.108 
Hoeg accepted this as a compromise to allow medium-term goals to be achieved in constrained 
circumstances, but his accurate prediction regarding the development of digital audio in the 
GDR would be compounded by delays to the completion of the TPA S2000 and political and 
economic developments that completely altered the specific circumstances within which it was 
viable.  
 
When the earliest conceptual forms of System 2000 were first mooted by the RFZ 
during the early 1970s, the organisation could only identify two audio manufacturers that were 
actively working towards similar forms of audio automation.109 By 1989 automation was much 
more commonplace and the RFZ’s forward-thinking had been long surpassed by practical 
progress among a broad range of audio developers in the West.110 While the reality was that 
the RFZ was off the pace of international technological developments, it was not far behind its 
own projected schedule. Early System 2000 project schedules - an example of which is 
reproduced in Figure 5.5 - predicted a decade-long research process and the completion date 
for the TPA S2000 remained fairly consistent throughout. This long development schedule 
meant that the TPA S2000 prototype was approaching its final preparatory phases, while the 
Berlin Wall was brought down and the GDR’s borders to Western Europe were reopened. 
Within six months, the RFZ was forced to admit “nicht unerheblich auf die Arbeiten an der 
“TPA S2000” waren die politischer Ereignisse 1989” (“the political events of 1989 were not 
irrelevant to the work on the TPA S2000”).111 The Wende had broad but uncertain implications 
for the market position of System 2000. The future role of the GDR’s broadcasting apparatus 
- System 2000’s primary customer - was initially undecided. The marketing of System 2000 
for foreign export, for years excluded from its development plan, suddenly became critical to 
new survival plans. At the same time, the currency and embargo conditions that might have 
made it appealing to Eastern European markets were rapidly dissipating. There were also 
shortcomings with System 2000 itself; Figure 5.6 shows the incomplete prototype undergoing 
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testing during this period. Although the TPA S2000 was close to completion, after a decade of 
research and development the RFZ could only point to sections of Rundfunk DDR’s radio 
production facility for working examples of its new designs. System 2000 remained an 
unproven product line that was still being assembled piecemeal by the RFZ’s in-house 
development team and still months or years away from standardised manufacture.  
 
In the months following the Wende, realigning System 2000 to work within hugely 
altered political and economic circumstances became a major preoccupation of the RFZ. One 
of the earliest assessments of the new context was a semi-formal one. On 10 December 1989, 
just weeks after the fall of the Wall, Irmgard Jünger circulated an open letter on the future of 
the project: “An alle “Betroffenen”: Über die Zukunft des S 2000”. Jünger had been working 
on the digital elements of the program since 1987 and her letter was extremely critical of the 
state of the System 2000 project:  
 
S2000 wird aber auf Grund mangelnder Forschung/Ergebnis-Kapazität und 
unzureichender Bedingungen im RFZ (Motivation, Ausstattung, Organisation) mit 
einem viel zu großen Zeitaufwand entwickelt (absolute Jahre) und wird mit 
überdurchschnittlichen Anstrengungen in die Produktion eingeführt. Eine absolut 
mangelhafte Produktionsbasis, der desolate Zustand unserer Volkswirtschaft (selbst 
lange im Voraus bestellte Bauelemente können mitunter nicht bereitgestellt werden), 
sowie Bürokratie (viel zu viel Papier) u.v.a.m. führen zu einer unzumutbaren Belastung 
aller Mitarbeiter, die an der Entwicklung, Produktion und Prüfung der S2000-Geräte 
und der TPA S2000 beteiligt sind.112 
 
S2000, due to deficient research and development capacity and inadequate conditions 
in the RFZ (motivation, equipment, management), will be introduced after too long a 
wait (total years) and with unnecessary exertion. An absolutely defective production 
base, the desolate state of our economy (even long pre-ordered components are 
sometimes not delivered), as well as bureaucracy (too much paper) and other factors 
lead to an unreasonable burden on all employees involved in the development, 
production and testing of the S2000 devices and the TPA S2000. 
 




Jünger further alleged that delays in the delivery of System 2000 directly led to the 
import of equipment for a refurbished control room at Funkhaus Berlin.113 Nonetheless, Jünger 
believed that the technological basis of System 2000 was sound, even in comparison with 
contemporary Western equipment, and that it remained an ideal replacement for System 700 
equipment throughout the GDR.114 She also adjudged that System 2000 retained a potential 
commercial advantage due to currency factors; “eine nach wie vor gültige Tatsache ist, daß 
dringend automatisierte Tonmischpulte benötigt werden, die man auch für DDR-Mark 
erwerben möchte” (“a fact that is still valid is that automated mixing desks, which can be 
acquired for GDR-Marks, are urgently needed”). 115  Although System 2000’s lengthy and 
expensive development could not be justified in the new open-market context the RFZ now 
suddenly faced, the project was close to completion and could still potentially bear positive 
results.  
 
Jünger’s proposals to rescue System 2000 emphasised speed; the research phase needed 
to be finalised as rapidly as possible in the following months, followed immediately by a move 
into series production. Jünger specifically advocated the rapid construction of a 16-channel 
version of the TPA S2000, followed by a second version of the 32-channel prototype by early 
1991.116  A further suggestion was to seek collaborations with Western companies and to 
research applying the System 2000 digital control system to Western analogue sound 
equipment.117 Jünger believed that the project’s investment costs, which she estimated at 18 
million East German marks, could be recouped and that the project could still produce audio 
equipment that would be technologically viable for the next ten to fifteen years.118 However, 
she judged that the automation features of the TPA S2000 were only of use to a small 
proportion of potential end-users and that the RFZ needed to develop a parallel series of fully-
analogue equipment using the System 2000 standards.119 As previously cited, this was already 
nominally a part of the long-term System 2000 plan under the label of System 2000 Compact. 
Somewhat side-lined by an overriding focus on completing the TPA S2000, this simplified 
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analogue-only line, now referred to as System 1000, was reemphasised in all System 2000 
strategic plans from this point onward.  
 
In 1985, the RFZ estimated that the unit cost of the full-scale TPA S2000 would be two 
and a half times the price of an equivalent Western system.120 This could be justified within the 
context of a closed market, but System 2000 no longer had this protection. Since the time of 
the abortive TESLA collaboration in the late 1970s, exporting System 2000 ceased to be 
considered as a factor in its economic viability. Post-Wende, all visions of System 2000’s 
survival relied on the assumption of foreign sales to Western and Eastern Europe. Official RFZ 
responses to the Wende shared some of Jünger’s optimism while recognising the scale of the 
challenge. All official RFZ assessments of the state of System 2000 emphasised speed of 
completion as a priority in its survival. In January 1990, a report by Wolfgang Hoeg suggested 
the magnitude of the price adjustment required to make the system marketable. Hoeg proposed 
that commercial viability for System 2000 could be achieved if it was rapidly reconfigured for 
broader usage and with a manufacturing cost reduced by 60%.121 Hoeg also echoed Jünger’s 
assertions that the large TPA S2000 was a niche product; System 2000 needed to be available 
in several configurations to service a broad range of demands. Hoeg submitted outlines for 
reconfiguring System 2000 modules into several small and medium-scale production desks.122 
The largest of these was 24-channels and still boasted automated features. The rest were smaller 
designs that used System 2000 modules but without the digital control components in an 
attempt to appeal to more general audio customers.123 Although these simplified designs were 
within the capabilities of the RFZ’s design team, they still needed additional development time 
during a period of rapid upheaval. Hoeg’s long list of proposed methods for reducing the 
development time needed by these new designs and for achieving the drastic reductions in 
manufacturing costs can also be read as an implicit criticism of development procedures up 
until that point.124 Of significance to Hoeg’s contingency plans was finding out whether the 
Staatliches Rundfunk Komittee still wanted to follow through on its order for a second TPA 
S2000, as this would impact the turnaround of the development of new equipment designs.125  
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Figure 5.7: A contingency development plan for System 2000 c. January 1990. Significant efforts were 




Hoeg perceived the time-sensitivity of his plans and wanted a firm outcome on the matter 
within a month. There was also a degree of uncertainty around the future of the existing TPA 
S2000 prototype and its availability for further testing.127 This desk was intact and functional 
at this point, but it was still not fully complete or ready for operational use. Irmgard Jünger was 
of the view that the TPA S2000 prototype was not fit for sale due to design issues and that it 
should be retained by the RFZ as the basis for improved designs.128  
 
Throughout 1990, the RFZ worked under the new principle of preparing System 2000 
for export. System 2000 was regularly featured in the RFZ’s technical journal and by May the 
RFZ was still publishing reports that depicted workable outcomes within the emerging 
commercial context. 129  The RFZ considered the international market for well-designed 
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analogue desks to be buoyant and particularly wanted to target West German broadcasters as 
customers.130 Emphasis remained on reducing the price-point by about 50% from pre-Wende 
estimates.131 Cheap components newly available from the West were thought to be potentially 
beneficial to turning around the multiple new System 2000 derivatives, but none of these 
designs progressed much further than the drawing board and revised development schedules 
still extended well into 1991 – as illustrated in the diagram reproduced in Figure 5.7.132 
Independent of its own efforts, the RFZ’s parent company, Deutsche Post, began to consider 
spinning off sections of the research organisation into limited companies.133 This was seen as 
a possible route to capitalising on the RFZ’s research and bringing the new System 2000 
designs to market, potentially in collaboration with West German partners. Even as the order 
for the second TPA S2000 was cancelled by the Staatliches Rundfunk Komittee, the RFZ 
claimed it was identifying potential new customers: the Goldener Löwe private recording 
studio in Leipzig, Funkhaus Dresden and Funkhaus Weimar.134 The focus on targeting West 
German broadcasters continued in June 1990 with new plans for a radio production desk.135 
Referred to as the NZ 2131 and much simpler in scope than the TPA S2000, its design was 
primarily analogue but allowed for the addition of centrally controlled static automation 
features as an optional extra.136 The design of the NZ 2131 implicitly references the RFZ’s new 
internationalist focus by marking the organisation’s return to applying international DIN 
standards.137 
 
Despite pressing through with new designs and proposals during the summer of 1990, 
there were increasing signals that System 2000 would not survive the ongoing political and 
economic upheaval. While the project’s survival plan now relied largely on a repositioning 
towards the international market, the RFZ continued to canvas domestic demand. Rundfunk 
DDR’s own technical procurement department, Studiotechnik Rundfunk, prevaricated about 
System 2000’s future role with the broadcaster;  
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Figure 5.8: The completed prototype TPA S2000 before its destruction around 1990/1991. The process of the 
Wende saw the infrastructure and personnel of Rundfunk DDR rapidly absorbed and reconfigured under West 
German organisational structures.138 
 
 
Aufgrund der bevorstehenden Profilierung des Rundfunks als öffentlich rechtliche 
Anstalt vor dem IV. Quartal 1990 keine Aussagen zum Bedarf an tonstudiotechnischen 
Geräten und Anlagen getroffen werden können.139  
 
Due to the pending profiling of broadcasting as a public-law institution before the 
fourth quarter of 1990, no statements can be made about the demand for audio-visual 
equipment and systems. 
 
A similar attitude prevailed elsewhere within Rundfunk DDR. The technical director at 
Funkhaus Dresden declared that they were not interested in engaging with System 2000, even 
though they were planning to move to a new facility in 1991.140 The response from outside the 
broadcasting industry was also negative. The technical director of the Sport und Kongresshalle, 
Rostock wrote,  
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Wir können auf Grund der Situation im Land zur Zeit keinen Bedarf für 
Tonstudioanlagen S 2000 anmelden da für unsere Einrichtung keine Konzeption für die 
künftige Nutzung vorliegt.”141 
 
Due to the situation in the country at the moment, we are unable to register any demand 
for sound desk S 2000, because our establishment possesses no concept for its future 
utilisation. 
 
In the end, System 2000 suffered a similar fate to what befell large swathes of Rundfunk 
DDR’s technical broadcasting infrastructure, as GDR broadcasting was folded into the West 
German broadcasting network and parallel infrastructures judged to be redundant were shut 
down.142 The specialised attributes of Funkhaus Berlin and the functional potential of System 
2000 became swiftly irrelevant and former-RFZ personnel were left to advocate their expertise 
outside of state structures. The completed TPA S2000 prototype – shown in Figure 5.8 - was 
destroyed during a period that saw much of the technical equipment of Funkhaus Berlin 
removed from the defunct broadcasting facility.143  
 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
Over the course of its lifetime, Rundfunk DDR succeeded in expanding its recording and 
broadcasting capacity to serve a large national audience. This was supported in large part by 
the design and manufacture of reliable audio equipment by the RFZ (and its predecessor, the 
BRF), along with other GDR audio manufacturing companies. The RFZ was able to observe 
and predict technological trends over decades and consistent leadership allowed it to enact 
long-term research projects that shadowed emerging technologies from the West. The research 
methodologies that realised the adoption of transistorised technology at Rundfunk DDR during 
the 1960s and 1970s were applied to the next generation of audio technology upgrades during 
the 1980s. Although the development of System 2000 was slow, its capabilities were probably 
sufficient to secure the viability of GDR sound and broadcasting technology for another decade. 
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However, it was not technologically appealing or cost effective outside the particular economic 
situation of the Eastern Bloc and this was exposed almost instantaneously once borders 
restrictions began to dissipate in 1989. Sentiment within the RFZ also indicated that the GDR 
did not have resources adequate to developing an infrastructure for handling the impending 
migration to digital audio. This forthcoming constraint resembled more immediate limitations 
within the GDR’s IT industry. The unveiling of a GDR-constructed 1 MB microprocessor in 
1988 was trumpeted by the state apparatus, but this masked the extent to which the chip lagged 
behind contemporary Western components and the inability of the GDR IT industry to 
realistically mass-produce it.144 
 
Technology developments in the West could rely on both the massive electronics output 
of multiple major multi-national corporations and the synergistic activities of smaller private 
companies that found application for these electronics in diverse specialised fields, as seen with 
audio automation during the 1970s. While the RFZ performed an analogous role to these 
private companies within the GDR’s research structure, its capacity to do so was constricted. 
An inescapable shortage of essential materials for the System 2000 project - alongside the 
political and economic circumstances that accompanied it in its latter stages - mitigated against 
its systematic introduction and precludes the possibility of making a definitive assessment on 
its technical viability. Nevertheless, the project demonstrated resourcefulness and its 
application could have been a counter-example to the low penetration of applied digital 
technologies in GDR industry.145 Despite considerable levels of uncertainty during the final 
days of the GDR, the RFZ and its workers remained committed to the System 2000 concept 
and worked to make it feasible within a drastically altered set of circumstances. While this 
effort failed, the experience and expertise of the System 2000 design team found new outlets 
after the Wende. Wolfgang Hoeg, a significant figure in the design of System 2000, brought 
his expertise to Neumann and was later also instrumental in the success of the sound technology 
company Stage Tec. Founded in 1993, Stage Tec specialises in digital audio hardware and 
developed a reputation for high-end digital sound production desks.146 Irmgard Jünger also 
found commercial application for her expertise in digital audio as a co-founder of Jünger 
Audio-Studiotechnik.147 These outcomes again mirror some aspects of the fallout from the 
 
144 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism, 191. 
145 Cortada, ‘Information Technologies in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 1949-1989’, 43. 
146 ‘STAGE TEC Company Profile’, accessed 9 August 2018, https://www.stagetec.com/en/stagetec/stage-
tec.html. 
147 ‘Jünger Audio - Corporate History’, accessed 31 July 2018, https://junger-audio.com/en/corporate. 
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GDR IT industry and other research areas of the RFZ. While high-tech hardware manufacturing 
largely failed to survive the economic convulsions of the Wende, software designers and other 
specialised workers from the GDR’s leading technology areas found ready applications for 
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At root, this thesis is an attempt to analyse how GDR politics and social realities emerged in 
its audio technologies and infrastructures. During the early stages of research a pressing 
question was whether it would even be possible to detect clear political threads in audio 
technology equipment and processes and make practical interpretations from these. In practice, 
the degree to which this area opened up to focussed investigation was extensive and profound. 
Traces of the GDR’s ideological stances, economic position and social currents are legible at 
every level of audio activity and during every period, undeniably colouring technological 
transitions, infrastructures and processes. Some of the traces discussed impacted in subtle ways 
that are open to interpretation, but more often these interactions of technology and political and 
economic conditions contributed appreciably to the form and methods of many undertakings. 
These were active processes taking place across many sections of the GDR’s audio 
communities and supporting industries. Although this thesis looks at a number of specific 
cases, a sense of developments and progressions over a wide range of time and technical 
contexts is given. The work of this thesis was achieved by following in directions indicated by 
the archival sources left by the GDR’s own institutions. Investigations coalesced around a small 
number of case studies that encompass a number of evocative technological stress points 
distributed across the GDR’s timeline and several of its major audio institutions. While 
archives provided the centres of focus and a solid grounding for much of what is contained 
here, engaging with the broader activities of some the GDR’s primary audio institutions, 
accompanying contemporary rhetoric and wider international technological contexts led to 
surprising alignments and some significant findings. 
 
The contribution of this thesis in a general sense is a contextual enrichment of GDR 
studies by providing some new case studies in areas that have not been fully incorporated into 
the field. Expansion in this broad area of study remains relevant. GDR history has had 
complicated developments of interpretation that are still ongoing, but its significance to 
understanding the history of Europe in the latter half of the 20th century is not in dispute and 
requires continued engagement with new techniques and approaches. The case studies of this 
thesis cover a large sweep of time and several distinct, if interrelated, areas, but they offer a 
broader view into cultural technologies and the GDR entity than may be supposed from the 
relatively narrow snapshot each singly offers. While the large trajectories that form the 
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backdrops to these specific studies have been described elsewhere, the work offered here 
contributes some finer detail and also contributes new angles of relief on the political and social 
dynamics of the GDR. The incorporation of new primary material facilitated new analyses and 
while the subject matter is often technical and technologically focussed, it should still be of 
interest and assistance to GDR historians of various, particularly culturally focussed, 
specialisms. Beyond this, these individual case studies deal with undertakings that mirror those 
taking place elsewhere and may be helpful to investigations of technological transitions in other 
contexts.  
 
 The more specific contributions of this thesis derive to a large degree from 
viewing the GDR case through the twin lenses of culture and technology; a marriage with 
significant opportunities for academic research applied to a sharply debated history. The GDR 
is well understood as an ideological and territorial interface, but the specific intersections of 
culture and technology have not been prevalent among studies to date. Modern technologies 
and industrial development processes in general were readily integrated into the GDR’s 
strategic program towards a utopian socialist state, arguably giving technological investigative 
angles a distinct utility here. Indeed, even outside of the specific context of GDR studies 
technology and technical work is still comparatively rarely examined in politicised 
circumstances, although this is changing. The technological aspect of the GDR ideological 
construct was complemented by a similarly deep-seated political emphasis on the societal role 
of culture. Culture was recruited by GDR planners as a force that could assist the development 
of a new state and new society distant from capitalist forms and problematic aspects of German 
history, while retaining some connection to less-contaminated associations of the German past. 
While the recognition of technology as an analytical framework is developing, the yet-more-
specialised area of cultural technologies remains sometimes absent from broader technological 
discussions that tend to focus on heavier primary industries. The backdrop of the Cold War 
accelerated the drive for militarised technological advancements, but the stakes for cultural 
endeavours and cultural technologies were also raised via similar mechanisms and attracted 
comparable rhetoric. The Cold War served as added incentive for conducting this analysis but 
it also acted as a reminder that although the processes described in this thesis are culturally-




Although the detail and focus of analysis of this thesis pertains primarily to the GDR, 
the methods used here may have procedural usage elsewhere. The findings herein justify the 
approaches taken by confirming how multi-disciplinary approaches may be suited for surfacing 
new perspectives and also by suggesting that the uniting of cultural and technological frames 
may have particular application in areas where there have been contested interpretations. In the 
pursuit of its goal, this thesis gives some sense of the activities and character of several 
institutions and actors over significant periods of time, engaging with a variety of subjects that 
are thematically revealing about a singular entity. This does not equate to a set of complete 
institutional or biographical histories – the purpose was to bring focus to a number of 
particularly revealing points that interlink some of the GDR’s audio stories. Extensive 
contextualisation is integrated into this thesis, but neither the material nor the practical limits 
of this project enabled a fully complete history of any of the cited institutions. For similar 
reasons, this thesis is not often able to make declarative judgements on specific policy 
decisions, instead seeking to report and offer interpretations on the material manifestations that 
emerged from GDR sound infrastructures over stretches of time. 
 
Some of the limitations of this thesis are counterparts to its strengths. It was constructed 
in large part on a foundation of largely unutilised caches of archival material; the value of this 
material was recognised early on and required a shift in the overall research approach. As 
previously stated in the introduction, an early desire was to balance the use of archival sources 
and preserve a sense of people actively working within the case studies by conducting 
interviews with contemporary audio workers. Constructing a contextual understanding from 
the archive sources and forming a focussed research direction was laborious and precluded 
including interviews in the process – although this would likely enriched both efforts. While 
the insights and perspectives brought to this material may in part be attributed to coming to this 
material as an outsider, engaging with the contemporaries of some of the events depicted could 
have provided a more efficient methodology and it remains possible that the interpretations 
offered require expanded frames of reference. Testing the findings of this thesis against the 
reminiscences of those who had experience of the period - while that remains a feasibility - is 
hopefully an opportunity that I can take. It is also worth noting that the focus of this research 
is largely limited to the single large cache of material assimilated during one six month period. 
Only a small proportion of the overall holdings was parsed and little supplemental primary 
research was possible as the thesis developed with new avenues largely supported by secondary 
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literature. These authorial and archival checks constrain this project’s strivings, but the value 
of the material unearthed here was evident immediately and this thesis seeks to collate a 
substantial amount of research work into an accessible and pertinent work. 
 
While this thesis lends its shoulder to the wheel in the progression of some relatively 
broad areas, its finer contributions are better delineated within the sub-fields  encompassed by 
the various case studies. The sweep of areas covered and angles taken may mean the different 
case studies have different value for different people; an incomplete list of the topics covered 
with a degree of detail includes recording studios, concert halls, broadcasting, record industry 
dynamics and technical research and development processes. Thus, this thesis engages with 
several sets of interpretative literature and it offers whole or fragmentary contributions to each 
of these. The value of this research to GDR historians has already been raised and cultural 
technologies as an avenue within infrastructural studies bears further exploration. The methods 
and concerns of sound studies have been not been fully applied in this work, but the topics and 
forms discussed here are well primed for such analysis. Some additional sense of this thesis’ 
overall contribution, along with more specific additions will be laid out thematically below. 
 
 
6.1 Halls and Walls 
 
This thesis focuses on a small number of case studies, but uses them to extrapolate broader 
tendencies and alignments within established narratives of the GDR in an effort to investigate 
the feedback loops between politics, culture and audio technology developments there. The 
first intuitions that eventually resulted in this research approach were based around the 
recording studio and an assumption that analysis of recording and performance venues could 
be instructive about more than just acoustics and technical procedures. The venues of the GDR 
provided a rich source of interpretation for design and cultural trends but these proved 
inextricable from political contexts. Several of the case studies here approach various 
broadcasting houses, recording studios and performance venues and in each case it became 




As a chapter, Chapter 1’s discussion of Funkhaus Berlin and the situations that formed 
it perhaps best encapsulates the mission of this thesis through its unification of several 
seemingly disparate strands in an effort to triangulate a technological structure’s deeply 
embedded position in the GDR’s formation. Despite their critical role in the delivery of a new 
era of mass communication, broadcasting houses have been the subject of surprisingly little 
investigation or critical interpretation beyond occasional appeals to nostalgia. Radio 
broadcasting infrastructure in East Germany was highly volatile and bitterly contested during 
the immediate post war period in ways that are instructive of the times, but also of the forms 
GDR broadcasting would take. While this chapter probably makes the least use of new research 
material, its contribution stems from bringing together many sources illuminating different 
aspects of this structure to construct a new overview of its deep and lasting significance to the 
GDR’s broadcasting infrastructure and national soundscape. The facility’s design is 
noteworthy and the included discussion of preceding events is critical to contextualising how 
its functional forms were determined. Broadcasting houses and similar period facilities remain 
in active use across the world, but their encapsulations of particular technological and cultural 
moments is perhaps better recognised in the US context. Radio City in New York was initiated 
as a commercial real estate project, but the visible associations its studios and venues carry of 
a progressive technological vision along with a shared role as an emblem of positivity emerging 
from the Great Depression are perhaps better integrated into the local general consciousness 
than buildings which performed similar functions elsewhere. There thus remains considerable 
scope for reconsidering the roles of broadcasting houses and their studios across Europe and 
beyond, both in isolation and collectively. Funkhaus Berlin provides an idea of the potential of 
such investigations. 
 
The Great Hall of the Palast der Republik in East Berlin, introduced in Chapter 4, 
certainly occupies a different design space to Funkhaus Berlin. It was constructed more than 
20 years later and was conceived for a very different set of purposes. Nonetheless, there are 
resonances in how political contexts were integral to its design motivations and how this can 
be traced in its final form. This emerges most notably in the unusual conjunction of functions 
that were combined under the roof of the Palast der Republik and in the Great Hall’s diverse 
performance remit. The Great Hall’s technical accommodation for this diversity, especially for 
sound, placed it right at the edge of contemporary capability and the degree to which its large 
sound system had an international influence is disruptive of some overriding narratives of GDR 
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technology. The Palast der Republik regularly provokes positive associations in anecdotal 
recollections of the GDR, but it remains in many respects under-analysed and especially so 
outside of its location and architectural form and in the more actively determined context of 
how it was actually used. This chapter only gives a sense of its formation and early stages of 
operation, but its design features communicate a lot about the hopes held for its usage and 
accessibility. Analysis of how its programming developed over time and whether the reception 
to its acoustic remained stable or altered significantly seems like an investigative avenue that 
is likely to offer rewards.  
 
The Great Hall’s integrated acoustic and sound reinforcement system (DSS) - designed 
to provide an environment suitable for the relative extremes of both romantic music and 
popular electroacoustic performances - draws attention to recurring threads of uneasiness in 
post-war acoustic design and sound reinforcement. During the 20th century there has been 
steady progress across diverse areas of methodical investigation for uniting qualitative and 
quantitative assessments of concert hall acoustics and creating more predictable design 
processes. Despite acoustician’s increasing predictive confidence in the decades after the 
Second World War, the frequency of acrimonious public and critical receptions to prestigious 
new venue acoustics during this period suggests much remained unreconciled. While one of 
the lessons of a survey of venue acoustics reception is that the passage of time is an important 
factor in the development of a generalised assessment, this recurring trend suggests an avenue 
towards intersections of culture, society and technology that has not been much explored.  
 
Traditional passive acoustics specialised for classical musical performance contexts are 
not the only forms of performance acoustics with incomplete histories. The utilisation of 
electronically augmented acoustics for classical music performance has raised interesting 
anxieties in that field and while electronic interventions are much more readily accepted in 
popular music contexts, the role and development of sound reinforcement for live concerts and 
other applications remains weakly historicised outside of specialised technical literature. This 
thesis alights on these discussions as the specific technical features of the Great Hall place it at 
an interesting nexus of these areas. Discussing these intersections shows a path towards placing 
modern acoustic and venue designs within and alongside ongoing social and political historical 
progressions. The story of the Great Hall and DSS shows the potential rewards for such 
approaches. In this case, a specialised technical system of little general interest can turn up 
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surprising findings that transform a local story into an international one that raises significant 
questions about technology’s suitability for particular performance contexts. While the 
proximity of the GDR’s recording and performance spaces to ideological currents helps 
validate the oblique approach taken here, what is clear is that a lot remains unresolved in the 
holistic interpretation of acoustics and electroacoustics – both in the GDR and elsewhere. 
 
While it remains difficult or impossible to listen to venues with a historic ear or analyse 
the soundscape created by sound systems that no longer exist, the fossilised forms of both leave 
clues enough to make further enquiries worthwhile. The discourse around the acoustics of 
revered performance venues and their modern iterations is a contested one, yet it remains a 
peripheral discussion even though it offers up material patterns of listening that can be 
contrasted between nations and cultures. While there are restrictions to approaches that rely on 
interpreting physical design, technical papers and contemporary discourse and extrapolating 
the implications for audiences and performers, some historical interpretation of these issues 
beyond those compiled by acoustic theorists and informed by a more humanistic bent is 
justified by the creditable work already undertaken in this area. Such approaches also help 
restore recognition of the collaborative importance of technology across all forms of 
performance, particularly those where that role is sometimes downplayed. 
 
Funkhaus Berlin, the Palast der Republik and other GDR venues discussed in this thesis 
collectively raise important questions about how cultural processes for music recording and 
performance were conceptualised and how these interacted and contrasted with international 
practices. These venues and their associated technologies are also helpfully indicative of the 
general health of GDR institutions and industry. Funkhaus Berlin exposes deep undercurrents 
of conflict that coloured physical infrastructure development in the GDR, but it also more 
straightforwardly shows that during the 1950s the GDR had the resources to construct a 
national broadcasting centre and the creative capability to do so efficiently and with original 
and effective design features. At a later stage, the Palast der Republik and DSS show that GDR 
research design groups maintained a degree of vitality through the 1970s and 1980s, sufficient 
to fulfil its own requirements for a new form of venue and even to develop international 
commercial aspirations. DSS is also informative for its uniting of GDR conceptual work with 
practical domestic expertise and for combining GDR-manufactured equipment with the 
internationally-sourced components necessary to cover the gaps of its own production 
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capabilities. Other areas of audio technology discussed in this thesis are similarly indicative 
across multiple levels and time frames of the GDR. 
 
 
6.2 Format Wars and Desk Jobs 
 
The Cold War has been cited as part of what gives this research significance. It was fought 
through many proxies and on many fronts and the character of these contests frequently shifted, 
often due to technological progressions. Such shifts in disposition can be identified in 
broadcasting changes that took place during the 1950s and 1960s and analysis of these grants 
insight into how infrastructural strategies were progressed. FM radio had particular 
significance to the development of broadcasting in Europe during the post-war period. Its 
technical characteristics greatly improved inter-station operability and reduced the radio 
airwaves status as an active front between East and West via systemised jamming. In this 
context its substantially improved audio capabilities were to a surprising extent a secondary 
consideration. The widespread introduction of stereo several years later was, by contrast, 
largely only justifiable in terms of its novel audio characteristics. Although this meant the 
introduction of stereo across Europe was much less contentious than that of FM broadcasting, 
it still had strategic implications for the GDR albeit in the cultural field rather than in the more 
fundamental area of the maintenance of an undisturbed broadcasting capability. 
 
Stereo is just a single example of the escalating political necessity in the GDR and 
elsewhere of providing citizens new technological experiences that were emulative of those 
being introduced elsewhere in the world. In the 1960s hearing stereo was an important indicator 
of a living modernity and the infrastructural reconfigurations and resources required to enact 
stereo in the GDR should be considered in this light. The introduction of stereo broadcasting 
and records in the GDR again confirms its ability to upgrade and renew its cultural 
technological systems, while also raising queries about how that was justified and presented to 
GDR citizens by their government. Stereo is notable as one of many “gifts” bequeathed by the 
GDR to its citizens in recognition of their collective efforts, an approach to infrastructural 
development announcements characteristic of the GDR’s communication style and 
paternalistic conception of its citizenry. The introduction of stereo was also characterised, to 
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some extent, by an informal pan-German collegiality among engineers and planners that 
contrasts starkly with the contemporary erection of the Berlin Wall. 
 
The unfolding technical narrative of stereo as depicted in this thesis also helps 
emphasise the degree to which supposedly rigid media formats are actually subject to large 
degrees of indeterminacy at various development stages. The actions and commentary of GDR 
technicians confirm that stereo as a universalised format was still in considerable flux even as 
it was being rolled out across various media. Format changes always raise issues of 
compatibility and both FM and stereo offered opportunities for the GDR to diverge from 
Western or internationalised standards. That the GDR across all media forms remained 
committed to compatibility is comment worthy and should be enticing of further investigation 
given the divisions in technical standards that were taken in other industries. Of general cultural 
significance and a useful reminder of the extended negotiations between new and old formats 
that are sometimes forgotten, the degree to which monophonic recording catalogues retained 
significance in the GDR and how these were technologically altered to better integrate with the 
developing stereo soundscape is just one rarely-discussed aspect of mono sound that this thesis 
raises. Also worth some consideration in the GDR’s process of adopting stereo is how it was 
illustrative of patterns later repeated during subsequent technical upgrades by displaying a 
combined strategy of tracking and adopting best international practices and standards while 
simultaneously maintaining an independent research capacity. It was this domestic research 
capacity that was instrumental to enabling the previously synopsised development of the DSS 
distributed sound reinforcement system and the ambitious System 2000 project. 
 
Sound desks rarely receive historical attention outside of their associations with 
particular studios or musical groups, but GDR audio technology systems tie into an intricate 
national social and political narrative and warranted analysis in this light. Rundfunk DDR’s 
one-off MKR stereo desk bridged an important period for the broadcaster, but probably the 
most interesting and revealing desk in GDR history was one that never saw active service. The 
story of System 2000 is thus a very different story than those audio equipment can sometimes 
accrue whereby a crucial, audible but ineffable contribution is made to a famous recording. 
System 2000 speaks to much more critical aspects of the GDR audio context. While the world 
is replete with technologies that had impressive potential but tragically failed to deliver, this 
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one provides direct access to the most challenging research project undertaken by GDR audio 
development processes as they approached their unanticipated endpoint. 
 
The research and development process that resulted in System 2000 during the 1980s 
is notable in and of itself as it was undertaken during a period when Western national 
broadcasters and record companies had largely ceased to develop their audio equipment 
systems in-house. That System 2000 incorporated digital elements makes this even more 
striking as progression in the field of audio automation was often dominated by small 
independent companies in the US that could exploit the large and diverse output of the US 
microelectronics industry. System 2000’s digital components also bring it into the fold of the 
GDR’s information technology narrative, an aspect of the latter-day GDR that has been 
relatively well examined. Common criticisms of GDR IT policy include its focus on 
development for export and its inability to bring promised benefits to domestic industry 
through improved rationalisation. System 2000 provides a useful complement to these 
observations as export was initially a distant secondary consideration; it was intended as a 
practical application of GDR digital technology that would supply demonstrable labour and 
time savings to the national broadcaster and form the basis of a renewed audio handling 
infrastructure for the country’s venues.  
 
System 2000’s protracted and fitful development mean that when compared to 
international  desks under development at the same period, it may have been approaching 
relative obsolescence even before it was brought into service. However, it had a functional 
potential for Rundfunk DDR that was thwarted by the repercussions of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the reorganisation of East German broadcasting. In contrast with some of the fatalism 
that prevailed in some GDR institutions during this tempestuous period, System 2000 workers 
remained committed to the project despite their recognition of bureaucratic impediments and a 
rapidly changing market context. The extent to which they completed a sophisticated multi-
tiered development project with clear utility for the GDR’s sound infrastructures confirms to 
some degree the resilience of GDR research and development processes during its latter stages, 
even as supply chain problems with various components hastened the project’s failure. It is 
worth restating that there were precedents for Rundfunk DDR assimilating technological 
developments within GDR technological frameworks - some have already been raised - and 
this ability was a major contributor to its expansion and maintenance of a degree of 
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technological independence. As with DSS, there are some indicators that System 2000 had 
influence beyond the borders and lifetime of the GDR. While continuing academic analysis 
since the GDR’s dissolution has diversified assessments of the GDR’s achievements within its 
own time period, less thought has been given to surviving influences outwith the GDR itself 
apart from the lingering cultural attachments alluded to by Ostalgie. A focussed overview of 
the professional second-lives of specialised GDR technical workers within the audio and 
software industries of reunited Germany may have important implications for the assessment 
of its late-stage activities. System 2000 is most revealing in what it reveals about the GDR 
economy and research processes during a specific historical juncture, but it also raises more 
internationally-applicable questions on how cutting edge recording practices are disseminated 
and assimilated across diverse national and political contexts. While the digitisation of audio 
playback formats and associated impacts on music listening habits and recording practices have 
been tackled by academia, System 2000 suggest that the early applications of digital technology 
which are important to these later developments should also receive attention. 
 
 
6.3 New Interpretations for Old Records 
 
Chapter 2 on the GDR’s national record company Deutsche Schallplatten possibly counts as 
the most original contribution of this thesis by offering an initial interpretation of a new set of 
data that may be of interest to a relatively wide audience. Deutsche Schallplatten was a major 
European record label for four decades, but it is uncommon for commercial record companies 
of similar stature to have publicly accessible records. Increasing interest in the historical 
dynamics of record production will be well served by continued investigation of this record 
company’s production figures, its technical procurement policies and its commercial 
relationships with Eastern and Western Europe. In particular, the material narratives of records 
unravelled in this chapter contribute directly to the expanding utility of music records as a 
vehicle for new investigations with recent work showing how vinyl records can provide a 
useful entry point into narratives seemingly outside the remit of a cultural consumable. In this 
thesis one of the most telling discoveries is how nationalisation processes in the GDR directly 
and negatively impacted record production during the tumultuous transition from 78s to vinyl 
records during the late 1950s, to date still one of the most materially significant media format 
migrations. This changeover moment – exposed using newly uncovered record production 
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figures – is informative of  GDR processes and industrial resilience at this point of time, and 
there is scope for seeing whether the 78s to vinyl transition might also be instructive in contexts 
outside of mainstream European and US discourses. 
 
One of the most common observations of the GDR’s record industry is how records 
were priced; from very early on in its existence classical music releases were subsidised and 
popular music recordings were consistently the most expensive. Motivated by an underlying 
ideological belief in the catalysing social power of classical music and the comparative 
degeneracy of popular music forms, the strength of this doctrine is made explicit by a long term 
policy of maintaining pressing standards for classical music records at the expense of non-
classical pressings. Popular music in the GDR was undoubtedly the recipient of some privative 
treatment but it was steadily better integrated into Deutsche Schallplatten’s overall business 
model as time progressed. Deutsche Schallplatten’s comparatively limited support of popular 
music production during the 1950s and early 1960s payed increasing financial dividends as the 
domestic and international markets for GDR pop acts developed. Indeed, a consideration of the 
differentiated roles of the GDR’s popular and classical music labels is crucial to understanding 
how Deutsche Schallplatten was able to carve out a sustainable business model by positioning 
itself astutely between its domestic and international markets. The company’s prestigious 
classical music assets and good relationships with West German and international record 
companies helped launch the company and maintained a cash flow of hard currency from 
abroad that was funnelled towards meeting production and equipment needs that were used for 
making records across all its labels.  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten perhaps did not attain powerhouse status comparable with some 
of its West German counterparts but its prestige and output were in reasonably good alignment 
with the GDR’s musical reputation and population base and it became one of the GDR’s better 
recognised organisations abroad. This was a serious achievement. The large West German 
record companies had decades of experience, extant plant and recording facilities as well as 
established patterns of distribution. Deutsche Schallplatten, by contrast, was in essence an 
entirely new record company that had to develop a production base from scratch and establish 
an identity just as the GDR was beginning to solidify into a stabilised nation. It was able to 
meet these goals due to a keen understanding and focussed exploitation of its market position 
and it navigated several incredibly volatile periods before maintaining several decades of 
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sustained incremental growth. Unlike some vulnerable areas of GDR industry, Deutsche 
Schallplatten’s model in the period preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall appeared stable and it 
had begun the initial stages of transitioning to CDs as the next dominant music format. Finally, 
Deutsche Schallplatten’s recording catalogue, both classical and popular, continues to be re-
mastered and re-released, providing a continuing GDR narrative of note that attests to decades 
of cultural activity only partially accommodated in post-Wende Germany.  
 
 
6.4 Future Ends 
 
This thesis discusses sound technology infrastructures constructed in the GDR and queries the 
degree to which political and other factors interacted with their development and form. The 
path towards this endpoint has been described and while untangling this intersection of areas 
was difficult, it is the task of historians to describe narratives crowded out by more dominant 
histories. The GDR certainly represents a technological other despite its proximity to key 
European post-war dynamics and this research project brings to light new elements within 
established GDR - and perhaps broader - technical and cultural narratives. This is not just a 
narrative of technological components and procedures – it also about a people and their society 
and how they used audio technologies to construct their lives. This thesis originally sought to 
centre itself on people and their activities and while the broadening of the scope of this thesis 
placed people at a greater remove from its central investigations than was originally intended, 
it avoids an overly deterministic view by implicitly recognising the intermixture of human 
effort and various forms of physical material necessary in infrastructural formations. This 
thesis attempts to enact its recognition of this by placing technological and infrastructural 
developments within broader historical narratives and by making a case for the utility of 
cultural technologies as a point of analysis in wider political narratives. For its contributions to 
knowledge and for raising multiple opportunities for continued research, this thesis likely 
warrants wider publication. Although each of the case studies stands on its own, the character 
of the interactions between cultural technologies and the GDR emerge most effectively across 
the studies and they would likely benefit from being published together.  
 
The missed opportunities in the collation of primary sources previously described also 
represent openings that can be returned to; most notably seeking GDR audio workers who are 
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willing to shed further light on the findings of this work. Workers from the RFZ research 
organisation mentioned repeatedly throughout this thesis represent prime candidates for such 
efforts, as the RFZ links nearly all the cases in this thesis. Although a small organisation with 
limited resources, it was capable of envisioning practical and radical research directions for the 
GDR over a substantial period of time. A more comprehensive history of this organisation 
would intersect across a multitude of dynamic areas, including the many semi-nationalised 
audio electronics and sound equipment manufacturers of the GDR not discussed in great detail 
here. Other than the RFZ, the most apparent future research directions raised by this research 
work have been suggested in the course of this conclusion. However, I also recognise that this 
work centres on a very specific central European context and relies heavily on US and UK 
comparators – similar investigations conducted outside of these culturally dominant spheres 
and incorporating more diverse realms of contextualisation demand consideration. As a final 
note on future directions, the role of women in the GDR is an area that has been investigated 
adeptly and been considered one of the GDR’s more substantial implementations of its own 
purported values. The primary sources used to drive this thesis convey enough to confirm that 
there were interesting gender dynamics in the GDR’s record and broadcasting industries, but 
offer only enough firm detail to allow the inclusion of some minor anecdotes here. This 
suggests a major limitation of these archival sources and again demands paying attention to the 
memories of GDR audio workers, most pressingly those women who worked as audio 
technicians and sound engineers within Rundfunk DDR and Deutsche Schallplatten. 
 
In summation, these case studies demonstrate that throughout its existence the GDR 
maintained an active process of technological renewal to both create and enhance audio-based 
cultural media infrastructures. Over a broad period, this process was characterised at first by 
attempts to renew stalled pre-war processes and damaged infrastructures and later by attempts 
to create independent infrastructures disentangled from pre-existing pan-German 
infrastructures or created anew within GDR ideological frameworks. Alongside this internal 
dynamic, the case studies of this thesis straddle both sides of the emerging technological 
progressions that defined the second half of the twentieth century. Despite economic and 
political challenges, the GDR’s resources and research capacity were able to maintain a 
reasonable level of parity with the West in technological areas that were developed before the 
war and which matured during the post-war period. The period of relative optimism 
experienced by the GDR in the 1960s, accompanied by the introduction of such developments 
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as colour television and stereo radio transmissions, can be attributed to some degree to the 
legacy of the refinement of this era of technologies. A development gap soon became more 
apparent in the area of technologies which emerged after 1946. The steady impact of the 
transistor and other microelectronics is key to understanding shifts in the GDR’s capacity to 
innovate in its latter decades, although developments in petrochemicals and in other areas were 
also impactful to audio infrastructures. The GDR’s ability to maintain pace with the West in a 
technological era driven by vacuum tubes and electric motors was creditable, but proved 
immensely more challenging in a time of microprocessors and plastics. While failure is a 
recognisable thread throughout these case studies, so too are many notable and mundane 
successes. These often balanced exigency, pragmatism and ideology in ways that are inimitable 
outside of the GDR’s particular circumstances.  
 
Primary political drivers in the GDR were the common ones: providing food, work, 
transportation, entertainment. Improving technologies and infrastructures facilitated the 
provision of these essentials but also provided the promise of more. The GDR made many 
promises to its citizens and in the long run it famously failed to deliver on some of the most 
fundamental of these. This has been well documented, but this should not prevent additional 
considered analysis of the other explicit and implicit compacts it entered into and how its 
unique circumstances filtered into the forms of its cultural technologies. It is hoped that the 
snapshots herein prove provocative and indicative of areas clearly worthy of continued study 



















Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms 
 
Amiga    Popular music sub-label of Deutsche Schallplatten 
 
Deutsche Post GDR national postal and telecommunications service  
 
Deutsche Schallplatten  National record company of the GDR, founded in 1953  
 
Eterna    Classical music sub-label of Deutsche Schallplatten 
 
Funkhaus Berlin  Main radio broadcasting house of the GDR built in 1952  
 
Haus des Rundfunks  Berlin radio broadcasting centre, built in 1930 
 
Hörgruppe   Critical listening group active within Rundfunk DDR 
 
Lied der Zeit  East German record label founded in 1946 
 
Palast der Republik Palace of the Republic. East Berlin civil and cultural 
centre opened in 1976 
 
Rundfunk DDR  Radio GDR. GDR’s national radio broadcaster, active 
from 1952 
 
Rundfunk im  
amerikanischen Sektor Radio in the American Sector. US-supported broadcaster 
based in West Berlin, active from 1946 
 
Sendesaal   Radio broadcast Hall 
 
Tonmeister   Sound Master. Senior sound engineer  
 
Wende    Period incorporating the reunification  of Germany 
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Appendix 2: List of Abbreviations 
 
BRF Betriebslaboratorium für Rundfunk- und Fernsehen 
(Operations Laboratory for Radio and Television). 
Technical research group for Deutsche Post in the 1950s, 
subsequently reorganised and renamed as the RFZ 
 
Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Cold War era 
economic organisation formed by the Soviet Union 
 
 
DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic 
Republic).  
 
GDR German Democratic Republic. The state founded in 1949 
from the Soviet-controlled Eastern Sectors of occupied 
Germany and Berlin 
 
NSDAP  Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  
(National Socialist German Workers Party) 
 
RFZ  Rundfunk- und Fernsehtechnische Zentralamt (Central 
Radio and Television Technical Department). Successor 
to the BRF, active from 1961 
 
RRG  Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft (Reich Broadcasting 
Corporation). Germany’s first national broadcaster, 
founded in 1925 
 
SED     Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands  
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany). Ruling party of the 
GDR. 
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Appendix 3: Conference Papers 
 
‘Singing Across the Wall: The Voices of Nina Hagen’. Paper presented at the Music 
and Sound Studies Network of the German Studies Association conference, Kansas City, 20 
September, 2014. 
 
‘Recording Studios in the GDR’. Paper presented at GDR Today II,  University of 
Bristol, 10 September, 2015. 
 
‘The German Democratic Republic and the introduction of Stereo’. Paper presented at 
Music PGR Research Symposium, University of Edinburgh, 18 May, 2016. 
 
‘Saal I, Funkhaus Berlin’. Paper presented at the Music and Sound Studies Network of 
the German Studies Association conference, San Diego, 1 October, 2016. 
 
‘Space, Sound and Technology at Rundfunk DDR’. Paper presented at GDR Today III, 
University of Bangor, 6 April, 2017. 
 
‘Space, Sound and Technology at Rundfunk DDR’. Paper presented at Music PhD 
Symposium, University of Edinburgh, 12 June, 2017. 
 
‘Recording Spaces, Technology and Vinyl Records in the German Democratic 
Republic’. Paper presented at Alison House Research Seminar, University of Edinburgh, 29 
March, 2018. 
 
 
